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Abstract 
History is an essential part of aboriginal law. The two disciplines, however, may produce 
incompatible narratives of indigenous-settler relations. In addition, indigenous legal 
traditions and the fur trade in the old North West have been under-represented in 
Canadian legal history, a gap that demotes over two centuries of working relationships to 
a brief preface to the numbered treaties and confederation. This dissertation seeks to 
bring under-observed normative relations between indigenous and European traders into 
Canadian legal history. It further considers the relevance of fur trade law to the 
jurisprudence on aboriginal treaty rights and the significance of history in overcoming 
historical injustice in settler states. 
Using an ethnohistorical methodology, three case studies are presented on the law of the 
fur trade followed by a chapter connecting the interpretation of the intersocietal law of 
the fur trade to the interpretation of treaties in history and law. Focussing the fur trade as 
conducted by the Hudson's Bay Company and the North West Company, the case studies 
investigate the normative expectations of the indigenous and company traders around 
particular aspects of the trading relationship. These aspects include institutions of 
leadership, the formation and maintenance of friendships, negotiations of trading post 
location, and the exchange of provisions and support in times of famine and illness. 
In these case studies, the intersocietal law of the trade is interpreted as incomplete and 
often laden with misunderstanding. It involved competition between normative systems 
and harboured persistent disagreements, even while sufficient shared obligations and 
occasional shared meanings emerged to support robust working relationships. This 
interpretation of the intersocietal law of the fur trade demands a shift in the 
characterization of treaties in history and law. I argue that to better serve the aims of 
justice and reconciliation, both the classification of treaties in history and the interpretive 
focus of the treaty rights jurisprudence must change to allow the complexity of the 
historical relationship - including the disagreements and injustices buried in simpler 
narratives - to emerge. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
History is an essential part of aboriginal law. In Canadian jurisprudence, 
aboriginal rights are premised on historical rights and relationships. Any attempt to 
establish an aboriginal right demands a thorough understanding of the long and varied 
history of indigenous-settler relations in North America. What emerges in legal 
argument, however, is a historical analysis that selectively pulls what is necessary to 
support the aboriginal rights doctrines without undermining the legitimacy of the 
authority of the state. 
There are many different versions of legal and philosophical reasoning that cull 
from the resources of history and they do so differently. Philosophies and legal arguments 
built on liberalism, for example, tend to view history as having produced injustices and 
distributive problems that need to be addressed in the present. For liberals, aboriginal 
rights are a modem phenomenon that have a role to play in redressing the conditions 
produced by history and in supporting indigenous peoples to thrive in liberal 
democracies. 1 In these approaches, history is something to be overcome. By contrast, 
communitarian philosophies and related critiques of liberalism emphasize the situated-
ness of individuals in traditions and community, giving history a constructive force in the 
1 See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001); Burke A. Hendrix, Ownership, Authority, and Self-Determination: 
Moral Principles and Indigenous Rights Claims (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). 
1 
present.2 Similarly, common law reasoning draws on history through precedent, looking 
for continuity with the past while adapting historical resources to the present. 3 And the 
presence of the past in the common law also finds parallels in some aspects of indigenous 
oral history and legal traditions.4 Authors who draw on these traditions view aboriginal 
rights as deriving from ancient rights, arguing that respect for historical aboriginal rights 
is essential to creating conditions of justice and legitimate state power. 5 In these 
approaches, history and historical patterns of interaction are generative of a rule of law 
that can and must be carried forward into the present. 
History is thus premise, content, justification, and source of aboriginal rights. But 
regardless of philosophical orientation, the retrospectivity of legal analysis means that 
history is filtered through legal and moral reasoning. In general, lawyers start from law 
and present-day legal problems and work backwards into history, rather than starting 
2 See, e.g., Alisdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd Edition (Duckworth, 1993); 
James Tully, Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism In An Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); Duncan lvison, Postcolonial Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
3 See, e.g., Martin Krygier, "Law as Tradition" (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237; Gerald J. Postema, "On 
the Moral Presence of Our Past" (1990-91) 36:4 McGill Law Journal 153; Brian Simpson, "The Common 
Law and Legal Theory" in Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1987) 359. 
4 See, e.g., John Borrows, Canada's Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 
[Borrows 2010]; Val Napoleon, "Living Together: Gitksan Legal Reasoning as a Foundation for Consent" 
in J. Webber and C. M. Macleod, eds, Between Consenting Peoples. Political Community and the Meaning 
of Consent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 45; Bruce Granville Miller, Oral History on Trial. Recognizing 
Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011). 
5 See, e.g., Borrows 2010, ibid.; Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice?: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada 
and Australia (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2001); Mark D. Walters, "The 
'Golden Thread' of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 
1982" ( 1999) 44 McGill L. J. 711; Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 
79 Cdn. Bar Rev. 196 [Slattery, "Making Sense"]. 
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from history and working back out to law. Historical inquiry serves legal argument more 
often than it inspires. In this dissertation, I attempt to work between the disciplines in 
both directions. Initially inspired by debates about the sources of aboriginal rights and 
Crown sovereignty, and the complexities of continuing colonial dynamics in indigenous-
state relations in the present, I wanted to understand the historical experience reflected in 
(and distorted by) both contexts. Chapters two to four, in which I present case studies of 
indigenous-settler relations during the fur trade, pursue the historical experience without 
attempting legal argument. Through these studies, however, it became apparent that the 
material was much more relevant to law and legal argument than anticipated. As a result, 
in the final chapter, I return to the lawyer's tradition ofrelying on history to support 
normative argument in a manner that - I hope - brings some historical subtlety back to 
the law. 
1. The Backdrop: Literatures and Debates 
The chapters that follow are unified by their inspiration from and reflection on the 
notion of intersocietal law. It is a notion that has many parallels and connections to 
accounts of legal pluralism and the agency of indigenous peoples in colonial history. 
More than two decades of scholarship on indigenous history and indigenous-settler 
interactions in North America, in which histories of the "victor" made way for more 
attention indigenous motivations and forms of resistance, led the way for more attention 
3 
to law in the interactions.6 Studies of colonial legal history, particularly ones that take 
their lead from the practices of colonial. and local actors over statements of law and 
policy from the imperial metropole, illustrate these directions and have recognized the 
persistence of local and indigenous legal cultures through the colonization, at least before 
the mid-nineteenth-century.7 Similarly, geographically focused studies of the fur trade in 
North America have described diplomatic protocols of exchange that drew from 
indigenous traditions as much or more than from European ones, and revealed worlds in 
which sophisticated inter-cultural negotiators thrived. 8 Still more parallel developments 
can be found in the fields of anthropology and legal pluralism, which have made cultural 
6 See, e.g., Daniel K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?" (1993) 50 The William and Mary Quarterly 379 
[Richter (1993)]; Daniel K Richter, Facing East from Indian Country. A Native History of Early America 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001); James Axtell, Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural 
Origins of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 ); James H. Merrell, Into the 
American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999). In 
the Canadian context, see Germaine Warkentin & Carolyn Podruchny, eds., Decentring the Renaissance: 
Canada and Europe in Multidisciplinary Perspective, 1500-1700 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001) and John S. Lutz, Makuk. A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2008) 
7 See, e.g., Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201 O); Lauren Benton, law and Colonial Cultures: legal 
Regimes in World History, 1400- 1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Lisa Ford, 
Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous Peoples in American and Australia, 1788-1836 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
8 See, e.g., Jennifer Brown, Strangers in Blood. Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980); Bruce M White, "The Woman Who Married a 
Beaver: Trade Patterns and Gender Roles in Ojibwa Fur Trade" (1999) 46: 1 Ethnohistory 109 [B. White, 
"Married a Beaver"]; Richard White, The Middle Ground. Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great 
Lakes Regions, 1650 - 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 ); Carolyn Podruchny and 
Laura Peers, eds, Gathering Places: Aboriginal and Fur Trade Histories (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 
[Podruchny & Peers 2010]. 
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and legal mixing a subject of study in its own right, with increasing attention to the 
agency of individuals within the encounters of collectives and cultures. 9 
These developments share important observations around how the power of the 
colonizer does not dictate everything about the outcome of colonization; that despite 
grand narratives and themes of colonial history found world-wide, significant differences 
in relationships and structures can be found by taking a contextualized approach. 
Contextualized colonial histories also demonstrate that power in the colonial relationship 
was not immediately the colonizer's to exercise; that long periods of interaction often 
conditioned and may have been necessary to consolidate colonial power. Such 
observations have found their way into legal discourse and doctrinal discussions, but 
incompletely. 
Within legal discourse, recognition of local and indigenous traditions has always 
been a part of the Imperial legal doctrines guiding the reception of English law in British 
9 From anthropology, see e.g., Sally Engle Merry, "Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes" 
(1992) 21 Annual Review of Anthropology 357 and Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai 'i: The Cultural 
Power of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Between law and anthropology, see e.g., 
Susan G. Drummond, Mapping Marriage Law in Spanish Gitano communities (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2006). From law, see e.g., Jeremy Webber, "Legal Pluralism and Human Agency" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 167; Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, "What is a Critical Legal 
Pluralism?" (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law & Society 25. Although not focused on the agency of 
individuals, Nicole Roughan's attention to the form of association between legal orders is worth 
mentioning here because it also attends to power dynamics in pluralist interactions: Nicole Roughan, "The 
Association of State and Indigenous Law: A Case Study in 'Legal Association'" (2009) 59 University of 
Toronto L. J. 135. 
5 
colonies, as illustrated in Canada in Connelly v Woolrich. 10 However, these doctrines, 
along with most jurisprudence and theories of aboriginal rights, emphasize the separation 
and distinctiveness between the British and indigenous legal regimes, rather than the 
blending, adaptation and interaction between legal regimes emphasized in the historical 
and anthropological interpretations referenced above. Doctrinal discussions of aboriginal 
and treaty rights - and particularly the latter - might recount a period of recognition in 
which indigenous peoples were important allies. 11 More recently, the Supreme Court 
hinted at the complex processes involved in the acquisition of sovereignty by noting a 
difference between de Jure and de facto sovereignty in its articulation of the 
constitutional duty to consult. 12 The Tsilhqot 'in Nation decision from the BC Court of 
Appeal also makes space for such discussions by noting that it is "curious that a treaty 
[the Oregon Treaty of 1846] that had no practical impact on relations between the Crown 
and the Tsilhqot'in can been seen as the defining moment" for determining the 
acquisition of sovereignty against the Tsilhqot'in and thus the timeline for establishing 
10 (1867), 17 RJRQ 75, aff d Johnstone v Connolly, (1869) 17 RJRQ 266. See also Campbell v Hall 
(1774), 1 Cowp 204, 98 ER 1045 (KB) and Amado Tijani v Southern Nigeria (Secretary), [1921] 2 AC 
399. 
11 See, e.g. R v Sioui, [ 1990] 1 SCR 1025. 
12 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 at para 32 and 
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 
SCR 550 at para 42. For discussion, see Mark D. Walters, "The Morality of Aboriginal Law" (2006) 31 
Queen's LJ 470; Kent McNeil, "The Meaning of Sovereignty", draft chapter (on file with author); Felix 
Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties. Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 
University of Saskatchewan, 2012). 
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their aboriginal title. 13 However, beyond the academic literature, these discussions have 
not (yet) amounted to a fundamental restructuring of the theory of the origins and nature 
of state authority in Canada at law. Standard accounts of constitutional history and the 
authority of the state remain, perhaps unsurprisingly, committed to the uni vocal Imperial 
theory and unable to grapple with ideas of law and constitutional relationships with 
indigenous peoples that developed through patterns of interaction and rely in part on 
indigenous legal traditions. 14 
Legal scholars working from common law and indigenous perspectives have 
much in common with the tide of transnational colonial histories and detailed, contextual 
analysis of legal pluralisms found in academe. These scholars theorize aboriginal and 
treaty rights in a manner that takes historical patterns of interaction into account, and thus 
recognize indigenous peoples' actions and legal traditions as a source of such rights. 
Treaty federalism or constitutionalism is one strand of theorizing that relies on the 
interaction of indigenous and settler legal systems as captured and memorialized in 
treaties. 15 While treaties may be interpreted as maintaining the separateness and 
13 William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 at para 32. See also the discussion in the trial decision, 
Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at paras 585-602 
14 See, for e.g., Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2012 Student ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) 
at 2-1 and 2-2 (noting the complexity of the survival ofaboriginal law but putting it to the side) and John 
Sorrow's critique of Professor Hogg's presentation in Borrows 2010, supra note 4 at 13-15. See also Peter 
Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Ground of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 175. 
15 See, e.g., James [sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, "Empowering treaty federalism" (1994) 58 Sask. L. 
Rev. 241, James [sa'ke1] Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada· (Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell, 2007); Kiera Ladner, "Treaty Federalism: An Indigenous Vision of Canadian 
Federalisms" in Francois Rocher & Miriam Smith, eds., New Trends in Canadian Federalism, 2d ed 
7 
distinctiveness of the legal worlds of the participants, 16 even such treaties have been 
recognized as generative of normative ordering and common interpretive space. 17 
Another and related strand focusses more on intersocietal law than treaties, capturing a 
broader set of historical experiences that may include treaties as well as less formally 
negotiated terms of co-existence and the development of customary rules. Authors have 
also identified intersocietal law as a source of aboriginal rights, but there are subtle 
differences in how the significance of intersocietal law is understood. 18 No one looks 
towards intersocietal law for particular rules that crystallized at a given moment (apart 
from treaties) and that could or should be brought to a court today to enforce. Instead, 
intersocietal law is characterized as an important source and foundation of aboriginal 
rights, leaving the particular shape and contributions of this body of law vague and 
obscure on most accounts. Brian Slattery has addressed the relationship between the 
historical processes of interaction and legal doctrine most extensively (and indeed coined 
(Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2003) 181; and Tully, supra note 2. These theories are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5. 
16 See, e.g., Haudenausonee and interpretations of two row wampum: Darlene Johnston, "The Quest of the 
Six Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination" (1986) 44 Univ. of Toronto Faculty of Law Rev. I; Paul 
Williams, The Chain (LLM Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University Law, 1982) [unpublished]. 
17 See, e.g., Robert A. Williams Jr., Linking Arms Together. American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and 
Peace, 1600-1800 (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mark D. Walters, "Brightening the 
Covenant Chain. Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History After Marshall" (2001) 24:2 Dalhousie 
Law J. 75. 
18 See, e.g., Borrows 2010, ibid; Brian Slattery, "The Organic Constitution: Aboriginal Peoples and the 
Evolution of Canada" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L. J. 101 [Slattery, "Organic"]; Jeremy Webber, "Relations 
of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community between Colonists and 
Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L. J. 623 [Webber, "Relations of Force"]; Mark D Walters, 
"The Morality of Aboriginal Law" (2006) 31 Queen's L. J. 470 [Walters, "Morality"]. 
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the term "intersocietal law" 19). He has described the lengthy process of interaction 
between indigenous peoples and European traders and settlers as foundational to the 
Canadian federation and continues to identify the intersocietal law that emerged from this 
interaction as the principle historical source of the doctrine of aboriginal rights.20 Jeremy 
Webber has taken a similar approach, but added processes of reflection to the 
"intercommunal norms" that emerged from the historical interactions in describing how 
historical intersocietal law has contributed to aboriginal rights. He thus describes 
aboriginal rights as "the product of practical reason - a process of experimentation and 
reflection that begins from a concrete reality of a lived relationship, tries to understand its 
strengths and weaknesses, and derives from it workable conceptions of justice."21 For 
these authors, the interaction captured by the notion of intersocietal law was embedded 
within the common law and British colonial policy, which adapted and responded to the 
experience of colonization as it evolved. More recent engagements with the notion of 
intersocietal law, represented by John Borrows and Mark Walters, focus on the 
contemporary context to argue that a morally justifiable account of aboriginal rights will 
19 Which he initially referred to "intersocietal custom"; see Slattery, "Making Sense", supra note 5. 
20 Slattery, "Organic", supra note 18 and Brian Slattery, "The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" 
(2007) 38 Supreme Court Law Review 595 [Slattery, "Generative"]. 
21 Webber, "Relations of Force", supra note 18 at 630, 638. For similar discussions of Aboriginal law as 
deriving from both indigenous and European legal traditions, see John Borrows, "With or Without You: 
First Nations Law in Canada" in John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) chptr 3; Walters, "Morality", supra note 18. 
9 
be intersocietal in character, and thus the content of aboriginal rights will be constituted 
by both indigenous and common law principles. 22 
These discussions from law, history and anthropology form the starting points for 
this dissertation. Taking my lead from the legal writers working from common law and 
indigenous law traditions in particular, I have attempted to bring a critical view to the 
notion of "intersocietal" law. In the legal theorists' work, intersocietal law is both 
descriptive and prescriptive. It is an attractive notion - that very different peoples find 
modes of co-existence that organically and through iterative processes of negotiation give 
rise to workable norms that structure their relationship.23 It also takes the historical 
interpretations of indigenous agency and mediated assertions and acquisitions of power 
and absorbs them into legal doctrine. But what exactly is the stuff of intersocietal law? 
And how has it come to inform or be represented within aboriginal rights doctrines? 
Jeremy Webber explored two examples of the modus vivendi through 
intercommunal murder and recognition of aboriginal land rights, demonstrating that at 
least the latter informed judicial interpretation in the nineteenth-century and was thus 
absorbed into common law aboriginal rights doctrines.24 While admirably and 
convincingly making the connections in relation to the nineteenth-century jurisprudence, 
Webber's (as well as Slattery's) historical investigations leave much room for further 
22 Borrows 2010, supra note 4 and Walters, ibid. 
23 Parallels to the modes of formation of international law are notable. 
24 See also Brian Slattery, The land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, as Affected by the Crown's 
Acquisition of their Territories (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1979) [unpublished]. 
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investigation and critical reflection. First, these accounts are focused on seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century colonial North America, an experience with specific geographical and 
cultural content. While Marshall CJ 'reflected' on this colonial experience in the early 
nineteenth-century Cherokee trilogy, pronouncing the common law principles by which 
indigenous tribes maintained their land rights and sovereignty but in a diminished form, 25 
interactions between European and indigenous settlers had just begun in large expanses 
of the pre-Canadian northwest. Does Marshall CJ's synthesis of early North American 
colonialism also reflect the experience in Rupert's Land and the North Western Territory 
(where settler-colonialism was slow to arrive and replace the fur trade as the dominant 
mode of interaction, and in some northern locales, arguably has yet to fully arrive)? 
Second, existing accounts leave many questions about the dynamics and content of 
intersocietal law: How does the content of intersocietal law reflect the sources of the two 
(or more) legal systems that went into the mix? How does the development of 
intersocietal norms impact the contributing systems? Is it transformative? Do participant 
groups adapt and grow closer together, or can intersocietal law support or even re-
inscribe maintaining large differences? Moving the geography of intersocietal law north 
and west, these questions are particularly relevant if we are going to understand the 
processes of intersocietal law as something other than an aspect of Metis ethnogenesis. 26 
25 Johnson v M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 
(1831); Worcesterv Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
26 As will become apparent in the chapters that follow, this dissertation does not address the ethnogenesis of 
the Metis. For literature about Metis (or metis) ethnogenesis, see Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer Brown, 
11 
Further, regardless of geography and the drive to further articulate the dynamics 
of intersocietal law, the doctrine of aboriginal rights has undergone much development 
and transition since Slattery and Webber first wrote about the contributions of 
intersocietal law. Both McNeil and Walters have noted that the Supreme Court has taken 
a tum away from the old common law doctrines that, in some explanations, embodied or 
absorbed the long indigenous-settler interaction that preceded and enabled the 
establishment of de facto Crown sovereignty. 27 Any continuity of modem aboriginal 
rights with the norms that emerged from historic relationships and patterns of co-
existence are consequently less important doctrinally.28 In addition, much critical 
scholarship, often by indigenous writers, rejects the proposition that the aboriginal rights 
doctrines (at least as they have been as developed under s 35) are capable of 
The New Peoples: Being and Becoming Met is in North America (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 
1985); Heather Devine, The People Who Own Themselves. Aboriginal Ethnogenesis in a Canadian Family, 
1660-1900 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004); Jean Barman and Mike Evans, "Reflections on 
Being and Becoming Metis in British Columbia" (Spring 2009) BC Studies 59; Chris Anderson, "Moya 
'Tipimsook ("The People Who Aren't Their Own Bosses"): Racialization and the Misrecognition of 
"Metis" in Upper Great Lakes Ethnohistory" (2011) 58 Ethnohistory 37. 
27 Mark D Walters, "The 'Golden Thread' of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under 
the Constitution Act, 1982" (1999) 44 McGill L. J. 711 and Kent McNeil and David Yarrow, "Has 
Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected their Definition?" (2007) 3 7 Supreme 
Court Law Review (2d) 177. 
28 Brian Slattery's more recent work also reflects these shifts in the doctrine. His reliance on intersocietal 
law has shifted from the primary source of aboriginal rights (see "Making Sense", supra note 5) to the 
primary source of the historical aspect of aboriginal law that is combined with a contemporary dimension 
governed by principles ofreconciliation (see "Generative", supra note 20). Thus, the historical dimension 
of intersocietal law gave rise to historical rights from which modem rights can be worked out, guided by 
principles that also require indigenous input but in the context of a contemporary constitutional balancing 
exercise. With respect to aboriginal title specifically, Slattery emphasizes the importance of negotiations to 
define the modem rights; "The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title" (2007) 85 Canadian Bar Review 255. 
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accommodating indigenous law and perspectives. 29 The debate has thus shifted from the 
sources of aboriginal rights to defining an approach that supports "reconciliation," which 
the Supreme Court has called the "grand purpose" of s 35. Reconciliation has received 
various articulations in the Supreme Court, 30 which include working out "a mutually 
respectful long-term relationship"31 in addition to, instead of, or as an expected 
consequence of "the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown. "32 Where does that leave intersocietal law? Are the historical 
sources of aboriginal rights less important to the modern construction of aboriginal rights 
than before? Why and how should historical processes of governing relationships be 
prescriptive of contemporary constitutional rights? Or has intersocietal law acquired a 
new importance in the post-1982jurisprudence, in light of the Court's acknowledgement 
of the difference between de facto and de Jure sovereignty and the resulting need to 
29 See, e.g., Gordon Christie, "A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and 
Haida Nation" (2005) 23 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 17 and Minnawaanagogiizhigook 
(Dawnis Kennedy), "Reconciliation without Respect? Section 35 and Indigenous Legal Orders" in Law 
Commission of Canada, ed., Indigenous Legal Traditions (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 77. Another 
branch of criticism attacks the continuity principle upon which common law aboriginal rights are founded, 
whether reflecting intersocietal law or not. These critiques argue that the recognition of aboriginal societies 
and legal systems of the eighteenth century did not carry through the nineteenth century, during which 
aboriginal rights were a matter of politics and not law and thus justiciable aboriginal rights are a thoroughly 
modem doctrine; see e.g., Paul G McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law. A History of 
Sovereignty, Status and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
30 See Dwight G. Newman, "Reconciliation. Legal Conception(s) and Faces of Justice" in John D. Whyte, 
ed., Moving Toward Justice. Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd & 
Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, 2008) 80. 
31 Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 10, [2010] 3 SCR 103. 
32 R v Van der Peet, [ 1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 31. 
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understand the processes by which sovereignty was acquired (or continues to be) and/or 
the processes that might support a just expression of sovereignty by the Canadian state? 
2. The Content: Overview and Methodologies 
This dissertation presents my attempt to engage with the issues and questions 
outlined above. Drawn more to probing the historical nature of intersocietal law than 
engaging directly with theorizing about aboriginal rights, I began to examine the nature 
and applications of intersocietal law. As I progressed through the case studies, I began to 
understand the value of these explorations more in terms of their offerings and indirect 
reflections in relation to the processes of co-existence and sovereignty than as a means to 
directly answer any of the questions posed above. In other words, the value of these 
studies is in the narratives of the shape and dynamics of legal ordering in intersocietal 
spaces, rather than (or more than) in any particular prescriptive direction for aboriginal 
rights or as an evidential base to respond to the sources and nature of aboriginal rights in 
a particular geography. In the end, however, I could not avoid the prescriptive call of 
legal training to take up the challenge of working through what my interpretation of a 
long history of interaction between indigenous and European traders and settlers - an 
organic foundation for Canadian constitutionalism - demands of the law. 
Chapters two through four present case studies of intersocietal law in the context 
of the fur trade, the primary arena for studying indigenous-settler relations in the under-
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represented northwest region. Chapter two ranges across different periods, geographies, 
and peoples, from York Factory to the prairies. Chapter three stays in the York Factory 
area and early period of the Hudson's Bay Company's presence there through to the mid-
eighteenth century. And chapter four focuses on the MacKenzie River District, Fort Good 
Hope in particular, spanning both the North West and Hudson's Bay Company's 
activities there in the early nineteenth century. Each chapter was written for particular 
conferences and publication projects, and so reflects both the themes of this dissertation 
as well as something of each project's aims and contexts as well. Together, these chapters 
focus on key features of fur trade exchange as suggested by my limited review of 
materials from the Hudson's Bay Company archives, published historical documents, 
ethnographic materials and oral histories, and the secondary literature. 33 These features or 
institutions are: leadership (chapter two), exchange of food (chapter three), and access to 
land and resources (chapter four). Notably absent as foci are features of the fur trade that 
have been well developed in the historical literature: fur trade marriages, 34 and the 
33 Please refer to Appendix A for the design of the studies and the scope of the primary research. 
34 See the seminal works: Silvia Van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties." Women in Fur-Trade Society in Western 
Canada, 1670-1870 (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer Publishing Ltd., 1980) and Jennifer Brown, supra note 
8. See also more recent contributions: Jennifer Brown, "Partial Truths. A Closer Look at Fur Trade 
Marriage" in Theodore Binnema, Gerhard J. Ens & R.C. Macleod, eds., Rupert's Land to Canada. Essays 
in Honour of John. E. Foster (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2001) 59; Heather Rollanson 
Driscoll, "'A Most Important Chain of Connection.' Marriage in the Hudson's Bay Company" in Theodore 
Binnema, Gerhard J. Ens & R.C.Macleod, eds., ibid. 81; Bruce White, "Married A Beaver'', supra note 8; 
Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western 
Great Lakes (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001); Susan Sleeper-Smith, Rethinking the Fur 
Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic World (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 
2009), Part 5. 
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exchange of furs for trade goods that was the lifeblood of the whole endeavour.35 Also 
absent are focii on international or intersocietal homicide36 and disciplinary practices 
within the forts and in relation to trading company employees37 - the aspects of fur trade 
relations that have received attention within specifically legal histories of the fur trade. 
These absences are partially intentional and partially a result of the limited scope 
of archival research. In light of the methodological lessons of my Masters' thesis, this 
35 See Arthur J. Ray & Don Freeman, 'Give Us Good Measure': An Economic Analysis of Relations 
Between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1978); Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters and Middlemen in the 
Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); Daniel Francis 
& Toby Morantz. Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 1600-1870 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983); Abraham Rotstein, "Trade and Politics: 
An Institutional Approach" (1972) 3 Western Cdn. J. of Anthropology 1; Peter Cook, "Symbolic and 
Material Exchange in Intercultural Diplomacy: The French and the Haudenosaunee in the Early Eighteenth 
Century" in Jo-Anne Fiske, Susan Sleeper-Smith & William Wicken, eds., New Faces of the Fur Trade. 
Selected Papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University, 1995) 75; Michael Payne, "Fur Trade Historiography" in Theodore Binnema, 
Gerhard J. Ens & R.C.Macleod, eds., Rupert's Land to Canada. Essays in Honour of John E. Foster 
(Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 2001) 3. 
36 See Hamar Foster, '"The Queen's Law is Better Than Yours': International Homicide in Early British 
Columbia" in Jim Phillips, Tina Loo & Susan Lewthwaite, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, 
vol 5 (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1994) 41; Hamar Foster, "Conflict 
Resolution During the Fur Trade in the Canadian North West, 1803-1859" (1993) 51 The Advocate 871; 
John Phillip Reid, Patterns of Vengeance: Crosscultural Homicide in the North American Fur Trade 
(Pasadena, Calif.: Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society, 1999). See also Webber, "Relations ofForce", 
supra note 18 at 638; and, John A. Dickinson, "Native Sovereignty and French Justice in Early Canada" in 
Jim Phillips, Tina Loo & Susan Lewthwaite, eds., ibid., vol. 5, 17 (although Dickinson's consideration of 
this issue is set in New France, in the context of French-Algonquian political alliances rather than 'only' 
the fur trade). 
37 See Hamar Foster, "Sins Against the Great Spirit: The Law, the Hudson's Bay Company, and the 
Mackenzie River Murders, 1835-1839" (1989) 10 Criminal Justice History 23 (a story ofone application of 
Canadian jurisdiction into fur trade country to prosecute a mixed-blood company employee for murder); 
Russell Smandych & Rick Linden, "Administering Justice Without the State: A Study of the Private Justice 
System of the Hudson's Bay Company to 1800" (1996) 11 Cdn. J. ofL. & Soc'y 21. See also Robert Baker, 
Law Transplanted, Justice Invented: Sources of Law for the Hudson's Bay Company in Rupert's Land, 
1670-1870 (Master's Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1996) [unpublished], chapter 3; Paul C. Nigol, 
Discipline, Discretion and Control: The Private Justice System of the Hudson's Bay Company in Rupert's 
Land, 1670-1770 (PhD Thesis, University of Calgary, 2001) [unpublished], esp chptr 3; and Edward 
Cavanagh, "A Company with Sovereignty and Subjects of its Own? The Case of the Hudson's Bay 
Company, 1670-1763" (2011) 26 Can. J ofL. & Soc'y 25 [Cavangah]. 
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project had no pretensions to achieving a broad survey of the law of the fur trade. 
However, I still had hopes of exploring law in the day-to-day interactions, processes, and 
obligations rather than in the exceptional moments, such as homicide and fur trade 
marriages. I was looking for norms of conduct and relationship rather than ceremony. As 
a lawyer, of course, I should have known better: ceremony and exceptional events 
illuminate the ordinary through the symbols, relations, and principles that are applied in 
those moments of performance and crisis. But I was also interested in shifting the 
subjects of study away from a few well-known examples of fur trade laws (paying 
compensation for homicides and custom of the country marriages) and the annual or bi-
annual ceremonies of trade, if the materials suggested that this re-direction was 
appropriate and possible. In the end, the foci and absences are more a result of the scope 
of the archival research than these initial intentions, and these well-known features of the 
fur trade and of fur trade law make appearances and remain important in my 
interpretations. 
The content and methodology of these chapters look more like fur trade history -
and ethnohistory in particular - than traditional legal history. These chapters use 
historical records, recorded stories, ethnohistorical material and other secondary literature 
to investigate particular symbols and words such as trading captains' coats, greetings of 
"I am hungry", dances to greet- strangers and cement relationships, promises of 
sustenance, and statements of what would be just in the circumstances. This interpretive 
approach is similar to the methodologies of fur trade ethnohistorians, such as Jennifer 
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Brown38, Carolyn Podruchny39, Bruce White40, and others, who attempt to achieve 
greater insight into the historical participants in the fur trade who did not create the 
written record, including women, indigenous people, and voyageurs. Relying on 
ethnographic and diverse materials, even if such materials are more recently created than 
the historical moment under investigation, allows ethnohistorians to "pose questions 
about earlier events and patterns, to investigate what is said, and often more important, 
what is not said in earlier historical documents. "41 While such methods have been 
critiqued as potentially introducing assumptions of cultural continuity42, other historians 
have argued that ethnohistorical methods are simply good history: the use of diverse 
materials to "read skeptically; question sources; verify assertions, understand the 
assumptions of the past and those of your generation and class, and even then, remember 
that all historical writing is interpretive rather than objective."43 Notwithstanding such 
debates, ethnohistorical methods appear to be the only option available to address the 
38 Jennifer Brown, supra notes 8 and 34. See also, Jennifer Brown "Ethnohistorians: Strange Bedfellows, 
Kindred Spirits" (1991) 38 Ethnohistory 113 and Jennifer Brown, "Rupert's Land, Nituskeenan, Our Land: 
Cree and English Naming and Claiming around the Dirty Sea" in Ted Binnema & Susan Neylan, eds, New 
Histories for Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada's Native Pasts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 18. 
39 See, e.g., Carolyn Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World: Travelers and Traders in the North 
American Fur Trade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006) and Carolyn Podruchny, Frederic W 
Gleach & Roger Roulette, "Putting Up Poles: Power, Navigation, and Cultural Mixing in the Fur Trade" in 
Peers & Podruchny 2010, supra note 8, 25. 
40 B. White, "Married a Beaver", supra note 8 and Bruce M. White, "'Give Us a Little Milk': The Social 
and Cultural Meaning of Gift Giving in the Lake Superior Fur Trade" ( 1982) 48 Minnesota History 60. 
41 B. White, "Married a Beaver", ibid. at 117. 
42 See, e.g., Richard White, supra note 8 at xiv. For a discussion of the risks involved in ethnohistorical 
methods, see also Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570, 2d 
ed.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 [1987]) at 133. 
43 Richter (1993), supra note 6 at 386. 
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subject matter at hand- norms constituted and guiding conduct across different cultures 
in a historical period with a minimal written record created by only a few of the European 
participants. Mark Walters has reached a similar conclusion in a study exploring an inter-
cultural history of the imperial Crown: "The interpretation of the history of relationships 
between peoples in colonial settings, including their legal relationships, must involve the 
distinctive methods associated with ethnohistory."44 
Apart from Mark Walters' innovative study, ethnohistorical methods remain 
I 
foreign to legal history and the law of the fur trade remains only minimally investigated. 
The traditional subjects of study for legal historians are the development of particular 
legal rules or institutions, and the role of legal actors within those formal institutions. 
Within the field of legal history, disciplinary debates have centred on whether law is a 
function of power and other societal forces, thereby suggesting an "external" approach to 
the history of law, or alternatively, whether law is embedded within these social forces 
and itself constitutive of power relations and consciousness, thereby requiring an 
"internal" approach to its history, including taking doctrinal developments seriously.45 
These historiographical concerns do not contemplate law beyond the institutions of state, 
44 Mark D Walters, '"'Your Sovereign and Our Father." The Imperial Crown and the Idea of Legal-
Ethnohistory" in Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter, eds, law and Politics in British Colonial Thought 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 91at93. 
45 This debate, represented by Willard Hurst (external) and Robert Gordon (internal), has been recently 
revisited in a symposium published in volume 37 of Law & Society Inquiry (2012), centred on Robert 
Gordon's seminal essay, "Critical Legal Histories" (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 57. See in particular, 
Susanna L Blumenthal, "Of Mandarins, Legal Consciousness, and the Cultural Tum in US Legal History" 
(2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry 167. 
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let alone law that may be cross-cultural (as opposed to merely comparative) with 
contributions from substantially different legal traditions. Such subjects of study have 
traditionally been the domain of anthropology and have always demanded an "internal" 
perspective in light of systems of law that are undifferentiated from other aspects of 
social and religious life. 46 They have not generally been considered within the domain of 
law. 
As in other fields of historical research, Canadian legal historians have also long 
recognized the need to include different participants, different law, and particularly 
aboriginal law within its field of vision,47 but some of these directions require different 
methodologies.48 And as suggested above in relation to the exceptional nature of Mark 
46 I explored the need for an internal perspective in conducting this sort ofresearch in Janna Promislow, 
Looking/or law at York Factory (LLM Thesis, York University, Faculty of Law, 2004), chptr 2. 
47 See, e.g., David H. Flaherty, "Writing Canadian Legal History: An Introduction" in David H. Flaherty, 
ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) 3 and Barry 
Wright, "Towards a New Canadian Legal History" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L. J. 349 (calling for a broader, 
'law and society' approach to Canadian legal history). For examples of studies that exemplify these 
directions by addressing aboriginal peoples in Canadian legal history, see Sidney L. Harring, White Man's 
law. Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
for The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1998); Douglas C Harris, landing Native Fisheries. 
Indian Reserves & Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849-1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) and 
Fish, law and Colonialism. The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001 ); Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-
1950 (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 1999); 
Tina Loo, Making law, Order and Authority in British Columbia 1821-1871 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1994); and Shelley Gavigan, Criminal law on the Aboriginal plains: The First Nations and 
the First Criminal Court in the North-West Territories, 1870-1903 (SJD Thesis, University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law, 2008) [unpublished]. 
48 Louis Knatla and Susan Binnie call for the inclusion of pluralist notions of law in legal history in Louis 
A. Knafla & Susan W. S. Binnie, "Beyond the State: Law and Legal Pluralism in the Making of Modem 
Societies" in Louis A. Knatla & Susan W. S. Binnie, eds., Law, Society and the State: Essays in Modern 
legal History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 3. 
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Walters' study, the methodologies of Canadian legal history remain quite traditional.49 In 
a recent historiographic essay, Louis Knafla notes the (still) large gaps in Canadian legal 
history in the treatment of the Northwest frontier and prairie provinces, which may be 
related to the persistence of a myth of lawlessness that has been prominent in American 
legal history as well. 50 Legal histories about the fur trade have generally been either a 
branch oflmperial legal history, trying to understand the legal effect of the Hudson's Bay 
Company Charter and British assertions of sovereignty over the Northwest,51 or a more 
practice-based consideration of the development of law within the Hudson's Bay 
Company forts, which had only limited and exceptional application to indigenous 
individuals who became involved with the trading posts. 52 Legal histories of the fur trade 
49 That is not to say that Canadian legal historians do not welcome new methodologies. In my experience, 
Canadian legal historians have greeted my experiment with enthusiasm. The block to more development in 
this area is, if anything, the difficulty in carrying out such research. Some other projects that might be seen 
as related to mine include, Val Napoleon, Ayook: Gitksan legal Order, law, and legal Theory (PhD 
Thesis, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009) [unpublished]( not aiming at legal history, but as a 
project of stating Gixtsan law, necessarily has a historical aspect); and Shelley Gavigan "Prisoner Never 
Gave Me anything for What He Done": Aboriginal Voices in the Criminal Court" (2007) 3 Socio-Legal 
Review 71. 
50 Louis A Knafla, "Introduction" in Louis A Knafla & Jonathan Swainger, eds, Laws and Societies in the 
Canadian Prarie West, 1670-1940 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005)1at4. 
51 See, e.g., Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Nations and Quebec's Boundaries: Canada Couldn't Give What It 
Didn't Have" in Emerging Justice?: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: 
Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2001)1; Kent McNeil, "Sovereignty and the Aboriginal 
Nations of Rupert's Land" (1999) Spring/Summer:37 Manitoba History 2; Hamar Foster, "Forgotten 
Arguments: Aboriginal Title and Sovereignty in Canada Jurisdiction Act Cases" (1992) 21 Manitoba L. J. 
343; Hamar Foster, "Long-Distance Justice: the Criminal Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts West of the 
Canadas, 1763-1859" ( 1990) 34 Am. J. of Legal History 1; Kenneth M. Narvey, "The Royal Proclamation 
of7 October 1763: The Common Law and Native Rights to Land Within the Territory Granted to the 
Hudson's Bay Company" (1974) 38 Saskatchewan L. Rev. 123), and Geoffrey S. Lester, The Territorial 
Rights of the Inuit of the Canadian Northwest Territories: A legal Argument (D.Jur. Thesis, Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University, 1981) [unpublished] at 1309-73. 
52 See citations supra note 37. Cavanagh perhaps provides a bridge between both approaches to 
considering the Hudson's Bay Company's sovereignty. 
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have also included the development of formal western legal institutions at Red River, the 
only settlement (apart from in British Columbia) in which such institutions were 
established by the Hudson's Bay Company under the authority of its Charter. 53 What is 
missing is legal-historical treatment of the fur trade as a joint indigenous and European 
endeavour, a subject that requires studying indigenous law and its interactions with settler 
legal traditions. 
In addressing such a topic, Hamar Foster suggests that "the researcher is faced at 
the outset with a considerable problem: the extent to which the details of these 
[indigenous] laws ... are knowable. Not only are these details part of an oral 
tradition ... they are embedded in social, cultural, and other practices in ways that make 
them difficult ... to see. There is also a limit to what can be recovered from between the 
lines of documentary accounts and from contemporary oral history fieldwork. "54 While 
there have been notable legal histories of intersocietal law in the fur trade, particularly in 
relation to "international homicide" as noted above and including a key study by Foster 
himself,55 Foster's observations describe conditions that have perhaps scared most legal 
53 See Dale Gibson & Lee Gibson, Substantial Justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba, 1670-1970 
(Winnipeg: Peguis, 1972); Dale Gibson, Privatized Justice: the Origins of Legal Institutions on the 
Canadian Prairies (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, Faculty of Law, 1993); Robert Baker, "Creating 
Order in the Wilderness: Transplanting the English Law to Rupert's Land, 1835-51" (1999) 17 L. & History 
Rev. 209; Kathryn M. Bindon, "Hudson's Bay Company Law: Adam Thom and the Institution of Order in 
Rupert's Land, 1839-54" in David H. Flaherty, ed, Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol 1 {Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1981) 43. 
54 Hamar Foster, "Law and Necessity in Western Rupert's Land and Beyond, 1670-1870" in Louis A 
Knafla & Jonathan Swainger, eds, Laws and Societies in the Canadian Prarie West, 1670-1940 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 57 at 63-64. 
55 See citations, supra note 36. 
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historians away. Indeed, legal historians have been noted for confining their subjects to 
ones that allow them to complete their studies "without looking far beyond the confines 
of the law library or the Westlaw or Lexis databases."56 However, as Hartog suggests, 
once the idea of law that informs legal history is less positivist, legal-historical inquiry 
then requires both internal and external perspectives, and the boundaries of the law are 
put into question regardless of cultural context.57 Moreover, depending on the topics and 
eras pursued, the internal consciousness of the legal history of European societies may be 
no more accessible to Western lawyers than that of historical indigenous societies. 
William Ewald's comparativist approach to the legal history of animal trials in medieval 
France provides a case in point.58 Legal history thus conceived necessarily engages with 
the philosophy of law and requires openness to reconsidering the meaning and confines 
of law itself in the process of historical interpretation. 59 
While the case studies pursued might have more in common with ethnohistory, 
there is a point to situating this work as a work of legal history. The point is simple: 
56 Hendrik Hartog, "Introduction to Symposium on 'Critical Legal Histories': Robert W. Gordon. 1984. 
Critical Legal Histories. Stanford Law Review 36: 57-125" (2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry 147 at 153. 
57 Ibid. 
58 William Ewald, "Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What was it Like to Try a Rat?" (1995) 143 U Penn L 
Rev 1889 and William Ewald, "The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to 
"Rats"" (1998) 46 Am. J. of Comparative L. 701. 
59 Walters observes a tension between contextualist history and legal history, which insists on the pastness 
of the past, and legal and ethnhistorical interpretation, which demand or embed integrity with the present 
(supra note 44). Ethnohistory gains this dimension from its anthropological roots, and starting assumptions 
of cultural continuity, while legal interpretation brings historical precedents to bear on present day 
problems. In my view, this tension does not arise until one attempts to use a legal ethnohistory in legal 
argument. Although tensions remain between traditional historical interpretation and ethnohistorical 
methodologies (see citations at supra note 42), ethnohistorical studies are deeply contextual. 
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indigenous law is law.60 Indigenous legal traditions and their interactions with fur trader 
legal traditions are part of Canadian legal history, even if we have yet to determine the 
significance of this law in constitutional law and history. No amount of difficulty trying 
to access and assess this law alters these important premises for this work. It is, on the 
other hand, possible to evaluate the material in three case study chapters as illustrating 
incomplete formations of law - both in terms of the limited scope of any intersocietal 
legal norms that governed relations, and in terms of whether it is appropriate to speak of 
principles of intersocietal law as having emerged at all.61 Such assessments do not refute 
the presence of prior legal systems of the indigenous and European trader; they only 
dispute the formation of shared legal norms or shared interpretive space. They also fall 
within the philosophical engagement with the concept of law demanded by this sort of 
study. Moreover, such observations fall within the intent of this study, which is to 
question the formation of intersocietal law rather than assume it occurred. 
Although chapter two starts from a point of judicial interpretation to demonstrate 
the importance of ethnohistorical understandings for law, traditional legal history and 
aboriginal rights arguments are at most a shadow over chapters two through four. Chapter 
five, on the other hand, returns to legal methodologies and the use of history to support a 
60 John Borrows, "Creating an Indigenous Legal Community" (2005), 50 McGill L.J. 153 at 173; Borrows 
2010, supra note 4; Val Napoleon, "Thinking about Indigenous Legal Orders" in Rene Provost & Colleen 
Sheppard, eds, (2013) 17 Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspective on Law and Justice 229. 
61 See Webber, supra note 21 for an approach that suggests that whether the interaction produced legal 
norms as opposed to simply norms governing relationships and behavior is beside the point. However, his 
argument is how such norms became law through the aboriginal rights doctrines (if not before), and is not 
an attempt to produce a legal history of the inter-communal law for its own sake. 
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legal history and legal argument about the nature of treaties and their interpretation. 
Historians such as Arthur Ray and Jim Miller have made important connections between 
the fur trade and treaties. 62 As reviewed in chapter five, these arguments include 
understanding the relationships of the fur trade as a form of treaty themselves63 , and more 
recently, a more 'juridical' style of argument suggesting that fur trade institutions and 
relationships should inform the interpretation of treaty promises. 64 Chapter five takes up 
these arguments from a legal perspective, sorting through the implications of viewing 
indigenous-European relations during the fur trade as governed by law, including treaty 
relationships. It provides an opportunity to reflect on treaty rights jurisprudence as well as 
the processes by which de facto if not de jure sovereignty was acquired, and the role of 
treaties and less formally negotiated orders in such processes. Even if the fur trade gave 
rise to particular legal norms (and I argue it did in some circumstances), the legal 
interpretation of the significance of those historical norms in treaty rights litigation or in 
legal histories of the acquisition of sovereignty involves a normative analysis that draws 
on more than interpretations of history. So while fur trade studies may give rise to 
62 See J. R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2009) [Miller]; Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller & Frank J. Tough, Bounty and 
Benevolence: A Documentary History of Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2000) [Bounty and Benevolence]; Arthur J. Ray, Telling it to the Judge. Taking Native 
History to Court (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011) [Ray, Telling]. 
63 See Miller, ibid.; Jean Friesen, "Magnificent Gifts: The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of the 
Northwest 1861-76" ( 1986) series 5, vol 1 Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 41; and John E. 
Foster, "Indian-White Relations in the Prairie West during the Fur Trade Period - A Compact?" in Richard 
Price, ed., The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1999 [1979]) 
181. 
64 See Bounty and Benevolence and Ray, Telling, supra note 62. 
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particular legal arguments about particular treaties, chapter five is more concerned with 
how discussions and interpretations of treaties and treaty rights are framed, both in 
history and law. Finally, pushing through the connections between fur trade and treaty 
hinted at in the case study chapters brings the relationship between law and history into 
sharp relief, and so the relationship between the two disciplines also occupies our 
attention in this chapter. 
3. The Results: Arguments, Contributions, and Directions 
In spite of the limited scope of the research, clear themes and arguments emerge 
from these case studies about the content and nature of fur trade law that follow through 
into the arguments about treaties. 
The interpretation of intersocietal law that emerges from the case studies is that 
there were shared norms - of process and occasionally substance - but that such shared 
normativity may have been fleeting and dependent on bi-culturally adept and interested 
traders. Several points of relationship might be articulated as specific, reasonably durable 
normative expectations or obligations across the different peoples, geographies and 
time lines of the case studies: 
• That food (and tobacco) would be provided to visitors or traders, as a matter of 
hospitality and maintaining good relations, or as a matter of need. 
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• That relationships between European and indigenous trading parties would be re-
affirmed before trade, generally with food and tobacco. However, in contrast to some 
accounts of the trading protocols, 65 the case studies indicate that the degree of 
ceremony varied with the status of the trader and that protocols were less elaborate in 
the context of increasingly individualized or family trading relationships following 
the Hudson's Bay Company's move inland. 
• That the consent or welcome of local peoples was required before a trading post 
could be established in their territory. If the European traders wrongly identified the 
local leaders from whom they should seek consent, it seems probable that intra-
indigenous law requiring consultation within and between bands and peoples 
mitigated against misidentification causing problems for the trading post, at least 
where those peoples were at peace. In addition, indigenous consent to European 
trader presence in the territory included commitments to some measure of mutual 
support. 
• That the European traders had to ensure a reasonably continuous availability of trade 
goods as part of maintaining good relations and ensuring their continued welcome in 
the particular territories in which they had landed. 
• That where European traders kept up their end of the bargain, they should be 
supported with assistance with harvesting activities and/or access to the resources 
65 See e.g., Bounty and Benevolence, supra note 62. 
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they needed. In the sub-arctic case study, there was a notable expectation of self-
sufficiency that was not observable from the Hudson Bay contexts. 
• That the respective leaders of the European and indigenous traders (if not 
communities) would be recognized with symbols and gifts. 
There are other parameters and aspects of the order of trading relations that are 
observable through the case studies, but by identifying the above list as specifically 
normative, I am suggesting that the case studies were sufficient to show a degree of 
regularity and often a degree of sanction attaching to these practices, expectations, and 
obligations. Importantly, these specific norms did not just emerge from practice; they 
were the subject of negotiations and attempts by indigenous leaders in particular to 
educate the newcomers to their territories. 
Some of these points defining the terms of exchange and relationship might be better 
described as indigenous law rather than intersocietal law in that the European traders did 
not necessarily bring any adaptation, adjustment, or even normative content to the 
indigenous modes of governance and business that were expected of them in fur trade 
country. On occasion, they continued to insist that the terms of the relationship were 
other than what was revealed by their conduct, or what they were able to demand of the 
conduct of their indigenous trading partners. This interpretation seems particularly strong 
in the MacKenzie Valley case study, and in relation to the expectation of self-sufficiency 
that was unique in that environment. Thus, the minimum content of intersocietal 
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normativity might be defined as the presence of at least competing norms capable of 
accounting for a given practice or conduct. To describe the domination of one system 
over the other and normative competition as intersocietal legal space is to attend to the 
persistence of other legal orders and their reaction to the dominant system. 
These interpretations and the work of this dissertation also offer directions and 
contributions specific to the different fields from which this interdisciplinary study has 
drawn. In relation to fur trade histories, I hope I have portrayed law as an important part 
of indigenous-European relationships and as a viable subject of study that might add new 
dimensions to ethnohistorical research. The studies also bring attention to the need for 
greater contextual specificity around trading protocols - time, geography, and 
indigenous and company cultures are all potentially relevant in understanding the scope 
and nature of the ceremonies and modes of exchange that guided the conduct of the trade. 
Similarly, kin relations and kin metaphors did not always manifest themselves. In this 
regard, and in relation to the eighteenth century in particular, there are differences 
between relations with "home Indians" and "trading Indians" that are worth further 
exploration, including the extent to which these different patterns of relationships are 
reflected in the trade after the Hudson's Bay Company moved inland and the increased 
inland competition sparked by this move. 66 In addition, the different forms and patterns 
of relationship may be of interest in reflecting on the emergence of new communities that 
66 See Cavanagh, "HBC", supra note 37 for an interesting suggestion of the significance of the home 
Indians to the HBC's establishment of sovereignty over a small scope of people and territory before 1763. 
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we might recognize now as Metis. Finally, the prominence of "friendship" as the 
dominant form of trading relationship suggests that this signifier deserves further 
elaboration in regard to the expectations and obligations encompassed by this term. 
With regard to legal histories and aboriginal rights discourse, the arguments and 
contributions are addressed in depth in chapter five. This study highlights mercantilist 
relationships that do not fit easily within settler-colonial Imperial legal histories or legal 
constructs and yet account for the longest period of indigenous-European relations in 
what is now Canada. From those contexts, this dissertation offers interpretations and 
arguments at a more abstract level of narrative, which are, in my view, the most 
significant and transferable results of my study. The language of intersocietal law is often 
associated with an idea of shared norms encompassing shared understandings. 67 This 
view is embedded in Canadian treaty rights jurisprudence, which defines treaty rights by 
identifying a "common intention. "68 This dissertation demonstrates that shared normative 
worlds do not necessarily involve shared or merged legal sensibilities, common 
intentions, or middle grounds of convergence and synthesis. Instead, the shared 
normative worlds of the fur trade were often ones of competing norms capable of 
generating and maintaining persistent misunderstandings. Incremental adaptations, shared 
humanity, and convergent motivations ensured that the parties did not abandon each 
other. Thus, the processes of intersocietal law are not necessarily transformative. In spite 
67 See discussion in chapter three especially. 
68 Explored at length in chapter five. 
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of such a limited conception, the intersocietal law of the fur trade demonstrates that such 
processes of law can support robust working relationships and give rise to durable 
normative expectations between parties. 
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Chapter 2: One Chief, Two Chiefs, Red Chiefs, Blue Chiefs 
Newcomer Perspectives on Indigenous Leadership in Rupert's Land 
and the North-West Territories* 
In 1995, a case came before the Federal Court of Canada in which the Sawridge 
First Nation from Slave Lake, Alberta, attempted to assert an Aboriginal right to control 
its membership. 1 Justice Muldoon concluded that any such right was "emphatically 
extinguished" by clear acts of Parliament, a conclusion that he reinforced through 
historical evidence combed from treaty negotiation records.2 Justice Muldoon's decision 
was thrown out the following year after the Federal Court of Appeal found a reasonable 
apprehension of bias in his judgment, but his interpretation of the evidence from the 
Treaty 6 record in particular nevertheless merits our attention. 3 
• In Hamar Foster, Benjamin L. Berger, & A.R. Buck, eds., The Grand Experiment: Law and Legal Culture 
in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 55. Acknowledgements: My thanks are due to 
Kent McNeil, Susan Drummond, and the editors of this volume, whose insightful comments and subtle 
suggestions have substantially improved this chapter. I would also like to acknowledge that this research 
has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Last, but certainly 
not least, I would like to thank John McLaren for opening my eyes to the intrigues of comparative colonial 
history and for his constant encouragement of my studies. There have been small editorial changes to this 
chapter since publication. 
1 Sawridge Band v. Canada (1995), [1996] 1 F.C. 3 (T.D.). More specifically, the Sawridge (Treaty 8), 
Ermineskin (Treaty 6), and Sarcee (now Tsuu T'ina, Treaty 7) First Nations argued that changes to the 
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, restoring band membership to women who had married non-Indian men 
and to the children of these unions, violated their rights to control their memberships under s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and were contrary to long-standing customs whereby women's band membership 
followed that of their spouse. 
2 Ibid. at para. 72. 
3 Sawridge Bandv. Canada, [1997] 3 F.C. 580 (C.A.). It is worth noting that the Court of Appeal found 
that Justice Muldoon did not appear to harbour negative views of Aboriginal people per se, but rather that a 
reasonable apprehension of bias arose due to comments that indicated his negative disposition toward the 
regime of distinctive rights for Aboriginal peoples enshrined ins. 35 of the Constitution (at paras. 15-16). 
In the aftermath of this decision, a new trial was commenced, and the matter remains hotly contested and 
unresolved. See Sawridge Band v. Canada, 2008 FC 322. Justice Muldoon also considered evidence from 
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Much of the evidence cited by Justice Muldoon was drawn from the reports kept 
by Treaty Commissioner Alexander Morris, Lieutenant- Governor for Manitoba and the 
North-West Territories. Morris was the lead Crown negotiator for Treaties 3, 4, 5, and 6, 
which were negotiated with primarily Cree, Assiniboine, Ojibway, and Saulteaux peoples 
in the 1870s. In pursuing these numbered treaties, the Canadian government believed it 
was clearing the way for peaceful settlement of the west in accordance with long-
established British principles.4 Treaty 6 was concluded in 1876 with First Nations who 
lived across what is now south-central Alberta and Saskatchewan. Morris' preparations 
for the negotiation of this Treaty included commissioning Methodist missionary 
Reverend McDougall to visit the Indians of this region the year before Morris planned to 
arrive. McDougall's purpose was to "tranquillize" the Indians by informing them of the 
government's intention to negotiate a treaty, an issue that was causing some concern in 
the region. 5 
Justice Muldoon cited Reverend McDougall's report to Morris about his mission 
as evidence of the extinguishment of self-government rights. In this report, McDougall 
Treaties 7 and 8, covering all of the treaties signed by the First Nations who brought the case. The choice to 
focus on Justice Muldoon' s treatment of the evidence from Treaty 6 is one of convenience, and the 
interpretive exercise pursued in the chapter could undoubtedly be extended to his treatment of the evidence 
in the Treaty 7 and 8 records as well. 
4 For discussions of the government's approach to treaties in this era, see e.g. John Leonard Taylor, 
"Canada's Northwest Indian Policy in the 1870s: Traditional Premises and Necessary Innovations" in 
Richard Price, ed., The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties (Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1987; first 
published 1979) 3; and Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992) at c. 17-19. 
5 See Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the Northwest 
Territories, Including the Negotiations on Which They Were Based, and Other Information Relating 
Thereto (Calgary: Fifth House, 1991; first published 1880) at 172-73. 
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described the reception of the Governor's message and also conveyed several requests 
from the Plains Cree regarding the upcoming negotiations. Among those requests was the 
following: "We would further ask that our chiefships be established by the Government. 
Of late years almost every trader sets up his own Chief and the result is we are broken up 
into little parties, and our best men are no longer respected."6 Taken without attention to 
the interpretive dimensions of language, historical context, and the personality and 
interests of the narrator, these words imply that Plains Cree leadership and government 
were in total disarray before the negotiation of Treaty 6. 
Justice Muldoon pursued this ostensibly straightforward interpretive route, 
bolstering his conclusion with further choice quotes from Morris' treaty record. For 
example, he cited Morris' report of the following speech to the Willow Indians, a band of 
Plains Cree: "One of you made a request that if he were accepted as a Chief, he should 
have a blue coat. I do not yet know who the Chiefs are. To be a Chief he must have 
followers. One man came forward as a Chief and I had to tell him unless you have twenty 
tents you cannot continue as a Chief." 7 These passages evoke the colonial milieu of 
Treaty 6, a milieu marked by a long interaction between colonial authorities and 
indigenous communities during the fur trade that affected the legal and political 
institutions of both societies. 8 The complexities of these interactions, however, are not 
6 Ibid. at 175, cited in Sawridge, supra note 1 at para. 85. 
7 Morris, supra note 5 at 226, cited in Sawridge, supra note 1 at para. 83. 
8 In the North American contexts of this chapter, see Toby Morantz, "Northern Algonquian Concepts of 
Status and Leadership Reviewed: A Case Study of the Eighteenth-Century Trading Captain System" (1982) 
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conveyed on the face of these passages. Instead, they leave a strong impression that at the 
time of Treaty 6, Plains Cree chiefs were dependent on colonial recognition for their 
political authority. In Sawridge, Justice Muldoon saw these passages as demonstrating 
that the Cree leaders lacked self-defined political authority, implying a further lack of 
control over the definition of the political unit. In his view, this constituted conclusive 
evidence that any right of control over membership was extinguished at the time of the 
Treaty, as a condition of making it. According to him, not only had the ancestors of the 
First Nations who brought this challenge surrendered control over their membership, but 
they had themselves acknowledged the absence of control and requested the assistance of 
the Dominion government. 9 
Many problems, some historical and some legal, can be ferreted out of Justice 
Muldoon's decision. Given that it was overturned, its significance lies not in its legal 
implications, but rather in what it reveals about the problem of political recognition 
across cultural divides and the interpretation of such problems in historical contexts, 
particularly when self-government rights are at stake. The significance of the Sawridge 
decision, then, is understanding what to make of Justice Muldoon's finding of radical 
19 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 482 (regarding the institutions of indigenous 
peoples); Arthur J. Ray, "The Factor and the Trading Captain in the Hudson's Bay Company Fur Trade 
before 1763" in Jim Freedman and Jerome H. Barkow, eds., Proceedings of the Second Congress, 
Canadian Ethnology Society, vol. 1, Mercury Series, Ethnology Service Paper 28 (Ottawa: National 
Museum of Man, 1975) 586; and John E. Foster, "The Indian-Trader in the Hudson Bay Fur Trade 
Tradition" in Freedman and Barkow, ibid., 571 (regarding the institutions of the Hudson's Bay Company). 
For an excellent exploration of this thesis in colonial legal history more generally, see Lauren Benton, law 
and Colonial Cultures: legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
9 Sawridge, supra note 1 at 86. 
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discontinuity in Plains Cree political life and how such interpretations of the historical 
record come to be constructed. 
In using the Sawridge case as a window on the complexity of colonial interactions 
around political authority, this study builds on socio-legal approaches to colonial legal 
history that John McLaren and his colleagues and admirers have pioneered in Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand over the last three decades. In addition to being the engine 
behind much of this scholarship, McLaren's work demonstrates how situating historical 
legal doctrines, actors, and debates in their full social and political contexts produces a 
richer understanding of law and legal processes. 10 This chapter intends to emulate this 
fine McLaren tradition by situating the dilemmas of leadership and political community 
implicated by the Treaty 6 record in a more complete historical picture than is apparent 
from the discussion in Sawridge. It is thus an effort to correct the impression left by 
Justice Muldoon's interpretation of the Treaty 6 passages cited above - to answer his 
interpretation of the history with more history by asking how it came to be that the Plains 
Cree would ask for government assistance in "establishing" their chiefs. 
Pursuing this question necessitates looking beyond the Treaty 6 record into the 
colonial relationships that preceded and shaped the Treaty negotiation. This quest takes 
10 Three recent examples include John P.S. McLaren, "Reflections on the Rule of Law: The Georgian 
Colonies of New South Wales and Upper Canada, 1788-1837" in Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne, 
eds., law, History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); 
McLaren, Robert Menzies, and Dorothy E. Chunn, eds., Regulating lives: Historical Essays on the State, 
Society, the Individual, and the law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002); and McLaren, A. R. Buck, and Nancy 
E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2005). 
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us into the practices used by the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) and other European 
traders to encourage indigenous people to take part in the trade; it also involves 
examining the relationships between these men and their indigenous trading partners. The 
investigation will not, however, pursue direct connections between players who 
negotiated treaties and the participants who shaped relations during the fur trade. Such 
connections are difficult to make because, although many participants in the treaty 
negotiations are named and identified, most of the Indians who traded with the HBC in 
earlier eras are not named in the written record. 11 Moreover, though European traders 
identified the band and kinship ties, geographic residence, and larger national or tribal 
affiliations of their indigenous trading partners to the best of their knowledge, their 
knowledge was frequently incomplete and left something to be desired. As a result, this 
inquiry attempts a goal that is less ambitious than tracing the history of a particular group 
of Plains Cree from their fur trade relations to their treaty negotiations. Its aim is to 
portray general patterns to situate the Treaty 6 episodes discussed above and to set a 
backdrop against which we can imagine continuity in Cree governance structures, even in 
the face of colonial interference and disruption. 
This discussion highlights the methodological concerns that shape interpretive 
projects of this sort. Ethnohistorical studies and approaches will be relied on to 
deconstruct the conclusions reached in Sawridge and to rebuild the picture, a process that 
11 See Theodore Binnema, Contested and Common Ground: A Human and Environmental History of the 
Northwestern Plains (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001) at 15. 
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exposes the sources upon which narratives of interference and disruption have been 
grounded. 12 This attention to how narratives of colonial relations are constructed 
demonstrates that even confident historical interpretations are permeated by ambiguities 
that strike at the foundations of our understandings of these relations. Although these 
ambiguities are often the point of debate and intrigue for historians, this chapter will turn 
the question back to Sawridge and invite the reader to consider the different purposes 
served by historical interpretation when undertaken by judges, particularly in the course 
of determining Aboriginal rights claims. 
The starting point for these explorations is recognizing that Justice Muldoon's 
interpretation of Plains Cree governance from the Treaty 6 record is, from a certain 
perspective, unremarkable. It is simply a recent addition to a long-standing colonial 
tradition of confusion around indigenous political forms that runs the gamut from 
misapprehension to manipulation. Examples from other treaty histories illustrate this. For 
instance, the Crown entered into the Robinson-Huron Treaty with the Ojibway in 1850 to 
settle their respective land rights north of Lake Huron. One Ojibway Chief became a 
signatory to the Treaty even though his territory was on the American side of the 
12 Ethnohistory combines traditional historical methods with insights from other fields and sources, 
including ethnography, anthropology, archaeology, and oral traditions. The inclusion of such diverse 
sources is intended to allow for greater insight into peoples who did not participate in the creation of the 
written record. See Jennifer Brown and Elizabeth Vibert, eds., Reading beyond Words: Contexts for Native 
History (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1996) at xxii-xxiii. 
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border. 13 Similarly, in 1921, Treaty Commissioner H.A. Conroy concluded Treaty 11 
negotiations at Fort Simpson with "Old Antoine" while the spokesperson selected by the 
people themselves, "Old Norwegian," went to eat lunch. 14 The Indian Act codified the 
tradition, producing legendary disruptions and distortions in Aboriginal governance and 
citizenship practices, leading to cases such as Sawridge. 15 And the tradition is being 
reproduced in contemporary settings, in which comprehensive treaties between the 
Crown and particular First Nations and Metis peoples are contested by other nations who 
assert that they also have rights and jurisdiction in the same region but have been 
excluded from the negotiations. 16 Whether arising from innocent misconceptions or 
13 See Janet E. Chute, "Ojibwa Leadership during the Fur Trade Era at Sault Ste. Marie" in Susan Sleeper-
Smith, Jo-Anne Fiske, and William Wicken, eds., New Faces of the Fur Trade: Selected Papers of the 
Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1995 (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 1998) 153 at 167. The Chief was Oshawano, also known as Cassaquadung, of the Crane 
dodem. Chute remarks that "The Indian Affairs Department had so little idea of the composition of the 
Sault bands that it is doubtful they ever realized they had included an American Crane chief in their 
negotiations" (at 167). She also notes that the "error" was eventually corrected with the deletion of 
Oshawano's name from the Treaty text in 1859. 
14 Evidence of Louis Norwegian, Proceedings of Re Paulette, vol. 2 at 149-52; Evidence of Phillip 
Lafferty, vol. 2 at 224-29; and Evidence of Charlie Cholo, vol. 2 at 237-38. Louis Norwegian's evidence is 
reproduced in Rene Fumoleau, As Long as This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, 
1870-1939, rev. ed. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004; first published 1975) at 446. See also 
Fumoleau, ibid. at 98-101, for a description of events in the negotiation of Treaty 8 at Fort Resolution. 
15 For a discussion of the some of the highlights of this history, see Val Napoleon, "Extinction by Number: 
Colonialism Made Easy" (2001) 16:1 C.J.L.S. 113. For recent case law, see Mcivor v. The Registrar, 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2007 BCSC 827. 
16 See e.g. Paul v. Canada, 2002 FCT 615 (the North Slave Metis Alliance failed in its application for an 
injunction to prevent the completion of the Dogrib Final Agreement, claiming that it had rights within the 
territory covered by the Agreement, that it had not been represented in its negotiation, and that the Dogrib 
Agreement would prejudice its rights); and Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada, [1998] 4 C.N. L.R. 47 
(B.C.S.C.) (the Gitanyow First Nation sought declarations that, first, the Crown had a duty to negotiate 
with it in good faith (granted: (1999), 66 B.C.L.R. (3d) 165, leave to appeal granted 1999 BCCA 343), and, 
second, the completion of the Nisga'a Agreement prevented the Crown from negotiating with it in good 
faith because it claimed rights within the territory covered by the Agreement and the Agreement prejudiced 
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intentional interference, the failure on the part of colonial administrations to grasp and 
respect the dimensions of indigenous political life is ongoing. 
The problem of political recognition is also a theme that animates colonial history 
more generally. The history of North America (and beyond) is replete with examples of 
mixed success on the part of colonial authorities in their attempts to recognize and gain 
influence over indigenous leaders. The historiography of this issue, mixed as it is with 
other aspects of colonial encounter, once portrayed contact as having a fairly immediate 
and disruptive impact on indigenous societies and their forms of social and political 
organization. The force of European culture and its technology was portrayed as 
pervasive. Inherent in such narratives were the classic dualisms of savage and civilized, 
heathen and Christian, nature and society, all of which fed a presupposition of superiority 
on the part of those who recorded the encounter as well as many who later interpreted 
that record. With the advent of the "new Indian history," however, the story has become 
much more complex. 17 Although narratives of disruption and devastation implying 
radical cultural (and political) change remain, they are told alongside stories of resistance 
and continuity. A key theme in this shift has been an emphasis on individuals and their 
significance as cross-cultural mediators.1 8 Through these individuals, we begin to see past 
the macro-level shifts in behaviour brought on by contact and technological change to 
its rights. The parties have since set aside the litigation and are seeking a resolution of these matters 
through negotiation). 
17 See Daniel K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?" (1993) 50 William and Mary Quarterly 379. 
18 See e.g. James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: 
Norton, 1999). 
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how things looked on the ground, and how individuals drew from centuries-old logic to 
grapple with new situations. 
Taking these common themes back to the relations that set the stage for Treaty 6, 
our exploration begins with the story of a Chief named The Bearded from the early years 
at York Factory, an HBC trading post located in present-day northern Manitoba. 
Although these events predate the Treaty 6 negotiations by almost two hundred years, 
several parallels exist between them. Occurring very close to the point of first contact in 
the York Factory region, this story contradicts histories that portrayed European contact 
as disruptive of previously "pristine" and static structures of leadership and governance 
amongst the Cree. 19 Instead, a more subtle narrative emerges, one that recognizes the 
influence of Europeans as new trading partners and allies, but also leaves room for 
adaptive and even renegade behaviour by individuals manoeuvring in a world of 
indigenous politics that remained beyond view. This account will be followed by a brief 
and more generalized examination of HBC practices regarding the recognition of leaders 
among their Cree trading partners before returning to the late nineteenth century to revisit 
the negotiation of Treaty 6. 
19 See e.g. E.E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870 (New York: Macmillan, 1960) vol. 1 at 1670-
1763. See generally Michael Payne, "Fur Trade Historiography" in Theodore Binnema, Gerhard J. Ens, and 
R.C. Macleod, eds., From Rupert's Land to Canada: Essays in Honour of John E. Foster (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 2001) 3; and Toby Morantz, "Old Texts, Old Questions: Another Look at the 
Issue of Continuity and the Early Fur-Trade Period" (1992) 58 Cdn. Historical Rev. 166. 
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1. One Chief, Two Chiefs: Radisson, The Bearded, and the Settling of York Factory 
In 1682, the French and the English extended their colonial rivalry into the area that 
eventually included York Factory, one of the most significant HBC establishments in the 
early fur trade (see Maps [1] and [2]). Their interests in securing this location were fairly 
obvious. With two large rivers - the Nelson and the Hayes-. merging to flow into 
Hudson Bay, it was ideally situated for Cree, Assiniboine, and other inland peoples to 
travel to the coast to trade furs, giving the European traders unparalleled access to 
desirable inland furs without having to travel into these unknown territories themselves. 
Moreover, the access to Hudson Bay from the Atlantic was also convenient for transport 
of goods and supplies between Europe and North America. Eventually, the English 
secured their claim to this region as against the French through the Treaty of Utrecht in 
1 713, but the trading post changed hands several times in the preceding thirty years, with 
both the French and the English attempting to establish their presence there in 1682-83. 
In the process of competing for the York Factory region, the HBC and French 
traders followed what was by then fairly standard colonial patterns in dealing with the 
indigenous peoples of the area. There is no report of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by 
the HBC officers who first landed there, but we do know that the company instructed its 
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officers to settle "leagues of friendship" with the peoples who inhabited these lands and 
later claimed that they had done so.20 
The record left by the French is more detailed. Their team was led by Pierre Esprit 
Radisson, an experienced trader well schooled in the arts of diplomacy amongst 
Algonquian peoples through his earlier experience 
Map 1: Early trading posts of the Hudson's Bay Company 
Cartographer: Eric Leinberger 
2
° For the instructions, see "Letter to John Nixon, 21 May 1680" in E.E. Rich, ed., Copy-book of letters 
Outward &c. Begins 29th May, 1680 Ends 5 July, 1687 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1948) at 9 and 12-
13. For the company's claims, see Memorial prepared by James Hayes, undated [est., 1682] in Rich, ibid. at 
70-71. 
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in the Great Lakes region and a key player in the HBC's earliest explorations of Hudson 
Bay before he switched teams to lead the French efforts in the York Factory region. 
Radisson left a journal documenting this mission, and his report confirms adherence to 
French practices of gift-giving and establishing kin relations with the local populations.2 1 
He describes making contact with the Swampy Cree people inhabiting the Hayes River 
basin shortly after arriving in the York Factory region in 1682.22 Soon after contact was 
established, Radisson participated in a small gathering during which he and the leader of 
the Hayes River Cree made speeches, exchanged gifts, and smoked pipes of tobacco. 
Through this process, Radisson was adopted by the Hayes River Chief as his son, and 
21 Canada, "Relation of the Voyage of Pierre Esprit Radisson to the North of America in the years 1682 and 
1683" by Pierre Esprit Radisson in "Report of the Minister of Agriculture for the Dominion of Canada, 
1895," Sessional Papers, no. Sa (Ottawa, 1896). See also Gideon D. Scull, Voyages of Peter Esprit 
Radisson (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967). For descriptions of French-Indian diplomacy in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, see Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the 
Great lakes Regions, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
22 The Swampy Cree inhabited the swampy lowlands near the coast of Hudson Bay. They are distinct from 
the Woodland Cree, who lived inland from the bay in the surrounding boreal forest, and from the Plains 
Cree, who lived further inland still and hunted buffalo on the plains. In spite of their different homelands, 
these peoples spoke dialects of a common language. See Victor P. Lytwyn, Muskekowuck Athinuwick: 
Original People of the Great Swampy land (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2002) at c. 1. 
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he himself promised to protect the Chief and his kin as if they were his own. 23 Radisson 
believed that this ceremony gave him and his men permission to build a trading house in 
the Chiefs territory and to conduct commerce there. 24 
Radisson makes it sound so easy. He arrives and in no time manages to establish 
an alliance and adoptive relationship with the most important person in the region. But 
how did Radisson know that he had the right man? By his own account, upon landing in 
unfamiliar territory, he located the Chief via the simple expedient of asking the first 
23 Radisson, supra note 21 at 11, 13; Scull, supra note 21 at 262-64. 
24 Radisson, ibid. at 11, 13, 77; Scull, supra note 21 at 262-64, 355. 
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group of Indians that he met.25 By some happy coincidence, the first person he asked was 
the Hayes River Chief himself, who, after appropriate words and ceremonies were 
exchanged, immediately granted Radisson the permissions he sought. It was also 
convenient that the Hayes River people were eager to form an alliance with Europeans 
such as Radisson and his men. These people were well aware of the existence of the 
Europeans and their goods - particularly their guns - through their allies and kin 
networks. Their more southerly Swampy Cree relatives in western James Bay had already 
been in contact with European traders for almost a decade, and their Ojibway neighbours 
around the Great Lakes for the better part of a century. This prior knowledge of 
Europeans and their guns is confirmed by Radisson' s report that, upon learning of his 
intention to establish a trading house and enter into a trade and alliance with them, one of 
the elders of the Hayes River people said, "Young men, you have no longer anything to 
fear. The sun has become favourable to us, our enemies will fear us, since here is the man 
whom we have been seeking since our fathers were born. "26 But none of these 
dimensions of the encounter helps us understand whether Radisson had formed this 
25 Radisson, ibid. at 11; Scull, supra note 21 at 263. 
26 Radisson, ibid. It is not clear from the record whether this elder was the Chief who had adopted Radisson 
as his son. It is perhaps worth considering whether this statement of anticipation was specific to Radisson, 
as, given his exploits and travels in the Great Lakes region, his reputation may have preceded him. 
Ultimately, however, this seems unlikely. Radisson's earlier travels took place in the 1650s and 1660s, and 
the speaker referred to the time in which their "fathers were born." This means that, were the anticipation 
specific to Radisson, the speaker would have to be quite young, a conclusion that is unlikely given 
Radisson' s description of him as an elder. 
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important relationship with the right man. Indeed, some incidents he reports from the 
following year give us pause. 
After establishing a relationship with the Hayes River Cree, Radisson went back 
to Europe and left his nephew, Jean Baptiste Chouart, in charge of the fledgling French 
trading house they had built near the mouth of the Hayes River.27 Shortly after Radisson 
left, a different group of Cree from the New Severn River, located to the south of the 
Hayes, were travelling near the French trading house. These people had already formed a 
trading relationship with the English who, since 1674, maintained a presence at the 
mouth of the Albany River in James Bay. Aware of these prior associations, the French 
were nevertheless keen to attract new customers. They greeted the New Severn people, 
told them of their purposes in seeking trade, and invited them to come to the trading 
house to smoke tobacco with them. Upon arriving at the French trading house, one of the 
party left and returned two days later. He, too, was greeted with tobacco, as was the 
custom of the land, but he came with unfriendly intentions. He took the unarmed Chouart 
aside and informed him that "[he] was worthless because [he] did not love the English 
and that [he] had not paid by presents for the country [he] inhabited to him who was the 
chief of all the nations and the friend of the English at the head of the bay. "28 After 
proclaiming himself "chief of all the nations," this man escalated his insults until the 
27 Jean Baptiste Chouart, also known as Jean-Baptiste Des Groseilliers, was the son of Medard Chouart Des 
Groseilliers, the other famous French explorer who accompanied Radisson on his first mission on behalf of 
the HBC in 1667. 
28 Radisson, supra note 21 at 67. 
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exchange degenerated into a scuffle. Chouart was injured but, by his report (through 
Radisson), was still able to gain the upper hand. The scuffle attracted the attention of the 
other New Severn people and Frenchmen at the fort, and Chouart was told that the man 
he held was an English mole to whom gunpowder and other goods had been promised if 
he succeeded in killing all the Frenchmen at the fort. The moment passed and Chouart, in 
a show of generosity (again, by his report), permitted all the New Severn River Cree to 
leave. 
When the Hayes River people learned of this incident, they were not satisfied to 
leave the dispute unresolved and the plot against their allies unanswered. They called the 
New Severn people back to the French trading house for a council and feast to "learn the 
merits of the case." Instead of diffusing the tensions, however, the meeting simply 
worsened the dispute. Insults were traded until the man who had described himself as a 
chief to Chouart was assaulted and killed on the spot.29 The Hayes River Cree went on to 
attack the nearby English post, escalating tensions throughout the region and beyond. 
With the threat of retaliatory attacks readily apparent, the French convinced several 
Hayes River Cree to stay with them throughout the winter for security. When the rivers 
were once again passable in spring, Chouart reported that "several detachments of 
friendly nations arrived to relieve us," including some from much further south.30 The 
29 Radisson, ibid. 
30 Radisson, ibid. at 71. According to the narrative, these detachments included more than four hundred 
men from the "Assinipoetes," who had come on the strength of alliances with Radisson that predated this 
mission along the Hudson Bay coast. 
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rivalry between the French and the English was thus taken up by their respective allies 
among the indigenous nations. Less apparent from this narrative, however, is how this 
rivalry might have been overlaid onto pre-existing or latent rivalries among the 
indigenous nations. 
It was to these tensions that Radisson returned in the summer of 1684, with the 
surprising news that he was in the service of the English once again. 31 Radisson then had 
the delicate task of converting his loyal Hayes River and other allies into friends of the 
English and enemies, or at least "strangers," to the French. During this process, he had a 
conversation with his adoptive father, the Hayes River Chief from whom he had 
originally received permission to settle in the York Factory region on behalf of the 
French. According to Radisson, the Hayes River Chief had learned "that the chief of the 
nation which inhabits the upper part of the river New Severn, named The Bearded, and 
one of his sons, who were his relations, had been killed when going to attack those 
among the Indians who had felt it their duty to maintain the Frenchman [Chouart] who 
had been wounded by an Indian gained over by the English. "32 In this recounting, the 
New Severn Chief- identified as "The Bearded" - and his son are differentiated from 
31 When the French merchants seemed uninterested in advancing or taking advantage of Radisson's 
explorations of Hudson Bay, Radisson sought greener pastures back with the English. See E.E. Rich, supra 
note 19 at 158-62. 
32 Radisson, supra note 21 at 77. 
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the man who was "gained over" by the English and who proclaimed himself to Chouart 
as "chief of all the nations. "33 
Perhaps the man who described himself in this manner was the leader of a 
different band of New Severn people or was a rival of The Bearded. Perhaps he was not a 
leader at all and was hoping his association with the English would help establish him as 
one. Or perhaps, in spite of the Hayes River Chief's report (delivered via Radisson), this 
man was The Bearded himself, or a different son, or another relative. We cannot be 
certain. But if we take Radisson's second-hand recounting as a reliable report of events, 
what we do know is that there were overlapping if not competing claims of authority 
regarding whose permission was required by the Europeans wanting to establish a 
presence in the York Factory region. Equally interesting for our purposes is that, though 
we cannot assess the strength of the claims to this authority, the Hayes River Chief's 
identification of The Bearded as kin and fellow Chief nonetheless indicates that political 
authority was established and recognizable amongst the Cree, if not their European 
trading partners. 
There is one final postscript and one more player to add before closing this tale. 
Captain Geyer, the HBC's bayside governor, was also in the York Factory region during 
the summer of 1684, continuing construction of the company's fort. 34 Anxious to 
33 In Lytwyn's interpretation, supra note 22 at 129, the man who sparked the conflict by demanding that the 
French recognize him as Chief is identified as The Bearded. 
34 Radisson, supra note 21 at xxiii, identified this man as Captain "Gazer," but, as explained by Douglas 
Brymner, the archivist who compiled Radisson's narrative, Gazer was most probably Captain Geyer. See 
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introduce the Hayes River Chief to him, Radisson called Geyer to meet him and the Chief 
before he sailed back to England. Introducing the Chief to Geyer was a measure that 
would confirm Radisson's renewed connection with the English and reassure the Chief 
that he too would benefit from the relationship with the English and their continued 
alliance. The meeting with Geyer, however, did not go well. Radisson suggested that 
Geyer give some presents to his adoptive father. He emphasized that such presents were 
necessary for two reasons: first, to demonstrate respect for the Hayes River Chiefs 
authority in the region in which they were building the English fort; and second, to fulfill 
a promise of gifts that Radisson had made the previous year, which would both confirm 
their relationship and preserve his reputation. Geyer bristled at Radisson' s suggestion. As 
Radisson explains, Geyer 
took this in bad part and was irritated even against the chief, without any reason, 
unless it was that he was my adopted father. I learned afterwards that he was 
annoyed because on my arrival I had not given any presents to a common Indian, 
who served him as a spy, and was son of the chief called "The Bearded," which 
would have been a horrible extravagance; for besides the Governor being inferior 
to me, I was not obliged to acknowledge his favourite, and I have never made 
presents except to the chiefs of these nations. 35 
Radisson's words, which show his disdain for the company's bayside governor, also 
reveal his concern that Geyer' s conduct should uphold his honour in the relationships he 
had formed while acting for the French. We might also say that Geyer was similarly 
also Alice M. Johnson, Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, vol. 1, ed. by John English and Real 
Belanger, s.v. "Geyer, George," online: Library and Archives Canada http://www.biographi.ca/. 
35 Radisson, ibid. at 77. In Scull, supra note 21 at 354-55, the "common Indian" in this passage is replaced 
with a "simple savage," a direct translation from the French. 
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concerned, or perhaps simply disliked Radisson and did not want to recognize his 
authority and superior knowledge of Hudson Bay. In any event, it is unlikely that either 
of these men took kindly to entertaining the other's allies. To do so would not only 
acknowledge the rival officer's authority, but might also imply that he himself had been 
wrong - that he had not identified the "right" leader or leaders to work with in the first 
place. 
Although this tale of political conceits has only one narrator - Radisson - it 
nonetheless provides three different versions of related events, offering a number of 
claims regarding both the identity of the regional Cree leaders and the scope of their 
authority. First, Chouart, through Radisson, reported the New Severn Cree man's claim to 
being "chief of all the nations" and the person to whom presents were owed. Second, the 
conversation between Radisson and the Hayes River Chief identified The Bearded as the 
New Severn Chief and implied that, although loyal to the English, this Chief and at least 
one of his sons were not involved in the original incident concerning Chouart. And third, 
the report from Radisson' s dealings with Geyer indicates that The Bearded' s son was an 
English spy, increasing the probability that the individual who described himself as Chief 
of all the nations had also been a son of the New Severn Chief. Further, the disagreement 
between Radisson and Geyer about who properly merited their respects in establishing 
their trading presence in the York Factory region may have indicated overlapping or 
competing indigenous claims or simply ignorance on the part of the Europeans. The 
reports are nevertheless consistent that there was a New Severn Chief known as The 
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Bearded who died in the ensuing hostilities. What else can we know? Did the Hayes 
River Chief have the authority to grant Radisson permission to establish the French 
trading post, or did Radisson also require permission from The Bearded? How extensive 
was the influence of these two Chiefs, and to what extent was it bolstered by their newly 
formed connections with the French and the English, respectively? What were the 
contours of the relationship and the reciprocal obligations between the New Severn Cree 
and the Hayes River Cree? And what of other relationships formed and tested through 
this tale: between adopted sons and fathers, between chiefs, their sons, and their larger 
kin relations? 
If we trust Radisson's account, the Hayes River Chief was the right man with 
whom to curry favour in trying to establish a foothold in the region where York Factory 
was eventually built. The Bearded was a neighbouring Chief, to whom they owed no 
special favours in respect of building on that land, and Geyer was foolish to assume that 
The Bearded's son automatically carried the mantle of Chief through his father. If we 
continue along this line and assume for the moment that the man who claimed to be 
"chief of all the nations" was The Bearded, this claim was a renegade one. If he was not 
The Bearded, its renegade quality is even more obvious. It was a claim that pushed the 
status quo, at least as assumed by Radisson and his entourage. It constituted a power 
grab, either by a person who already had some power or by one who was more 
audaciously seizing the moment to get some. But this interpretation of the claim follows 
only if Radisson's assessment of the Hayes River Chief and his authority was correct. 
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The possibility that Radisson' s assessment was wrong requires that we consider a 
different backdrop for this story, a status quo in which the man claiming to be chief 
actually was the more powerful figure or in which the Europeans required permission 
from more than one chief to establish their trading houses. Alternatively, the Europeans 
might also have arrived in the midst of a power struggle that rendered the scope of the 
Chiefs' respective authorities unclear. 
There are more reasons to trust Radisson' s reporting and analysis than to distrust 
them. His narrative of the events of 1682-84 was at least in part a self-serving account to 
confirm his renewed loyalties to the HBC and underscore his accomplishments for the 
Company, thereby securing his importance to it in future. This aim might have affected 
his writing style, but it would not have affected his judgment and actions during the 
events he described. Radisson was one of the most knowledgeable traders in North 
America, with many years of experience in Indian country, including periods of adoption 
and captivity among the Iroquois.36 His nephew Chouart also had many years of 
experience in Indian country. If any European traders could distinguish an Indian chief on 
sight, whether by comportment, clothing, or other distinguishing marks, it would 
probably have been these two. Thus, in spite of a well-earned reputation for hyperbole 
36 For a recent biography of Radisson, see Martin Fournier, Pierre-Esprit Radisson: Merchant Adventurer, 
1636-1710 (Sillery, QC: Septentrion, 2002). 
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and a healthy ego, Radisson was likely to have understood the political dynamics of his 
new acquaintances and was among the most able narrators of this era.37 
The reliability of narrators is always questionable, however, even when we deal 
with someone as knowledgeable as Radisson. Their limitations are particularly apparent 
when we begin to probe the extent of their knowledge. Radisson may have understood 
how to greet and make alliances with Algonquian peoples such as the Swampy Cree of 
the Hudson Bay lowlands. And he quite probably understood the qualifications of a chief, 
along with the privileges and obligations of this office. However, he could not have 
known the lay of the land with respect to rivalries and disputes between the nations of the 
lowland Cree and others. When he wrote his narrative, he had not been in the region long 
enough to discover these dynamics. What he knew of these matters would have come 
from the Hayes River Cree, a group that had already tied its trading future to him and 
vice versa. There is no neutral informant, or any final answer to historiographic questions 
of continuity: did the Europeans create new rivalries among the Cree and new leaders to 
lead them, or did their arrival simply reignite old fires? On these issues, the record is 
silent. 
37 Radisson's hyperbole - he once infamously described himself and Des Groseilliers as "caesars" - has 
prompted historians to consider him untrustworthy. However, Germaine Warkentin explains that his style 
reflects the language of the court more than it does the overbearing ego often attributed to him. She also 
notes that hyperbole is less apparent in the accounts of his voyages from the 1680s - the source for this 
tale - which are written in a plainer style, aimed at the needs of merchants. Warkentin, "Discovering 
Radisson: A Renaissance Adventurer between Two Worlds" in Jennifer Brown and Elizabeth Vibert, eds., 
Reading Beyond Words: Contexts/or Native History (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1996) 43. 
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2. Red Chiefs, Blue Chiefs: HBC Trading Captains, Cree Chiefs, and Symbols of 
Authority 
Radisson clearly had a good understanding of his indigenous trading partners and 
knew how to work in their country. This knowledge and skill was highly valued in the fur 
trade, as the ability to know and be respected by indigenous traders meant stronger 
relationships and, ultimately, more furs. But not every trader had Radisson's know-how. 
Some HBC traders were better than others at knowing and working with their Indian 
trading partners. Over time, some of the individual wisdom was consolidated through the 
institutional practices of the HBC, but the success of individual traders applying these 
practices remained variable. 
One such company practice was the appointment of trading captains. During the 
first century of its presence in North America, the HBC stayed firmly planted on the coast 
of Hudson Bay. Most of the furs it acquired were brought to it by Plains Cree and other 
inland peoples who made an annual or biennial trek down the rivers in large trading 
parties. From this fixed geographic position, trading post factors had very little scope to 
influence inland peoples and their participation in the trade. One of the few tools 
available to the factors was recognizing trading captains. Bestowed upon the leaders of 
large trading parties, this recognition nurtured relationships with resourceful and 
influential (or so the factors hoped) leaders, encouraging them to bring more people, or at 
least more furs, down to the Hudson Bay coast to trade. Once at the fort, these leaders 
represented the inland fur producers and members of the trading party in discussions of 
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price and other dealings with the HBC. Company factors hoped that recognizing a special 
relationship through the trading captain system would convince their trading partners to 
remain loyal to them and not do business with the French (and later, Canadian) 
competition. 38 
The HBC also depended upon local populations to assist it with hunting and other 
activities associated with daily subsistence. Local leaders were instrumental in organizing 
the labour force necessary to undertake bigger seasonal activities, such as the spring and 
fall goose hunts, and were therefore also recognized as trading captains. The relationships 
between these local leaders, their kin, and the company often moved beyond such 
services, becoming close and multi-faceted. They were, as we saw in Radisson's 
narrative, allies who gave the company permission to be on their land. They were also 
frequently the fathers of the women who married senior company officers according to 
the "custom of the country," bringing the officers into their kin networks and fostering 
more integrated relations between the company and the local peoples. 39 In addition, these 
local leaders also served as HBC ambassadors, greeting leaders from other nations in the 
course of their seasonal travels and inviting them to the trading post on the company's 
38 Regarding the conduct of the trade generally, see Arthur J. Ray and Don Freeman, "Give Us Good 
Measure": An Economic Analysis of Relations between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company before 
1763 {Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978). Regarding trading captains more specifically, see 
Morantz, supra note 8. 
39 See Sylvia van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade Society in Western Canada, 1670-1870 
(Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer, 1980); Jennifer Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families 
in Indian Country (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1980); and Heather Rollanson Driscoll, "'A Most Important 
Chain of Connection': Marriage in the Hudson's Bay Company" in Theodore Binnema, Gerhard J. Ens, 
and R.C. Macleod, eds., From Rupert's Land to Canada: Essays in Honour of John E. Foster (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 2001) 81. 
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behalf. In fostering these relationships, the HBC was also implicated in the enmities and 
rivalries of these local peoples. 
Recognition as a trading captain meant receiving gifts and material symbols of the 
relationship implied by this status. In a system that quickly became standardized across 
HBC trading posts, the captains received gifts of tobacco, liquor, food, a special coat that 
was either red or blue, and other clothing when they arrived at the forts to trade. They 
received further gifts of tobacco, guns, cloth, and brandy when they left. 40 Local trading 
captains received similar gifts at the gathering accompanying the spring goose hunts and 
at least some tobacco, food, and brandy when they visited the forts at other times. In 
material terms, these gifts expressed the HBC's rudimentary understanding of the 
institutions of Cree leadership, the central feature of which was that, except in times of 
war, Cree leaders maintained their status without coercive force, relying instead on their 
persuasive abilities, their wisdom, and their generosity.41 These characteristics signalled 
the leader's merit as a hunter and diplomat, as someone capable of acquiring wealth. But 
wealth was valued only as something that would be shared rather than accumulated. The 
HBC gifts played into the dynamics of Cree leadership, at least as the HBC understood 
them. The coats served to distinguish a captain's status, whereas the other gifts could be 
40 Ray and Freeman, supra note 38; and Glyndwr Williams, ed., Andrew Graham's Observations on 
Hudson's Bay, 1767-91 (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1969) at 317 (Graham's Observations]. 
41 See e.g. Graham's Observations, ibid. at 169-70; and Captain James Knight's observations in the York 
Factory Post Journal from 1717 (20 April 1717), Winnipeg, Hudson's Bay Company Archives (HBCA) 
(B.239/a/3). 
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distributed among his trading party and his constituency to confirm and maintain it.42 By 
giving the captains tobacco to distribute to other nations upon their departure, HBC 
factors promoted their ability to demonstrate generosity to other people and nations away 
from the fort, thereby again reinforcing their status as leaders. The more "productive" 
trading captains - those who brought more furs to the company - were rewarded with 
larger quantities of gifts and promises of more to come, again reinforcing their influence 
among their own people. 43 
To return to questions of continuity and disruption, the key to understanding the 
implications of this system for indigenous political forms and governance lies in the 
manner and scope of its application. First, we must question how well the HBC men 
knew the Cree communities they dealt with. As in the story of The Bearded, we must 
consider the scope of our narrators' knowledge and factor in an appropriate margin of 
error. For example, one of the best-known observations regarding Cree governance is 
from the journals of Andrew Graham.44 Graham spent approximately twenty-five years 
on the west coast of Hudson Bay and benefited from the tutelage of James Isham, one of 
the most respected and successful factors York Factory ever had. Both were known to 
have taken country wives. But Graham never travelled inland himself, culling his 
observations from his experience among the local peoples and from other men who had 
42 Ray and Freeman, supra note 38 at 68, remark that, according to a nineteenth-century source, the 
captains often gave away these coats, along with all the other gifts. 
43 Ibid. at 69 and 241. 
44 Graham's Observations, supra note 40. 
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made the journey into Indian country. And though both Isham and Graham left 
rudimentary trading vocabularies in Cree and other languages, it is remarkable that no 
pidgin language, no lingua franca, ever developed through the contact between the HBC 
and the Swampy Cree or inland peoples. That there was no Chinook of the northwest is 
indicative oflimited contact between trading post factors and their trading partners.45 
Given these parameters, the development of more than a tourist's acquaintance with the 
lives and political systems of their indigenous trading partners was very much a matter of 
individual initiative and skill in getting the required information through other sources.46 
Second, though most of the HBC's interests aligned with recognizing trading 
captains who already had a following, the implementation of this strategy depended on 
the ability of individual factors to identify such persons, a skill that was not universally 
well developed. As a general rule, the company needed trading captains who had 
influence over others. Due to this, it sometimes found itself dealing with leaders whom, 
had circumstances permitted otherwise, it would not normally have chosen for such a 
role. Daniel Francis and Toby Marantz discuss an example from Richmond Fort (1749-
59) on the eastern coast of Hudson Bay whereby "Shewescome, an Indian the postmaster 
deemed an 'idle lazey fellow,' was maintained as a captain because 'he has so Great a 
45 Linguist Peter Bakker has noted the possibility that trade proceeded through interpreters and has 
remarked that "[g]iven that the HBC traded with Natives for such a long period, it is surprising that so few 
of their employees knew a Native language." Bakker, "Hudson Bay Trader's Cree: A Cree Pidgin?" in John 
D. Nichols and Arden C. Ogg, eds., Nikotwasik iskwahtem, paskihtepayih!: Studies in Honour of H.C. 
Wolfart (Winnipeg: Algonquian and Iroquoian Linguistics, 1996) 1 at 4. 
46 For discussions of the skill set of a trading post factor, see Ray, supra note 8; and Foster, supra note 8. 
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Sway over the Natives here I am Obliged to be very kind to him, for what he says is a 
Law with them. "'47 On the other hand, there were interests and situational factors, 
including less knowledgeable and talented HBC officers, which would have led to the 
appointment of captains who would not otherwise have attained leadership status in their 
communities.48 For example, HBC factors were under pressure from the company to 
encourage Aboriginal hunters to change their hunting objectives from food to furs, a 
change the company believed would increase the productivity of its trading posts. 
Bestowing the title of "captain" and its associated presents was the primary means by 
which HBC factors could encourage this transition, and it was probably applied 
indiscriminately by at least some HBC men. Competition with rival French traders was 
also a significant motivation for recognizing trading captains who were otherwise not 
recognized as leaders by their communities. Finally, the HBC was not alone in its interest 
in forming trading captain relationships. Trading captain status was meaningful to the 
local and trading party leaders in part because it gave them the tools they needed to seek 
or reinforce their leadership status within their own communities. Consequently, the 
institution of trading captain presented an opportunity to stake out or expand a leadership 
role, an opportunity that would appeal as much, if not more, to ambitious or potentially 
47 Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 
1600-1870 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983) at 44, quoting Fort Richmond 
Post Journal, HBCA (B.182/a/1 :48d). See also Morantz, supra note 8 at 490. 
48 Ethnographer David G. Mandelbaum noted that "[t]he Hudson's Bay Company disturbed the pattern of 
chieftainship in some degree": Mandelbaum, The Plains Cree: An Ethnographic, Historical and 
Comparative Study (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina, 1979) at 108. 
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rebellious individuals as to well established leaders. One need only reflect on the story of 
The Bearded to consider how this potent mix of colonial and local interests might play 
out. 
In the context of this system of recognition and rewards, and the circle of 
generosity it created, the line between the recognition of existing Cree leaders and the 
creation of new ones was easily crossed. Trading captains may or may not have been men 
who were, or would otherwise become, recognized as leaders in their communities. 
However, the appointment of leaders who might otherwise not have been recognized as 
such does not necessarily equate to the subversion or disruption of a whole system of 
governance and politics. In fact, the HBC's choices of leaders and forms ofrecognition 
relied on Cree institutions and practices, and may have in some cases served to reinforce 
rather than detract from them.49 Thus, though it is important to recognize that the 
institution of trading captain had some impact on leadership in Aboriginal communities 
and probably had disruptive impacts in specific cases, conclusions that HBC practices 
caused discontinuities in Cree leadership structures and resulted in "puppet" leaders 
lacking legitimacy in their own communities are unwarranted, at least on a general level. 
In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the company began to establish 
trading posts inland, finally engaging its Canadian competitor, the North West Company, 
directly. With this move the competition between the two trading companies heightened 
49 As Morantz, supra note 8 at 495, notes, "[t]he trading captain system may not have been extraordinary 
from the perspective of [northern Algonquian] social organization." 
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until they merged in 1821. Deeply connected to the Company's efforts to outdo its 
competitors, the practice of recognizing captains fell away after this merger. However, 
this formal end to the institution of captain did not end the HBC practice of recognizing 
important leaders and "principal men." In spite of Governor Simpson's best efforts to 
rationalize the company's practices and cut away all the fat that had accumulated through 
the years of competition, trading post factors were never able to completely abandon the 
annual or sometimes semi-annual giving of gifts and special tokens of recognition to the 
leaders of their trading partners. so The negotiation of the numbered treaties on the prairies 
thus occurred against this backdrop of long-standing practices of political recognition. 
3. The Lessons of History: Revisiting the Sawridge Case 
The numbered treaties include provisions regarding the distribution of medals and 
suits of clothing for Indian chiefs and headmen. To a modem reader, these provisions 
seem archaic and appear to support interpretations of treaty history that portray the 
Indians as victims who gave away their land for trinkets. However, if we keep in mind 
the events of the early 1680s in the York Factory region and the HBC practice of 
recognizing trading captains, the historic significance of these provisions comes into 
focus. Rather than demonstrating victimhood, they take their place in a long history of 
recognition in which the newcomers acknowledged Cree and other Aboriginal leaders 
50 Arthur Ray notes that in spite of Simpson's intended reforms, trading practices "in the parkland area ... 
remained largely unchanged and at best the company managed to trim the excesses": Ray, Indians in the 
Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-
1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 196. 
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through gifts, coats, and symbolic gestures. 51 It was a process that influenced and 
disrupted local politics, including the selection of particular leaders in some cases, but 
that certainly did not supplant the political modalities underlying the recognition of those 
leaders. 
If we take this longer view in revisiting the excerpts from the Treaty 6 record 
cited in the Sawridge judgment, the Plains Cree request for the Dominion government to 
establish their chiefships is still troubling but less mysterious. The Treaty 6 context 
included the collapse of the buffalo herds. 52 The conditions of scarcity rendered special 
relationships with the Company, or its more recently arrived American competitors, more 
important than ever since these relationships were a medium through which indigenous 
peoples accessed relief and support for hunting and trapping from the European traders. 
In these conditions, the Plains Cree who asked that their "chiefships be established by the 
Government" undoubtedly did not mean to imply that they had no system of government, 
but rather that they would like the Dominion government to regulate the destructive 
forces wrought by the combination of American competition in the fur trade and .scarcity 
on a scale never before experienced. They understood that the interests created by these 
conditions had the potential to splinter their communities, but such comprehension cannot 
51 See Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank J. Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A Documentary History of 
Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) at c. 1. 
52 See Taylor, supra note 4. 
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be equated with the disappearance of a system of governance as a fait accompli. And yet, 
this is precisely the conclusion drawn by Justice Muldoon in the Sawridge decision. 
Muldoon's literal interpretation of the Plains Cree request is also problematic on a 
number of other fronts. Drawing on the interpretive lessons from Radisson's narrative of 
events in the early 1680s, we can query whether Muldoon treated Reverend McDougall's 
report with sufficient appreciation of the factors that shaped and limited McDougall's 
vision. Little probing is required to conclude that he does not. For one, Justice Muldoon's 
conclusions assume that all Plains Cree were looking for colonial recognition and 
assistance in sorting out internal leadership problems. He does not consider who made the 
requests relayed by Reverend McDougall, or on whose behalf they were voiced. Digging 
just a bit deeper into the record confirms that taking this request as representative of the 
views of all or even most of the Plains Cree is problematic. A consideration of the whole 
report submitted by Reverend McDougall reveals that the group of Cree who asked the 
government to establish their chiefships was primarily composed of people whom the 
Reverend considered moderate, reasonable in their demands, and inclined to cooperate 
with the government's designs. For example, McDougall expressed relief that the 
troublemaker Big Bear - the famous Plains Cree Chief who resisted the treaty until 1882 
and was jailed for his part in the Northwest Resistance of 1885 - and his followers were 
a "very small minority" in this larger group. 53 In his report, he further marginalized Big 
53 Morris, supra note 5 at 174. 
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Bear's influence by describing him as "a Saulteaux, trying to take the lead in their [the 
Plains Cree] council," a statement presuming that Big Bear's non-Cree ethnic origins 
diminished his legitimacy as a Cree leader. 54 Although this assumption certainly reveals 
McDougall's views on the subject, it provides no insight into the institutions of 
leadership as understood by the Cree themselves. 55 
Like Radisson's assertions regarding the Hayes River leader's importance and the 
correctness of his own decision to deal with him, McDougall's attempts to downplay the 
significance of Big Bear's influence demonstrate his eagerness to establish the success of 
his mission and to please Lieutenant-Governor Morris. But, simply probing the record 
regarding his motives and bringing a longer history of colonial relations and ethnographic 
sources to bear on his assertions reveals that the Plains Cree held differing opinions 
concerning the treaties. The request conveyed by Reverend McDougall did not represent 
the wishes of all Plains Cree, even though a majority did accept the treaty the following 
year. 
54 Ibid. The "Saulteaux" are known today as the Anishnabe or Ojibway people. Rudy Wiebe notes that in 
1874, a year before Reverend McDougall's visit, the Hudson's Bay Company had recorded Big Bear's 
camp as consisting of sixty-five lodges, or approximately 520 people. By comparison, Sweet Grass, another 
prominent Plains Cree Chief who was named by the company as "Chief of the Country," had fifty-six 
lodges. See Wiebe, Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, vol. 11, ed. by John English and Real 
Belanger, s.v. "Mistahimaskwa (Big Bear)," online: Library and Archives Canada 
http://www.biographi.ca/. 
55 See Binnema, supra note 11, who comments that, among the peoples of the northwestern plains, no 
necessary correspondence existed between ethnic groups/cultural units and social, political, and economic 
units; and Susan R. Sharrock, "Crees, Cree-Assiniboines, and Assiniboines: Interethnic Social Organization 
on the Far Northern Plains" (1974) 21 :2 Ethnohistory 95, who remarks that plains bands were often 
polyethnic in composition, either Cree-Assiniboine or Cree-Saulteaux, with fused ethnic identities 
emerging in the nineteenth century. 
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Further comments from the Treaty 6 record cited in the Sawridge judgment can 
also be productively revisited at this juncture. The beginning of this chapter quoted 
Treaty Commissioner Morris' report of the Treaty 6 negotiations. In it, Morris told the 
Willow Band of the Plains Cree that a chief must have a following of twenty tents in 
order for the government to deal with him as a chief. In this instruction, we see the old 
HBC concern that a man possess a certain amount of influence to be recognized as a 
leader. Contrary to Justice Muldoon's interpretation, however, this concern can be seen 
as a reflection of the persistence of Cree political institutions rather than a sign of their 
breakdown. As discussed above, Cree political community and leadership was flexible, 
decentralized, and held together by non-coercive means. In this system, the influence of a 
Cree chief varied over his lifetime. 56 The Cree did not need a numerical definition of 
chiefhood; the government did. Moreover, the top government negotiators did not come 
equipped with the wisdom and experience of Radisson, Isham, or Graham that was 
necessary to understand these institutions of leadership. Morris, for instance, had been a 
lawyer and parliamentarian in Upper Canada and a judge in Manitoba before his 
appointment to negotiate the treaties. Although Morris was informed and accompanied by 
HBC men in the negotiations, his view of Cree political institutions was probably 
coloured - if not confined - by his background and class. Even if he understood that 
56 For example, Wiebe, supra note 54, notes that Big Bear's influence grew from approximately twelve 
tents (20 men) in 1862 to sixty-five lodges (520 people) in 1874 and then to 247 people in 1882. The 
waning of his influence in the latter years was tied to the starvation suffered by his people. 
68 
Cree leadership was dynamic and flexible, these characteristics would appear to confirm 
the inferiority of Cree society and signal the administrative headaches and obstacles 
involved in bringing order to the "chaos" of the North-West Territories.57 To grapple with 
Aboriginal governance structures, Morris and his successors introduced rigid, distorting 
means of control such as the Indian Act, but such measures were not present during the 
fur trade. Morris' comments thus mark a new era in the influence of the colonists on 
Aboriginal leadership, not because the underlying desire to identify influential leaders 
had changed, but because of the new legal tools used to address it. 
Lastly, Morris also referred to a request made by a chief for a blue coat. The 
colour of a coat may seem a trivial matter, but in fact it was a potent signifier. In a section 
not quoted in the Sawridge judgment, Morris reported responding to this request as 
follows: 
The color of your Chiefs coat is perhaps a little thing; red is the color all the 
Queen's Chiefs wear. I wear this coat, but it is only worn by those who stand as 
the Queen's Councillors; her soldiers and her officers wear red, and all the other 
Chiefs of the Queen wear the coats we have brought, and the good of this is that 
when the Chief is seen with his uniform and medal every one knows he is an 
officer of hers. I should be sorry to see ~ou different from the others, and now that 
you understand you would not wish it. 5 
As noted above, coats were an important element of the "outfits" that were given to 
captains upon their arrival at the trading post. Andrew Graham's report describes the 
57 See Jean Friesen, Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, vol. 11, ed. by John English and Real 
Belanger, s.v. "Morris, Alexander," online: Library and Archives Canada http://www.biographi.ca/. 
58 Morris, supra note 5 at 226. 
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coats as being red or blue, but makes no mention of any significance attaching to which 
colour a captain received. Morris, however, imbues only red coats with the symbolism of 
the Queen, and in particular, with being an officer of the Queen. Interestingly, his reply 
was not immediately accepted by the Cree in these negotiations. Instead, a second Cree 
Chief, known as Kah-mee-yis-too-ways or the Beardy, voiced a similarly worded request 
for a blue coat: "I want from my brother a suit of clothing in color resembling the sky so 
that he may be able when he sees me to know me."59 To this second request, Morris again 
responded, "I cannot give the Chief a blue coat: he must accept the red one and he must 
not suffer so small a matter as the color of the coat to stand between us."60 
These extracts come from a larger conversation in which relief and assistance 
with preserving and managing the buffalo were clearly much more pressing concerns for 
the two Cree Chiefs mentioned here. In the end, both the Beardy and the first Chief, Say-
sway-pus, accepted the treaty, indicating a pragmatic willingness to put symbolism aside 
for the sake of preserving their peoples' livelihoods. Nevertheless, the insistence of the 
Cree Chiefs and the potential symbolism of coat colour remain unexplained. Did the Cree 
Chiefs reject the notion of becoming officers of the Queen? Did blue have a particular 
symbolic meaning for the Willow Cree? Did these Chiefs want to be distinguished from 
the other Chiefs taking treaty? Or perhaps they sought a particular symbol of the treaty, 
59 Ibid. at 227. 
60 Ibid. at 228. 
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with the colour of the sky embodying a promise that would satisfy the Beardy' s 
insistence that the treaty payment "exist as long as the sun shines and the river runs."61 
As usual, the documentary record presents a number of mysteries that cannot be 
solved, at least not without assistance from Cree people, ethnographies, and other 
resources far removed from the documents themselves. However, instead of assuming 
such mysteries to be trivial matters, thereby dismissing their importance to our 
understanding of history and the treaties, we should stop and take note. Legal traditions 
are full of symbolism, and we miss important signals of political and legal authority when 
we pass over such details without considering what these strange little notes in the record 
might reveal. Moreover, we should be skeptical that a narrator such as Morris would 
catch the meaning of these requests himself. 
4. Conclusion 
The path travelled in this chapter took us from events around the 1876 negotiation 
of Treaty 6 to some of the earliest colonial encounters on the west coast of Hudson Bay 
in the late seventeenth century. The intervening two centuries were very roughly filled in 
by b~iefly canvassing the HBC practice of recognizing trading captains during the fur 
trade. This journey demonstrates that, from day one of the colonial encounter and in 
varying degrees, Cree political structures have been understood and misunderstood by 
European newcomers. It demonstrates that continuity will not only be found in the 
61 Ibid. at 227. 
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political institutions of indigenous peoples, but in newcomer confusion as well. This 
continuity of confusion is itself enough to raise doubts about Justice Muldoon's 
conclusion that Plains Cree leadership and governance were in disarray by the time of the 
treaties. Finally, this journey highlights the ambiguities that permeate colonial history and 
interpretations of Native-newcomer relations. It is this ambiguity that must be carried 
forward and considered when judicial interpretations of history are poised to determine 
- and, very often, deny - the rights of Aboriginal peoples. 
In the end, the identification of general themes cannot answer questions raised in 
a particular case. In such cases, attention to ambiguities invites new questions to match 
every question answered. These questions act as place holders for what we do not, and 
possibly cannot, know. They serve to remind us that we cannot always distinguish 
renegade from representative in historical narratives, that we need to factor the 
incompleteness of our knowledge into the interpretive process and the conclusions we 
reach, particularly when Aboriginal rights are implicated. Without this approach, our 
knowledge of indigenous history is as incomplete as the documentary record and as 
insecure as a house of cards, waiting for someone to ask the question that blows it all 
down. 
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Chapter 3: "Thou Wilt Not Die of Hunger ... for I Bring Thee 
Merchandise" Consent, lntersocietal Normativity, and the Exchange 
of Food at York Factory, 1682-1763 * 
1. Striking A Bargain Along the Hayes River 
In the summer of 1683, Jean Baptiste Chouart was in charge of a fledgling French 
trading house located on the west coast of Hudson Bay near the mouth of the Hayes 
River. 1 A seasoned trader following in the footsteps of his father, Medard Chouart Des 
Grosseilliers, and uncle, Pierre Esprit Radisson, Chouart needed to protect vulnerable 
French commercial and colonial interests against English competitors who were also 
trying to gain a foothold in the region. For both the English and the French, advancing 
their interests meant establishing good relations with the local Cree. Thus, when a group 
of Cree from New Severn River passed near Chouart's fort that summer, he greeted them 
with tobacco and welcomed them to the fort to trade. That these people had already 
formed a trading relationship with the English at Albany Fort in James Bay only 
heightened the Frenchmen's motivation to treat their visitors well. 
One of the members of this party left the trading house and returned two days 
later. The latecomer was also welcomed with tobacco, but his intentions were not 
• In Jeremy Webber & Colin Macleod, eds., Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the 
Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 77. There have been small editorial changes to this 
chapter since publication. 
1 Jean Baptiste Chouart, also known as Jean-Baptiste Des Groseilliers, was the son ofMedard Chouart Des 
Grosseilliers, the famous French explorer who accompanied Pierre Esprit Radisson on his first mission on 
behalf of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1667. 
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friendly. The man claimed to be "chief of all the nations" in the region and complained 
that Chouart "had failed to give presents to pay for possessing the country [he and the 
French] inhabited. "2 The insult escalated into a scuffle between the two men, attracting 
the attention of the other New Severn Cree at the fort. Once he had gained the upper hand 
(by his own report), Chouart was informed that this self-proclaimed chief was an English 
mole who had been promised gunpowder and other goods if he succeeded in killing the 
French at the fort. Chouart chose to demonstrate his generosity and permitted all of the 
New Severn Cree to depart without further incident, but they left on bad terms with the 
French.3 
The consequences of this episode were felt throughout the network of young 
alliances that was forming in the region, playing into tensions between lowland Cree 
groups that likely preceded European arrival. Siding with their French allies, the Hayes 
River Cree were not satisfied to leave the dispute unresolved. They called the New 
Severn people back to the post for a council and feast to "learn from them the merits of 
2 Canada, Parliament, "Relation of the Voyage of Pierre Esprit Radisson to the North of America in the 
Years 1682 and 1683" by Pierre Esprit Radisson in Sessional Papers, No. 8a (1896) Note A at 67 
["Voyage"]. See also Martin Fournier, Pierre-Esprit Radisson: Merchant Adventurer, 1636-1710 (Sillery, 
QC: Septentrion, 2002) at 258; Victor P. Lytwyn, Muskekowuck Athinuwick: Original People of the Great 
Swampy Land (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2002) at 129. Fournier worked from an 
unpublished manuscript of Radisson' s travel narrative, discovered in 1997 in Windsor Castle. 
3 For a more complete treatment of this incident and its implications for discussions of Cree leadership, see 
Janna Promislow, "One Chief, Two Chiefs, Red Chiefs, Blue Chiefs: Newcomer Perspectives on 
Indigenous Leadership in Rupert's Land and the North-West Territories" in Hamar Foster, Benjamin L. 
Berger, and A.R. Buck, eds., The Grand Experiment: law and legal Culture in British Settler Societies 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 55 [Chapter 2 of this dissertation]. 
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the case," but this did not settle matters; instead, the conflict intensified. 4 The self-
proclaimed New Severn chief again found occasion to complain and disparage the 
French, which so enraged one of the Hayes River Cree that he attacked and killed the 
man. The Hayes River Cree and their allies then went on to attack the nearby English 
post, further increasing tensions in the region. 
These events left Chouart and his French associates vulnerable to attacks, so 
Chouart sought the aid and protection of their Hayes River allies over the winter. 
Assisting the French meant staying near their post, a location that offered only limited 
winter hunting. It is therefore not surprising that the Hayes River people made some 
demands of Chouart before they agreed to remain throughout the winter. Specifically, 
they insisted that he keep them fed, a request to which he readily acceded. 5 
Thirty-four years later, a Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) official named James 
Knight faced a similar situation. The Treaty of Utrecht ( 1 713) had secured the region to 
the English, and York Factory, which was downstream from the location of Chouart's 
trading house, had become firmly entrenched on the Hayes River. Although hostilities 
between the French and English in this area were settled, the need for good relations with 
the local Cree remained constant. Captain Knight, the HBC bayside governor of the day, 
was making concerted efforts to negotiate with the Hayes River Cree to convince them to 
4 
"Voyage," supra note 2 at 67. 
5 Ibid. at 69. Foumier's account of the same events is slightly different, most notably leaving out the 
council between the Hayes River and New Severn River people. See Fournier, supra note 2 at 250-51. 
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cease their long-standing hostilities against the Chipewyan people, with whom Knight 
wanted to build a trade. The Cree literally stood between the HBC and trade with the 
Chipewyan, for the latter needed to cross Hayes River Cree territory to reach either York 
Factory or the more northerly post the HBC intended to build on Churchill River. By 
1 71 7, a peace had been brokered but was still fragile. As Knight recorded in the trading 
post journal, the Cree were "in a Curs'd Ill humour by reason so many Indians dying all 
this winter and doo think that the makeing of the Peace with the Northern Indians [the 
Chipewyan] has been the Occasion of it, for they are of the Opinion the Devill must have 
so many every year[;] if they can but kill their Enemys they may spare themselves."6 
Knight knew that, if he could convince the Cree to remain near the factory during the 
winter, they would not enter Chipewyan territory, and thus he could prevent further 
killing that would threaten the peace. 
In essence, he was facing the same problem that Chouart had encountered. If the 
Cree stayed near the factory, they would have to alter their winter hunting patterns and 
locations. This shift would in tum increase the likelihood of food shortages over the 
winter and thus the probability of deaths, which would simply confirm the Cree belief as 
articulated by Knight. Like Chouart, Knight found his way out of this problem by 
promising the Hayes River leader that he would provide relief in the event of illness or 
famine, an assurance that the leader accepted. As Knight recorded in the trading post 
6 York Factory Post Journal, Winnipeg, Hudson's Bay Company Archives [HBCA], B. 239/a/3, (17 April 
1717). 
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journal, the leader was "Resolve[ d] to be pretty near the Factory Next Winter that if they 
[the Hayes River Cree] are in any Likelyhood of being Starvd he can reach to Gett in & 
Desires that I would Allow him some Relief which If Should fall out so I have Promised 
he should be Releivd. "7 
2. Interpreting the Bargain 
Over time, the provision of relief to Cree and other Aboriginal peoples who 
helped supply York Factory became a matter of course and was no longer immediately 
associated with the safety of the fort or keeping the peace. HBC officers relied on Cree 
hunters to bring them fresh "country provisions," for which they paid with trade goods, 
such as guns, cloth, metal implements, tobacco, and brandy. These people were in turn 
assisted by the factory when they were ill or otherwise disabled, during the frequently 
lean months of March and April before game and migratory birds returned to the area, or 
when famine descended upon their country. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the 
quid pro quo so obvious in the episodes from 1683 and 1717 is difficult to discern in the 
records kept by the HBC traders. Instead, frequent descriptions of starvation among their 
local Indian trading partners appear in the journals and letters HBC traders sent back to 
their superiors in London for review, with no corresponding references to the services 
these traders provided. Less than a hundred years after the first engagements between 
7 Ibid. (20 April 1717). 
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Europeans and Aboriginal peoples, the initial agreements and acts of "consent," however 
limited, that allowed these relationships to progress were forgotten, at least by the 
European half of the equation. 
The records sent home by the bayside employees were scripted in part to justify 
the inventories of supplies they requested. Consequently, statements of need should be 
read cautiously. These records nevertheless form the basis for the lasting interpretation, 
by historians as well as contemporaneous historical actors (at least in England), that the 
local Indian populations were dependent upon HBC trading posts and that the HBC was 
frequently engaged in acts of charity, benevolence, and relief - that the relationship, in 
other words, was one of paternalistic care rather than consent, agreement, and mutual 
obligation. But, as we will see, the evidence, taken as a whole, suggests that something 
very much more than paternalism was at play - that normative expectations guided the 
relationships and that those expectations were the product of something like agreement, a 
mutually determined (if not fully congruent) sense of obligation. 
This chapter is an attempt to unpack those relationships and to uncover the 
normative aspects of exchange on the Hayes River. Relying on the term "normative" to 
capture the full range of obligations that may arise in non-state environments, it 
investigates the norms that informed the actions of HBC and Cree participants, the extent 
to which these norms were shared, and whether they reflected a true "meeting of the 
minds." 
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In the process, it considers what consent might mean and how it might be 
achieved and sustained between individuals and communities from different normative 
traditions or, to use Ludwig Wittgenstein's phrase, different "forms oflife."8 As we will 
see, the relationship between the parties on the shores of Hudson Bay included moments 
of express agreement (at least ostensible agreement) nested within a much larger body of 
normative expectations that originated in the parties' cultures and in their interactions 
over time, and that were understood and respected with varying degrees of consistency. 
This chapter examines the genesis, nature, and dynamics of that body of "intersocietal 
law." 
In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that the Canadian law of 
Aboriginal rights springs from practices adopted in the interaction of European and 
Aboriginal peoples in northeastern North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. According to Brian Slattery, for example, "[t]he principal source of the 
doctrine of aboriginal rights is an ancient body of inter-societal custom that emerged 
from relations between British colonies and neighbouring Indian nations in eastern North 
America."9 Similarly, Jeremy Webber has suggested that Aboriginal rights result from 
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2d ed., trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1958). For a fuller discussion of Wittgenstein, see Jeremy Webber, "Meanings of Consent" in J 
Webber and CM Macleod, eds, Between Consenting Peoples. Political Community and the Meaning of 
Consent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 3 [Webber, "Meanings"]. 
9 Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Canadian Bar Review 196 at 
200. Significantly, Slattery's more recent work emphasizes that Aboriginal rights are identified through 
principles of recognition and reconciliation. The former refer to the historical rights of indigenous peoples; 
the latter involve a principled analysis to arrive at the "legal effects of Aboriginal rights in modem times." 
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"the interaction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, and the process of 
reflection on that experience ... They constitute a set of norms that are fundamentally 
intercommunal, created not by the dictation of one society, but by the interaction of 
various societies through time."10 Other scholars, such as James (Sakej) Youngblood 
Henderson, have emphasized the explicit bargaining process involved in treaties to 
highlight First Nations' contributions to the Canadian constitutional order. 11 Whether via 
the accumulation of custom and reasoned reflection or the explicit negotiation of a treaty 
- and this chapter suggests a strong connection between the two processes - these 
approaches emphasize the agency of indigenous people in their relations with 
nonindigenous actors and stress the extent to which the resulting norms were created 
through cross-cultural interaction. The focus on intersocietal law in these accounts is 
prescriptive as well as historical, suggesting that a similar co-determination is important 
in moving toward justice in today's relations. 
Brian Slattery, "The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" (2007) 38 Supreme Court Law Review 595 
at 623. Although introducing the forward-looking "principles of reconciliation" into his analysis might 
temper his earlier statement of historical intersocietal custom as "the principal source of the doctrine of 
Aboriginal rights," Slattery confirms the continuing significance of the concept of intersocietal law by 
stating that "the law of Aboriginal rights is neither entirely English nor Aboriginal in origin: it is a form of 
intersocietal law that evolved from long-standing practices linking the various communities together" (ibid. 
at 596) 
10 Jeremy Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community 
between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 623 at 638. For similar 
discussions of Aboriginal law as deriving from both indigenous and European legal traditions, see John 
Borrows, "With or Without You: First Nations Law in Canada" in John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The 
Resurgence of Indigenous law {Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 3; Mark D. Walters, "The 
Morality of Aboriginal Law" (2006) 31 Queen's Law Journal 470. 
11 James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, "Empowering Treaty Federalism" (1994) 58 Saskatchewan Law 
Review 329. See also John Borrows, "Ground Rules: Indigenous Treaties in Canada and New Zealand" 
(2006) 22 New Zealand Universities Law Review 188. 
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The agency implicit in intersocietal law can, however, be taken too far, suggesting 
that Aboriginal peoples somehow consented to the injustices, dispossession, and 
assimilation in their colonial experience. Clearly, the impact of power must be factored 
into our understanding of intersocietal norms. Webber, for example, warns against a rose-
tinted view of the process through which intercommunal norms emerged: 
[The intercommunal order] was not the product of the parties' unconstrained 
consent ... Human interaction never occurs in a perfect world, free from the 
effects of social inequality, and this was especially true of the period of 
colonization, marked as it was by warfare, the seizure of lands, and the 
decimation of Aboriginal societies by disease. The intercommunal norms 
inevitably reflected, to some degree, the relative power of the Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal parties. 12 
If intersocietal norms were formed in the context of such great imbalances of power, one 
might wonder why scholars want to emphasize that this interaction is a source of today's 
relationships and rights. 13 James Tully has addressed this argument in the context of 
treaties: "Just because a particular practice of consent, such as a treaty with a non-
European authority, is surrounded by force and fraud, it does not follow that the practice 
of treaty making loses its authority." 14 For Tully, emphasizing the consensual foundation 
of treaty processes in Canadian constitutional history is not about covering up the 
12 Webber, supra note 10 at 628. 
13 For example, in the context of Australia, Bain Attwood argues that the histories produced through and for 
law tend to obscure its legitimizing role in the colonial enterprise and thus stand in the way of 
decolonization. Bain Attwood, "The Law of the Land or the Law of the Land? History, Law and Narrative 
in a Settler Society" (2004) 2 History Compass 1. 
14 James Tully, "Consent, Hegemony, and Dissent in Treaty Negotiations" in Jeremy Webber & Colin M 
Macleod, eds, Between Consenting Peoples. Political Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2010) 233 at 238 [Tully, "Consent"]. 
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problems of the past. Instead, both the commitment to consent and the awareness of 
coercion and fraud should inform the agenda of reformed treaty processes in the present. 
Similarly, in the case of intersocietal norms, the recognition of agency and the realization 
that coercive forces also shaped the norms should inform a critical engagement with, and 
correction of, the norms of today. 15 
Two other interpretive tendencies associated with intersocietal norms should be 
considered before embarking on the account of relations at York Factory. First, the 
existence of functional relationships between the societies can lead one to presume a 
greater measure of agreement, a more extensive sphere of common understanding and 
joint determination, than may have existed. Jennifer Brown, a historian who has written 
about "fur trade society," emphasizes the partial and incomplete nature of the social 
sphere of the fur trade, warning that a "misleading degree of uniformity and consensus" 
exists in phrases such as "the custom of the country" - the idiom used to describe unions 
between Aboriginal women and European traders and the normative conventions 
associated with these unions. 16 Brown is identifying an issue that is often encountered in 
15 Walters, supra note 10. 
16 Jennifer Brown, "Partial Truths: A Closer Look at Fur Trade Marriage" in Theodore Binnema, Gerhard J. 
Ens, and R.C. Macleod, eds., Rupert's Land to Canada: Essays in Honour of John E. Foster (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 2001) 59 at 61. See also the preface to her 1980 book, in which Brown wrote 
that "(t]he fur trade ... may be conceptualized as a partial or incomplete social sphere." Jennifer Brown, 
Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1980) at 
xvii. 
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the description of social norms: a tendency to obscure disagreement and the incomplete 
scope of social normativity. 17 
The tendency to assume comprehensiveness and consensus can also be seen in 
conceptual models of cultural interaction. One influential model in indigenous-
nonindigenous relations has been Richard White's "middle ground," a concept that 
describes both a particular historical space - the pays d'en haut (the upper Great Lakes 
region during the fur trade era) - and a more generalizable process of colonial cultural 
interaction. 18 The concept has become so popular that, as Susan Sleeper-Smith observes, 
"many scholars are guilty of turning every time and place of cultural encounter into a 
middle ground, transforming the phrase into an elusive metaphor for various forms of 
compromise." 19 This chapter explores the normative dimensions of indigenous-settler 
relations outside the pays d'en haut, and it does not, then, directly test White's thesis.20 
Nevertheless, his conceptualization of cultural accommodation as "a process of mutual 
and creative misunderstanding" is relevant and helpful.21 As White explains, "the central 
17 For a discussion of this tendency in the legal pluralist literature, see Jeremy Webber, "Legal Pluralism 
and Human Agency" (2006) 44:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 167. 
18 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great lakes Regions, 1650-
1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 ). 
19 Susan Sleeper-Smith, "The Middle Ground Revisited: Introduction" (2006) 63 William and Mary 
Quarterly I at 4. 
2° For a study that engages with White's thesis directly, see Gilles Havard, Empire et Metissages: Indiens et 
Fram;ais dans le Pays d'en Haut, 1660-1715 (Sillery, Paris: Les Editions du Septentrion et Presses de 
l'universite de la Paris-Sorbonne, 2003). Havard is critical of White's middle-ground thesis for obscuring 
the tensions that framed the particular interaction in the pays d'en haut and argues that it is unnecessarily 
limiting as a paradigm of intercultural accommodation. 
21 Richard White, "Creative Misunderstandings and New Understandings" (2006) 63 William and Mary 
Quarterly 9 at 9. 
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and defining aspect of the middle ground was the willingness of those who created it to 
justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner's cultural 
premises. "22 This does not mean that the participants perceived their partner's cultural 
premises completely or correctly. Instead, the inhabitants of the middle ground "took 
such congruences as one could find and sorted out their meanings later."23 Still, historian 
Daniel Richter has cautioned against "an exclusive stress on the arena in which people 
from different cultures were able to work with, rather than against each other" because 
such narratives run "the risk of obscuring the very real conflicts that must remain central 
to the tale. "24 
The second interpretive tendency that one should guard against is the assumption 
that invention was the key dynamic of intersocietal space. Invention is central to White's 
middle ground, which he describes as a creative interaction "arriv[ing] at some common 
conception of suitable ways of acting" - a "process of mutual invention. "25 This 
interpretation has its analogue in Canadian law's description of Aboriginal rights as sui 
generis. The courts have used this Latin tag in two ways: as a characterization of the 
nature and source of the rights, and as a way of describing the Crown-Aboriginal 
22 White, supra note 17 at 52. 
23 Ibid. at 84. For an example of the overstatement emerging from such middle-ground concepts and 
idioms, see Sidney Harring, who states that "the 'middle ground' of the meeting of European and 
indigenous legal traditions in North America is a common law that both recognizes legal traditions and 
incorporates elements of their common understanding into modem Canadian law." Sidney Harring, White 
Man's Law: Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1998) at 278 [emphasis added]. 
24 Daniel Richter, "Whose Indian History?" (1993) 50 William and Mary Quarterly 379 at 390. 
25 White, supra note 17 at 50. 
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relationship. 26 These uses are closely related - sui generis relationships gave rise to sui 
generis law. Both assume that the encounter gave rise to something new. 
But this emphasis on invention can overstate processes of intercultural formation 
and accommodation at the expense of cultural continuity.27 To illustrate, consider the 
alternative process that historian Heidi Bohaker invokes: cultural adaptation.28 
Adaptation would be found where Aboriginal and European people had sufficiently 
robust resources within their own normative systems to cope with aspects of the 
encounter, such as how to do business with new trading partners, how to treat strangers in 
need of help, and how to deal with strangers who wrong one's person, kin, nation, or 
things. Adaptation does not preclude the reverberation of real change within both 
societies as a result of their interaction. Nor does it preclude a creative and vibrant 
intersocietal space made up of competing and coexisting normative frameworks. But it 
would direct our attention to continuity in indigenous (and European) norms, alongside or 
in place of newly minted sui generis versions. 
It is neither possible nor necessary to determine whether invention or adaptation 
dominated in the abstract. We need to focus on how norms developed in particular 
contexts, allowing for complex fragmented colonial interactions, ordered and structured 
26 For the former, see e.g. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. For the latter, see e.g. R. 
v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. 
27 For related critiques, see Heidi Bohaker, "Nindoodemag: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship 
Networks in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701" (2006) 63 William and Mary Quarterly 23; 
Darlene Johnston, Litigating Identity: The Challenge of Aboriginality (LL.M. Thesis, University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law, Toronto, 2003) at 33-34 [unpublished]. 
28 Bohaker, ibid. at 51. 
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in a variety of ways. These cautions point to the need for a nuanced exploration of the 
dynamics of normativity and consent between Aboriginal peoples and European 
newcomers. In the next section, I turn to the aftermath of the incidents involving Chouart, 
Captain Knight, and the Hayes River Cree, canvassing the relations, centred around the 
exchange of food, that developed at York Factory in the early period of the HBC's 
presence in North America. After setting out the patterns of exchange and the institutions 
and practices that developed in conjunction with them, I will discuss the normative 
dimensions of the exchange. I will then return to the general questions of normativity and 
consent in intersocietal spaces, using the historical material to imbue these concepts with 
the incompleteness and ambiguity inherent in such spaces.29 
3. Hunting, Fishing, and Starving? Local Exchange at York Factory 
In both episodes described at the beginning of this chapter, Europeans promised 
to feed their Hayes River friends in order to enlist their assistance. And in both, it was 
clear that the Cree understood that staying near the trading establishments meant 
incurring risks with respect to their sustenance. 
29 A note is due on naming. Where possible and appropriate, I have tried to use the specific names of the 
peoples involved in this story- Hayes River Cree rather than Cree or Aboriginal, English rather than 
European. However, I have chosen to use geographically defined English names rather than those that 
people had for themselves or the confusion of variants employed by the HBC. I made this choice for the 
sake of simplicity and accessibility. 
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The Cree homelands, which include the mouth of the Hayes River, were in the 
boggy lowlands around the coast of Hudson Bay.30 Older histories portrayed the Hudson 
Bay lowlands as uninhabitable and therefore empty before Europeans established their 
forts there, with Cree peoples from the woodlands visiting the coast only for seasonal 
goose hunting in the spring and fall. 31 From these starting assumptions, historians had 
hypothesized that the trading posts established in the region brought enormous changes to 
Cree lifestyles. The presence of the posts was assumed to have induced the Cree to stay 
closer to the coast, thus altering seasonal migration patterns that involved living inland 
during the winter. The allure of the posts was explained by European technologies such 
as guns and kettles, which were thought to have quickly rendered indigenous 
technologies obsolete. The traders' encouragement to the Cree to redirect their efforts 
from subsistence activities (hunting for food) to producing commercial goods (hunting 
and trapping for furs) was also thought to have created food shortages, thus fostering 
Cree dependence on the posts. 32 The presumption of dependence in this early work was 
nicely encapsulated by E.E. Rich, who commented that one of the "permanent features of 
the Company's trade" was already manifest at Rupert's River in 1673: "[T]he local chief 
30 The lowland Cree are defined in contrast to upland Cree, whose homelands were in the forests of shield 
country. For a detailed description of the extent and nature of the lowland Cree homelands, see Lytwyn, 
supra note 2, c. I. 
31 See e.g. Arthur S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71: Being a History of Rupert's Land 
(The Hudson's Bay Company Territory) and of the North-West Territory (Including the Pacific Slope), 2d 
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973 [1939]) at 3 and 32-3, and discussed in Lywtwyn, ibid. at 
27-9. 
32 For succinct fur trade historiographies, see Lytwyn, "Introduction," ibid.; Michael Payne, "Fur Trade 
Historiography" in Binnema, Ens, and Macleod, supra note 15, 3. 
87 
and two friendly Indians came to [Governor] Bayly to beg for subsistence. This was 
given them, and they were sent fishing. Here already was shown the marked tendency for 
the Indians to become dependent on the traders."33 Rich apparently saw no irony in the 
fact that Indians who were reduced to begging for "subsistence" were "sent fishing." 
More recent historians have arrived at different interpretations of the impact of the 
fur trade on the lowland Cree in the early contact period. Victor Lytwyn, for example, 
introduced archaeological evidence to support his argument that the lowland Cree 
occupied at least parts of the lowlands year-round before Europeans arrived in the area. 34 
Lytwyn has also carefully analyzed the number of lowland Cree that became closely tied 
to the trading post economy, suggesting that only a few of them did so, with most 
continuing to visit the posts for only occasional employment or relief, at least until the 
smallpox epidemic of 1782-83.35 Lytwyn's findings provide a significantly different 
starting point for understanding the relationship, effectively defeating older hypotheses of 
rapid changes in Cree lifestyle in response to the presence of the posts. Lytwyn's work 
also provides further support for Arthur J. Ray's suggestion that dependency on the posts 
developed only after game populations collapsed in the nineteenth century, and Toby 
33 E.E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870: 1670-1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1960) vol. 1at71. 
For an eighteenth-century account of this interaction, see also John Oldmixon, "The History of Hudson's 
Bay" in J.B. Tyrrell, ed., Documents Relating to the Early History of Hudson Bay (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1968 [ 1931]) 3 71 at 3 83. 
34 Lytwyn, supra note 2, c. 2. 
35 Ibid. at 20. 
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Morantz' thesis that the introduction of the fur trade did not always undermine Indian 
societies but may in fact have strengthened existing societal tendencies in some cases. 36 
The negotiations between Chouart, Captain Knight, and the Hayes River Cree add 
another dimension to the evolving picture of lowland Cree lifestyles and the dynamics of 
the early encounter on the coast of Hudson Bay. They indicate that the Cree were aware 
of the potentially dangerous implications that changing their winter hunting migrations 
might have for their food supplies. The negotiations also call upon contract-like forms of 
consent as a source of normative expectations around the exchange of food. And these 
were not the only agreements supporting food exchange, and exchange more generally, 
between the Cree and European traders along the coast of Hudson Bay. 
It is worth considering the negotiations that had occurred earlier, when the French 
and the English first managed to establish trading settlements in the York Factory region. 
These were not first encounters between native and newcomer on the scale of Columbus 
and the Arawak but, rather, a meeting of strangers with some knowledge of the other 
through trade and kin networks and the legacies of earlier explorers.37 With Radisson and 
36 Arthur J. Ray, "Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare and the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1930" in 
Shepard Krech III, ed., Subarctic Fur Trade: Native Social and Economic Adaptations (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1984) 1; Toby Morantz, "Old Texts, Old Questions: Another Look at the Issue of Continuity and the 
Early Fur-Trade Period" (1992) 58 Canadian Historical Review 166 at 167-68. 
37 For the Cree, prior exposure to European trade goods and knowledge of European habits would have 
been acquired through their kin and trade networks with Algonquian peoples from James Bay and the Great 
Lakes. In addition, the Cree had noticed previous attempts by European explorers Henry Hudson ( 1610-
11 ), Thomas Button (1612-13), and Jens Munk (1619-20) to explore their part of Hudson Bay; see Lytwyn, 
supra note 2 at 61. The HBC had first attempted to establish a trading post on the Nelson River in 1670, but 
this mission, led by Radisson and Bayly, failed due to sickness and weather. Rich, supra note 32 at 67, 
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Des Grosseilliers at the helm, the French party was led by experienced, knowledgeable 
traders with direct knowledge of Algonquian peoples and their forms of diplomacy. 
Radisson kept journals in which he described how he put this knowledge to work upon 
arrival at the Nelson River (called the Bourbon by the French), located in close proximity 
to the Hayes. From these journals, we know that Radisson made contact with the Hayes 
River Cree shortly after reaching the region in 1682. He participated in a small gathering 
during which he and the Cree leaders smoked tobacco and exchanged speeches and gifts. 
In these ceremonies, Radisson was adopted by the leader as his son. Radisson reported 
that he made the following speech to the leader just prior to· the exchange of gifts: 
[T]hy friends shall be my friends, and I have come here to bring thee arms to 
destroy thine enemies; thou wilt not die of hunger, nor thy wife nor thy children, 
for I bring thee merchandise: take courage, I will be thy son.38 
Radisson's words raise many questions. Did he promise to keep his adoptive kin 
(who would have encompassed the whole Hayes River Cree band) from starving? Or did 
he promise to sell European goods that would help the Hayes River Cree defeat their 
enemies and guard against hunger themselves? And, given Radisson's reputation for 
grandstanding, does this assurance and his report in general overstate his importance to 
notes that no Indians had been encountered at Nelson River on this occasion. See also John Oldmixon, The 
British Empire in America, vol. 1 (London: John Nicholson, 1708) at 391. 
38 
"Voyage," supra note 2 at 11-12 [emphasis added]. Radisson reported that the leader responded with "a 
long harangue" in which he thanked him and assured him that his people would serve him with their lives if 
necessary. 
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the Hayes River Cree?39 Such themes recur in the exchange of food that developed over 
the next half century and will be explored below. Regardless of how one construes this 
promise, it and the surrounding exchange are notable as original acts of agreement that 
made future relationships possible. 
The gift giving signified that the promises made by Radisson and the Hayes River 
leader were not merely rhetorical. The significance of gifts among Algonquian peoples 
was well known to French traders, and later, to their English counterparts as well.40 
Radisson gave tobacco, pipes, knives, and food to the Cree who had gathered, as well as a 
blanket and gun to the Hayes River leader to signify his adoption. In return, he received 
the leader's robe and gifts of pelts and more robes (essentially beaver pelts). Under 
Algonquian protocols, these acts indicated that the words just spoken were more than 
intentions: they created obligations. But the nature of the obligations is ambiguous. Were 
they specific, such as promising relief in the case of famine, or did they simply establish a 
39 Germaine Warkentin suggests that Radisson's hyperbole reflects the language of the court, not simply 
the overbearing ego often attributed to him. Warkentin also notes that the accounts of his voyages from the 
1680s - the ones at issue here - are less florid in style; written in a more prosaic manner, they were aimed 
at the needs of merchants. Germaine Warkentin, "Discovering Radisson: A Renaissance Adventurer 
between Two Worlds" in Jennifer Brown and Elizabeth Vibert, eds., Reading beyond Words: Contexts for 
Native History (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1996) 43. 
40 The significance of presents is often mentioned in the Jesuit Relations. For example, Father Barthelemy 
Vimont observed, "Presents among these peoples despatch all the affairs of the country. They dry up tears; 
they appease anger; they open the doors of foreign countries; they deliver prisoners; they bring the dead 
back to life; one hardly ever speaks or answers, except by presents. That is why, in the harangues, a present 
passes for a word." Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, vol. 22 (New 
York: Pageant Book, 1959) at 291. The HBC also came to understand that presents were required to broker 
a peace between nations and to encourage Indians to visit its trading posts, and that certain gifts were a 
necessary precursor to trade. See E.E. Rich, ed., Copy-book of Letters Outward &c. Begins 29th May, 1680 
Ends 5 July, 1687 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1948) at 9, 81, 135. 
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relationship under which the precise obligations might vary? Radisson himself saw gift 
giving as necessary to create the "great bond of friendship," and thus he probably viewed 
his commitments as relational and ongoing. 41 Whatever the content of the agreement, 
Radisson believed that it included permission for the French to settle in the Hayes River 
area, in the homelands of his newfound kin. 42 
The HBC similarly sought permission from the locals when it first arrived. 
Although no first-hand account of the company's efforts survives, the HBC's general 
instructions to its bayside officials included making "compacts" with the natives to 
"purchase" their land and rivers, or if this were not an option, at least to secure a "league 
of friendship and peaceable cohabitation" and the freedom to trade.43 Officials were 
further instructed to confirm such agreements through ceremonies that would be 
meaningful to the Natives, and the company suggested that they additionally use "Tallys 
of wood" to memorialize the date and individuals involved in each "contract. "44 The 
HBC's efforts to make such compacts were then cited and relied upon in its legal 
wrangling with the French for possession of the bay over the next decade.45 
41 
"Voyage," supra note 2 at 11. 
42 Ibid. at 77. See also Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 128. 
43 Oldmixon, supra note 36, summarizes an account of the 1670 voyages of Radisson to the Nelson River 
and Des Groseilliers to Charles Fort on the Rupert River, which was written by HBC employee Thomas 
Gorst (who was at Charles Fort). However, his summary sheds no light on the relevant actions of the HBC 
in the York Factory area. For the HBC instructions, see "Letter to John Nix on" (21 May 1680) in Rich, 
supra note 39 at 9; see also "Letter to John Bridgar" (15 May 1682) in ibid. at 36. 
44 Postscript to "Letter to John Nixon," ibid. at 12-13. 
45 In answer to a French memorial complaining that the English company was setting up shop on territory 
that the French king had already possessed for twenty years, the HBC countered the French claim by 
relying on a "league of Friendship" made by a company official with the "Native Indians" at Rupert River. 
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Trading protocols that evolved within thirty years of these early moments 
demonstrate that food became a procedural and symbolic element of trade relationships, 
with feasts and gifts of food becoming an inextricable aspect of at least some trade.46 For 
example, before the English finally secured York Factory from the French via the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713, the latter had enjoyed a ten-year period of relatively stable relations 
with the Hayes River and undoubtedly other Cree and Assiniboine peoples in the larger 
area. During this time, trading practices had evolved to include pipe smoking, speeches, 
gifts of tobacco, and feasts for the leaders, who then shared the food with their 
followers.47 Thus, when Captain Knight took control of York Factory in 1714, he 
encountered numerous complaints from "Frenchifyed Indians" who, according to him, 
had been spoiled by the French.48 Knight and his men may not have realized it, but the 
In this, the official "firmely purchased both the river it selfe & the Lands there aboute." The HBC further 
asserted that the original Rupert River agreement was "repeated and confirmed" by the next company 
official and that its officials continued to make "solemne compacts and Agreements with the Natives for 
their Rivers & Territories" wherever they established new settlements. Memorial prepared by James Hayes, 
undated (probably 1682), in Rich, supra note 39 at 70-71. Such claims are repeated in later memorials 
between the HBC and the French as their struggle for possession of the Hudson Bay coast escalated 
through the last years of the seventeenth century. 
46 These protocols have attracted their share of attention from fur trade historians. See e.g. E.E. Rich, 
"Trade Habits and Economic Motivation among the Indians ofNorth America" (1960) 26 Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science 35; Abraham Rotstein, "Trade and Politics: An Institutional Approach" 
(1972) 3 Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology 1. However, the elaborate protocol most famously 
described by Andrew Graham (and analyzed by Rotstein) appears to have been primarily associated with 
the trading Indians - those who travelled from far inland to trade on the coast in the summer months - not 
the lowland Cree who lived close to the forts. 
47 
"Letters of La Potherie" in Tyrrell, supra note 32, 143 at 265-67. 
48 As quoted in Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 73. This comment is from the HBC's account books. For an 
account of the negotiations that correspond with this remark, see York Factory Post Journal, HBCA, B. 
239/a/3 (17 and 20 April 1717). 
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demands of the "spoiled" Indians may have been an effort to educate them. For example, 
in one interaction, Knight reported that the Hayes River leader 
is very uneasy and tells me wee are not like the french and that I do not treat them 
as they did in feasting of [them]; yett they brought a Considerable Present to me 
and wee had the Ceremony of the Friendly pipe today by reason of y'hott words 
wee had Yesterday [about] not given 'em brandy, Tobacco, Flower [flour], Indian 
Com, & Pease, which I am not in a condition to do.49 
This passage indicates that feasts and gifts of food were an important part of cementing 
the relationship between the local Indians and the HBC, quite apart from questions of 
subsistence and need. It also reveals that, in spite of the relative ignorance of the HBC 
leadership with respect to the meaning of such gifts, the Hayes River Cree were willing to 
work at the relationship and were not easily dissuaded by impolitic behaviour on the part 
of the trading post's latest occupants. 
Once secure in its position at York Factory, the HBC began developing 
relationships with Aboriginal groups further afield. Inland peoples such as woodland and 
plains Cree, Assiniboine, and Northern Ojibway - collectively known as the "trading 
Indians" to the HBC men - were drawn into the trade as "middlemen," soon supplanting 
the lowland Cree as the fort's primary suppliers of furs. 50 The local exchange around the 
49 York Factory Post Journal, HBCA, B. 239/a/2 (8 September 1716) [punctuation added]. It should be 
noted that the late arrival of the HBC supply ship was partially responsible for Knight's reluctance to host 
feasts or give the Indians the goods he enumerated. York Factory was short on provisions and other 
supplies. 
50 Arthur J. Ray and Don Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure": An Economic Analysis of Relations between 
the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company before 1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) at 
41; Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 
1600-1870 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983) at 41. 
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forts shifted in response to these developments: food and supplies required by York 
Factory now made up the bulk of it, and the people who participated in it became known 
as "home Indians." Most of this trade occurred in the fall, winter, and spring, with the 
short summer months being dominated by visits from the trading Indians, who travelled 
from much further away and could do so only during the summer. With these 
modifications, food became more prominent in the local exchange but nevertheless 
remained a feature in the protocols surrounding the long-distance traffic in furs. 
The exchange encompassed a number of different transactions and relationships. 
In a detailed study of the lowland Cree and their participation in the early fur trade, 
Lytwyn suggests that there were two main groups of lowland Cree: the coastal people, 
who were called the "home Indians" (or "homeguard"), and those who lived inland on the 
swampy ground, known as "half-home Indians" (or "half-home guard"). 51 According to 
Lytwyn, home Indians stayed within 160 kilometres of York Factory and were the most 
frequent visitors in the winter, whereas half-home Indians ventured further inland and 
were likely to visit only in late winter to trade their winter catch and participate in the 
spring goose hunts. Trading post journal entries also occasionally name the Indians as 
51 Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 15-18. Lytwyn provides Cree names for the peoples identified by this 
geographical division. The coastal lowland Cree were known generally as Winnipeg Athinuwick, meaning 
the "people of the coast," whereas the inland Cree were the Muchiskewuck (or Muskekowuck) Athinuwick, 
meaning "people of the swampy ground" (the Swampy Cree). He also identifies several subgroups and 
Cree names for the Swampy Cree, according to the major river basins in the area. 
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"Severn" or "Albany," meaning that they were home Indians at the Albany or Severn 
posts, which were located to the south of York Factory. 52 
The spring goose hunt, which will be described in greater detail below, was the 
most significant part of the local exchange for the provisioning of the fort. The local 
exchange also included periodic visits over the winter in which Aboriginal traders 
delivered furs, collected supplies, and brought in fresh meat for which they were paid 
with brandy and other goods. These traders usually arrived alone or in small groups, 
having left their families at their wintering grounds or camps within several days' travel 
from the factory. Usually greeted with tobacco and a welcoming smoke, they rarely 
stayed at the fort for more than one night before returning to their families. During these 
visits, they sometimes picked up dry meat they had stored at the fort. 53 The HBC also 
supported lowland Cree by providing food and relief to those in need, most often the sick, 
widows and orphans, the injured and the elderly, or others in times of famine. 54 Finally, 
the local exchange also encompassed one or two hunters who wintered at the fort with 
their families, hunting and providing other services for the HBC as needed. Women's 
work - snaring and gathering food, and producing goods such as snowshoes - was 
performed by the wives and daughters of the hunters who stayed near the fort year-round 
52 It is similarly possible to find occasional references to "Strange Indians" or "Uplanders" arriving at York 
Factory during the winter months. See e.g. York Factory Post Journal, HBCA, B. 239/a/l (19 and 20 
February 1715). 
53 See e.g. York Factory Post Journal, HBCA, B. 239/a/18 (20 March 1736). 
54 The numbers who sought relief at the fort varied greatly from year to year, with few regularly requiring it 
until the smallpox epidemics of the late eighteenth century. Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 20. 
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but also by "custom of the country" wives of HBC officers; it was an essential part of this 
aspect of the local exchange. Sylvia Van Kirk writes that most of the women who became 
the country wives of HBC officers were daughters of home Indian leaders, which 
indicates that the HBC also came to understand that kin relations, such as those sought by 
Radisson with the Hayes River Cree, were critical in the development of its trading 
networks and alliances in the region. 55 
The picture that emerges is that a minority of home Indians became integrated 
into the factory's economy, whereas others had infrequent contact and a limited role in its 
provisioning and trade. Participants in both of these local exchange networks were 
involved in the fall and spring goose hunts, which produced several hundred to several 
thousand geese each year. 56 
The spring goose hunt was the larger undertaking of the two. Well before the mid-
eighteenth century, it had already become an important event in the relationship between 
the factory and the local populations. Its significance was evident in the pre-hunt 
55 See Sylvia Van Kirk, '"The Custom of the Country': An Examination of Fur Trade Marriage Practices" 
in Lewis H. Thomas, ed., Essays on Western History (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1976) 47 at 
50. 
56 Lytwyn (supra note 2 at 242, n. 38) estimates that the spring and fall goose hunts brought in up to five 
thousand birds. He notes that the fall hunt was actually more important, given the unreliability of other food 
sources, such as caribou, that accompanied the onset of winter, but the spring hunt received the most 
attention in the journals and other writings left by HBC traders. Providing an example of consumption 
levels, Lytwyn (ibid. at 146, 147) indicates that, from 1727 to 1728, HBC employees at York Factory 
consumed an average of 126 geese per man, for a total of 3,023 geese. Some of these were eaten fresh, but 
most were salted and preserved to supply the fort with food throughout the year. See also Dale Russell, 
"The Effects of the Spring Goose Hunt on the Crees in the Vicinity of York Factory and Churchill River in 
the 1700s" in Jim Freedman and Jerome H. Barkow, eds., Proceedings of the Second Congress, Canadian 
Ethnology Society, vol. 2 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975) 423. 
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protocols. 57 Home Indian leaders, whose status resembled that of the men who had 
negotiated with Chouart and Knight, organized and encouraged families to return to the 
fort in the spring for the hunt.58 Early eighteenth-century English historian John 
Oldmixon recorded that these leaders, known as okimah, played an important role as 
"Speech-maker to the English; as also in their own grave Debates, when they meet every 
Spring and Fall, to settle the Disposition of their Quarters for Hunting, Fowling, and 
Fishing."59 The lowland Cree leaders' role in this regard was aided by gifts from the 
factor at York, such as tobacco, brandy, and other goods, much of which we can assume 
was dispersed among those who had gathered, given that redistribution of wealth was a 
key factor in the ability to attain and retain a leadership position in Cree society.60 These 
goose hunt captains also received special coats and cloth to distinguish their rank. The 
evidence, at least from Albany Fort, indicates that many goose hunt captains retained 
their status and were recognized by HBC traders well beyond their productive hunting 
57 This section on goose hunting is drawn largely from Lytwyn, ibid. at 137-47. 
58 The nature of the local leaders who became involved with the HBC and whether their status was 
"genuine" or "legitimate" in their communities or acquired primarily through HBC influence are 
complicated matters deserving a much longer discussion than is possible here. See Toby Morantz, 
"Northern Algonquian Concepts of Status and Leadership Reviewed: A Case Study of the Eighteenth-
Century Trading Captain System" ( 1982) 19 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 482. 
59 Oldmixon, supra note 32 at 382 [emphasis in original]. Oldmixon was writing specifically about Cree 
who lived in the vicinity of Rupert's River, located at the bottom of James Bay. See also Francis and 
Morantz, supra note 49 at 45. 
6° For more on leadership in historical Cree societies, see Morantz, supra note 57; David G. Mandelbaum, 
The Plains Cree: An Ethnographic, Historical and Comparative Study (Regina: Canadian Plains Research 
Center, University of Regina, 1979). For a trader's comments on the nature of leadership among his trading 
partners, see Glyndwr Williams, ed., Andrew Graham's Observations on Hudson's Bay, 1767-91 (London: 
Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1969) at 170. For a twentieth-century ethnography of the role of the goose 
hunt "boss," see Brian Craik, "The Formation of a Goose Hunting Strategy and the Politics of the Hunting 
Group" in Freedman and Barkow, supra note 55, 450. 
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years, suggesting that such recognition was significant to HBC-lowland Cree relations, 
regardless of, or in addition to, any role these leaders had in organizing the goose hunts.61 
The protocols that preceded the goose hunt were thus similar to those that accompanied 
the summer visits of the trading Indians to York Factory as well as those employed by 
Radisson when he first arrived in the area. Their symbolism and rhetoric were associated 
with the annual renewal of friendly relations between Aboriginal and European traders. 62 
The families that assembled - on average, twenty-four families between 1 728 and 
1760 - camped around the factory and waited for the geese to return to the coast.63 
During this time, the HBC supported them with food as necessary and hosted a pre-hunt 
feast, distributing oatmeal, peas, salted fish, and tobacco. 64 Brandy was also an important 
part of this celebration; by the 1730s, a gift of brandy for the first goose killed was 
61 Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 18-19; Francis and Morantz, supra note 49 at 44. It is worth noting that the 
home Indian captains also served the factory in an ambassadorial role, carrying messages and gifts of 
tobacco to other Aboriginal groups to encourage them to come to the factory to trade. 
62 See Rotstein and Rich, both supra note 45 (trade protocols akin to renewal of formal political alliances); 
Ray and Freeman, supra note 49, c. 15 (trade protocols akin to business courtesies). Various traders 
recorded their opinions: for James !sham's comments on the significance of pipe smoking and ceremonies, 
see E.E. Rich, ed., James Isham 's Observations on Hudsons Bay, 1743 and Notes and Observations on a 
Book Entitled "A Voyage to Hudson Bay" in the Dobbs Galley, 1749 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1949) 
at 84-85; for Andrew Graham, see Williams, supra note 59 at 205; for Edward Umfreville, see W. Stewart 
Wallace, ed., The Present State of Hudson's Bay by Edward Umfreville (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1954) at 
31. 
63 Based on data presented by Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 140-41. 
64 These HBC feasts were distinct from the feasts and dances held by the lowland Cree away from the 
factory at the same time of year. The latter- known as Niskisimowin - have been explained by ethnologists 
as having spiritual significance, honouring the importance of the geese to the lowland Cree and maintaining 
harmony between the spirit of the birds and their hunters. See David Meyer, "Waterfowl in Cree Ritual -
The Goose Dance" in Freedman and Barkow, supra note 55, 433. For a trader's account of the goose 
dance, see Rich, supra note 61at76-77. 
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already being described as an "Old Custom."65 The HBC equipped the hunters with guns, 
powder, and shot, in anticipation of a return in numbers of geese, even if its outlay was 
not completely recovered in some years. 66 
The goose hunt indicates that a balance of power, or even an imbalance, existed in 
favour of the Cree, not the utter dependence assumed by early historians. The hunt was 
the most significant interaction between the factory and the extended network of home 
Indians in any year, and it was a critical event in securing the company's food stocks. It 
furnished the lowland Cree with goods such as guns, hatchets, cloth, and blankets, but 
also beads, tobacco, and brandy- things once labelled "luxury" items by Ray.67 These 
contrasting receipts indicate that the HBC staff were dependent on these hunters to 
survive the year, or at least to augment their diets and thereby make the year more 
tolerable. As historian John Foster comments, "[ o ]n balance it is probable that the 
personnel of the Company's posts were not dependent upon the Home Guard for physical 
survival. But they would know that in a major way the pleasantness of their stay in 
Rupert's Land was dependent upon the Home Guard fulfilling their role in the fur trade. 
65 Albany Fort Post Journal, HBCA, B.3/a/20, fo. 20 ( 10 April 1732), as quoted in Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 
139. Isham's record of typical conversations between English and Indian also demonstrates the widespread 
nature of this custom: "E [Englishman] - Why you have Brought the first Goose that's Kill'd; A [Indian A] 
- Yes, perhap's you will give me a Botle of Brandy; E- Yes, their itt's [it is]." Rich, supra note 61at55. 
66 This practice bears some resemblance to the system of credit that developed - known as "trusting" -
whereby lowland Cree traders were outfitted with hunting and trapping supplies in the fall, and then repaid 
their debts over the course of the winter. HBC men frequently complained about their inability to enforce 
these debts, as Indians who had been trusted sometimes took their goods to French traders instead, even if 
they had sufficient goods to deliver to the company. See Francis and Morantz, supra note 49 at 51-53. 
67 Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters and Middlemen in the Lands 
Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 85. 
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Such an understanding would not be lost on the Home Guard either."68 Taking this 
suggestion further, Dale Russell provocatively suggests that, if the Cree were 
"dependent" on trade goods for convenience rather than survival, the goose hunt 
"probably reinforced the Cree's perception of the situation [that] he, rather than the 
Europeans, was 'in control. '"69 
Several HBC traders reported that, generally, the relationship with home Indians 
was one of mutual dependence. James !sham's comments in this regard, recorded in a 
mid-eighteenth-century manuscript of his "Observations on Hudsons Bay," are well 
known: "it's to be observ'd that those Indians that hunts at Seasons for the forts, can not 
do without the assistance of the English, any more than the English without them, for the 
Chief of our Living is this Country's product."70 Like other later eighteenth-century 
traders, Arthur Graham emphasized the "degenerate" character of the home Indians due 
to the high volume of brandy for which they traded, but he nevertheless noted that the 
provisions they provided were "not inconsiderable."71 The relationship has thus come to 
68 John E. Foster, "The Indian-Trader in the Hudson Bay Fur Trade Tradition" in Freedman and Barkow, 
supra note 55, 571. 
69 Russell, supra note 55 at 432. 
70 Rich, supra note 61 at 78. 
71 Williams, supra note 59 at 192 ("the English brandy killing many of the [home Indians] before the young 
ones grow to maturity. Indeed they are so degenerated as scarcely to be able to endure their native labours, 
and climate ... We give in return for one buck deer two quarts brandy, for one doe deer one quart ditto"). 
The published version of Graham's Observations dates from 1791 (although Graham completed different 
versions and parts of it as early as 1769). His account is based in large part on his experiences as an HBC 
trader in various positions at Churchill, York, and Severn between 1749 and 1775. See Williams, 
"Introduction" in ibid. 
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be understood as one of "interdependence," which home Indians and traders viewed as 
mutually beneficial and necessary. 
This conclusion has eclipsed further investigation of the normative worlds that 
supported these stable and seemingly well-ordered relationships. Indeed, the normative 
dimensions are obscured by the more readily available pragmatic and material factors that 
can explain - at least functionally - the give and take in the local economy. In functional 
terms, it seems perfectly sensible for the HBC traders to have engaged in this interaction: 
they needed the provisions, obtaining them on-site was cheaper than importing them from 
England, and they needed good relations with the local population. Consequently, they 
followed its customs, such as making feasts and giving gifts of tobacco, to encourage it to 
supply them with provisions. They were also aware of the potential for starvation in the 
harsh climate of the Hudson Bay coastline; helping the local population when it was in 
need made sense, even if HBC management was critical of the expense involved, so that 
the favour might be reciprocated should the tables tum. 
Similarly pragmatic reasons can also explain the lowland Cree participation. For 
the early historians, the superiority of European technologies, combined with the 
presumed poverty of the Indians and their resulting dependence upon the trading posts, 
answered all questions about the home Indians' motivations for close connection to the 
posts. However, since it is now well established that economic dependence was a late 
eighteenth- or early nineteenth-century development, there is a greater need to explain 
why otherwise self-sufficient Indians became involved. At least some, if not a majority of 
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home Indians, viewed exchange with the newcomers as desirable and entered into it 
voluntarily. In addition to economic interests, there were military advantages to be gained 
through the guns and other goods they obtained, as Radisson's pitch that he came "to 
bring thee arms to destroy thine enemies" made clear. Moreover, the key role played by 
local leaders, and the fact that the HBC records do not refer to any problems finding local 
people with whom to work, indicates that there were perceived, if not real, social and 
political advantages for cultivating a close relationship with the trading post. In a society 
in which leadership was non-coercive and earned through material generosity and 
accomplishment, connection to a potentially powerful ally (as measured by the HBC's 
wealth and ability to provide advantageous, and later necessary, military technologies) 
was probably an opportunity to increase and solidify a leader's sphere of influence. 72 
Such relationships have often been described in the anthropological literature as 
involving "general" or "balanced reciprocity," terms that have also been applied to 
lowland Cree society, so that the interactions with HBC traders were said to have been 
integrated into a pre-existing framework. 73 General reciprocity, a concept defined by 
Marshall Sahlins in the 1970s, can be described as 
a kind of give and take characterized by diffuse obligations to help others who 
may be in need, regardless of the specific balance of account, of how much has 
been given or received, by whom, in the past. [It can be] contrasted ... with 
balanced reciprocity, in which every gift anticipates an equivalent return, and 
72 See generally Morantz, supra note 57. 
73 See e.g. Ray and Freeman, supra note 49 at 58, 243-44. 
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negative reciprocity, characterized by persistent and underhand attempts to get 
something for nothing. 74 
General reciprocity fits well with Isham' s comments regarding the mutual 
dependence between the men at the factory and the lowland Cree hunters. It also fits with 
the provision of relief by the HBC to the lowland Cree who required it. Under a principle 
of general reciprocity, HBC traders understood that they would be helped in return if they 
were in need (and, no doubt, they often were). 75 Other aspects of the local exchange -
such as the winter trade of goods for furs with the people whom Lytwyn identified as 
half-home guard Indians - are better characterized as "balanced reciprocity." The types of 
reciprocity correspond with degrees of closeness in social relations, thus indicating that 
the people who came to trade during the winter were in a less close relationship with the 
HBC than those who received relief. 76 
General and balanced reciprocity are descriptive concepts. They can explain the 
actions of both lowland Cree and HBC traders, ascribing motivations akin to enlightened 
self-interest in the process. They do little, however, to further the objectives of this 
chapter, because the explanations are too generalized to reach the normative dimensions 
to which this discussion aspires. They tell us why the parties had reason to cooperate in 
74 Tim Ingold, "On the Social Relations of the Hunter-Gatherer Band" in R.B. Lee and Richard Daly, eds., 
The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
399 at 400, paraphrasing M. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London: Tavistock, 1972). 
75 See Francis and Morantz, supra note 49 at 94, for an application of general reciprocity in this manner. 
76 For an explanation of the connection between reciprocity and the closeness of social relations, see 
Ingold, supra note 73 at 400. 
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various ways, but they say little about when such obligations arose, their terms, or how 
they were regulated and enforced. To go beyond these limitations, one must explore how 
HBC traders and lowland Cree entered relationships that supported a system of general 
reciprocity and sketch the boundaries and underlying assumptions that kept the 
relationships vital. What were the "normal" limits of the relationships, and under what 
conditions would they end or change to support different expectations? Were HBC 
traders simply responding to the demands of a foreign clientele, or were their own ideas 
of fairness engaged? If so, how did their attitudes mesh (or not) with those of the lowland 
Cree? And did the parties develop understandings that were shared across the Cree-HBC 
divide? To answer these questions, we must take a normative tum. 
4. The Language of Intersocietal Normativity 
We saw previously that early historians assumed that the lowland Cree became 
dependent upon HBC charity. This conclusion stemmed from a literal interpretation of 
the references to "Starving or Starv'd Indians" in trading post journals and letters to the 
company in London. These instances were indeed frequent, but what is remarkable is 
that, as in the quotation from E.E. Rich above, they are often juxtaposed with references 
to hunting, fishing, trading, and even the provision of food by these and other Indians, so 
that the fort appears as a nexus of exchange that includes Cree provision, as well as 
consumption, of food. For example, in March 1715, Captain Knight recorded the 
following events in the trading post journal: 
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Mar 1 - In the Afternoon came here 7 Indians Starvd & gave A Sad Relation of 
Sev'll others in the Like Conditions when they parted with them [about] 3 
Months Ago [.] 
Mar 7 - [2 Indian Boys from this group went up river with 4 HBC men to mend a 
hedge and look for deer, and another Indian went up the river with 3 of his 
family, also looking for deer.] 
Mar 10- 6 Indians came from Portnellson River [with] Meat & Furs [which] they 
traded. 
Mar 11 - [Indians who traded left and took one of the "Starvd" Indians with 
them.] 
Mar 12 - [2 Indians came from the south] in want of foods & 2 came with one of 
our Men from the ... Deer hedge. [T]hese Indians ... have been very hard putt 
to it for they have left some to perish having killed no Deer this Winter. So I 
fitted our Indian[s] out [with] provisions to go meet [their] familys, who went 
away by Moon Light ... 
Mar 15 - some Indians came from portnellson & brought some Meat they traded 
some the rest they gave toy' poor Indians [here][.] 
Mar 16- [An Indian went out for deer but didn't find any, an Indian came down 
the river for want of food,] so I gave him some flower & [peas] & he returned 
to his Family. [An Indian boy came back with no deer, but some other small 
game and fish.] 
Mar 20 - [2 Indians went upriver and one came back from Norward to say that 
they had killed 2 deer and that the travelling deer were being kept back by 
cold weather and they expect plenty once the first great thaw happens.] 
Mar 22 -y'lndian y' went to meet the Starvd ffamilys; 12 ... came here & Says 
there was 2 More left to perish Since the First Indians came here & that he 
now left the indians he came from in a Misserable Condition & has Slept 2 
Nights since so I fitted other Indians [with] Necessarys to go meet them in the 
Afternoon 5 Indians came from portnellson[.] 
Mar 23 - [The Indians that came yesterday traded their skins and went away and 
3 Indians went to meet the starved gang]. 77 
Given that Knight understood his trading partners well and recorded their reports and 
information faithfully, these accounts clearly indicate hardship and famine among a 
number of the Indians in the late winter of 1715. Indeed, famine conditions were common 
77 York Factory Post Journal, HBCA, B. 239/a/l (March 1715) (author's paraphrasing in square brackets). 
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near the trading post in March and April of each year. 78 But the records are equally clear 
that other Indians, travelling to the factory from other wintering spots, had food. These 
entries also portray the factory as a meeting point for different kin groups of lowland 
Cree, at which they would share provisions and information, and then go to meet others 
who were potentially in need. The entries indicate that aid and provisions flowed between 
Indians, not solely from the HBC to them. 79 
These journal entries use "starving" in a manner that obviously refers to physical 
need. Elsewhere in the record, however, the word appears to have been employed in a 
more idiomatic way, indicating something other than a physical condition. For example, 
in a section of his "Observations" titled "Indian's Coming in the Winter to Trade & C.," 
Isham recorded the following as a typical conversation between HBC and Cree traders: 
A [Indian] - I am hungary 
B [Indian] - I am starv' d no Deer to be got 
E [Englishman] -There is tobacco & pipes smoak 
A & B-than'k you 
E - there is some bread & Burgue 
A - thank you freind 
78 See, for example, the following comment by Isham: "These Natives are ofte'n starv'd and in Want of 
food, Especialy in the winter season that Keeps by the Sea side, but upland Indians are Seldom put to these 
shifts, - having plentier of Beast of all sortts, then what is to be Gott by the sea shore." Rich, supra note 61 
at 80-81. Also, consider the Hayes River Indians' negotiations with Chouart and Knight, and the awareness 
of the potential for famine shown in their demands. 
79 This flow of assistance between Indians still seemed to be functioning in 1743 when York Factory Chief 
Factor Thomas White made the following journal entry, noting that help from the factory was an option of 
last resort: "[An Indian and family arrived for relief because he was sick and lame all winter] & had it not 
been for y'assistance of other Indians, he must have perisht but they going further oflt] to look for beaver 
& he not being able to travel obligd him to Come to y' factory for reliefe." York Factory Post Journal 
HBCA, B. 239/a/25 (17 December 1743). 
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E - there is tobacco for Indians to smoak if you see any 
A-Very well 
B - Ill be in at the Breaking up of the Rivers. 80 
In this conversation, "I am hungary" is the first thing said by the prototypical Indian 
trader. The impression is that he greeted the factor by announcing an expectation that he 
be fed. Adding to this impression is Isham' s record of the phonetic Cree version of this 
statement: "Yo! Sucky Enwemittsunn uma." Here, "Yo!" appears to be a colloquial 
exclamation, which may be comparable to the modern English "Hi. " 81 
This conversation indicates that at least some expressions of hunger - in Isham' s 
view, the typical ones in the context of trade - do not appear to be limited to a physical 
state and instead form part of a ritual greeting between home or half-home Indians and 
HBC traders during the winter. Mary Black-Rogers reached similar conclusions in her 
study of the use of the word "starving" in HBC records. Noting that it was often 
employed in conjunction with words such as "begging" and "pity," and relying on her 
knowledge of Ojibway culture, she posited the following: 
80 Rich, supra note 61 at 63-64. 
81 This is speculation on my part, as I have been unable to find a similar word in dictionaries such as E.A. 
Watkins, A Dictionary of the Cree Language as Spoken by the Indians of the Hudson's Bay Company 
Territories (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1865). Watkins, however, does list the 
word "Yohoo!" as an exclamation meaning "What now!" (at 459). Nor have I found the word that Isham 
translated as hungry- enwemittsunn - in any Cree dictionary (regardless of dialect). Watkins' words for 
hunger/hungry include the verbs n6ot'akutatootum (he hungers for it), sewutao (he is hungry, he feels his 
stomach empty), kowakutao (starving through hunger), and sekuchew (starving through cold), all of which 
relate to the physical condition of hunger and none of which indicate a root similar to the word reported by 
Isham. Linguist Peter Bakker has described !sham's Cree as intelligible but also as an ungrammatical mix 
of several dialects, which may be part of the difficulty. Peter Bakker, "Hudson Bay Trader's Cree: A Cree 
Pidgin?" in John D. Nichols and Arden C. Ogg, eds., Nikotwasik iskwahtem, paskihtepayih! Studies in 
Honour of H.C. Wolfart (Winnipeg: Algonquian and Iroquoian Linguistics, 1996) 1 at 24, 25. 
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Was it always a request for food? /STARY-with-pity-attached/ may even have 
come to function metaphorically as a ritual affirmation or announcement of the 
current status of the speaker's relationship with the trader - almost as a greeting. 82 
Black-Rogers found further support for this suggestion in a later journal entry by trader 
J.D. Cameron at Rainy Lake, regarding his Ojibway trading partners: "Nothing pleases an 
Indian more than in giving him something to eat immediately on his arrival. It is the 
grand Etiquette of Politeness amongst themselves."83 
The role of food in trading etiquette is further elaborated in letters sent to London 
by HBC officials. For example, in responding to inquiries from London, Richard Norton, 
Factor at Churchill Factory in 1738, wrote the following: 
And as to the biscuit and prunes mentioned in ... [your letter to me], I am 
surprised that your honours should be unacquainted with a thing that has been so 
long standing in the accounts from all your factories in the country, and therefore 
to satisfy your honours thereof I do humbly assure that there is not an Indian 
comes to the factory but what expects some biscuit, prunes, a pipe and a pipe of 
tobacco etc. at their first coming to trade, which is a compliment of so long 
standing as cannot without danger to your honours' interest be recalled, and on 
this occasion is the biscuit and prunes your honours make mention of expended. 84 
The precise meaning of this practice remains open to interpretation but can generally be 
understood as signifying a continuing relationship most commonly designated as 
82 Mary Black-Rogers, "Varieties of 'Starving': Semantics and Survival in the Subarctic Fur Trade, 1750-
1850" (1986) 33 Ethnohistory 354 at 369. See also Bruce M. White, "'Give Us a Little Milk': The Social 
and Cultural Meaning of Gift Giving in the Lake Superior Fur Trade" (1982) 48 Minnesota History 60. 
83 Rainy Lake (Lac La Pluie) Reports on District, HBCA, B. 105/e/6 fo. 4 (1825), quoted in ibid. at 370. 
84 Richard Norton, "Letter from Richard Norton" (17 August 1738) in K.G. Davies, ed., letters from 
Hudson Bay, 1703-40 (London: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1965) 252. See also the 8 August 1728 
letter from Thomas McCliesh, Factor at York Factory: "I am sorry of our disappointment of prunes, 
because nothing obliges the native more for they all in general expect as a due debt at first coming a biscuit, 
some prunes a pipe and piece of tobacco." Davies, ibid., 135. 
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"friendship," as indicated by the "thank you friend" uttered by the Indian trader in 
Isham' s dialogue. 
There were, then, multiple meanings attached to the language of hunger and 
starvation. In the events recounted at the beginning of this chapter, Chouart and Knight 
both made explicit assurances to provide relief. These were highly specific undertakings, 
made in exchange for actions required of the Indians. In comparison to the more general 
representations Radisson made to his new Hayes River allies, in which he promised that, 
because he brought merchandise, they would not die of hunger, they have the appearance 
of a specific agreement. 
Chouart's promise may have been a short-term arrangement made with a few 
people who would help the French deal with the dangers of a single winter, but the scope 
of Knight's pledge is less certain. He was trying to broker a lasting peace between the 
Hayes River and Chipewyan Indians. Interestingly, however, in discussions regarding 
food just one year later, such a specific agreement was not mentioned. By that time, 
171 7, Henry Kelsey had taken over the leadership of the fort while Knight went north to 
establish the company's post on the Churchill River. In that winter's trading post journal, 
Kelsey noted that 
The [two] Indians that came yesterday [from the Hayes River Captain] traded and 
gave me 26 Deer tongues and 20 Beaver tails that were sent by the Captain to me. 
I sent the [Captain] 3 [gallons of brandy], Pease & as Much Oatmeal with two 
falhome of Tobacco. Some other Indians returned and said there were no Deer 
and they are allmost Starv'd, [and] report that the Indians in general are in want of 
food, eating their doggs and skins, and that one tent has gone to Gov Knight [at 
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Churchill] for [relief] but the rest would not go because I ordered [them to the] 
contrary last fall. 85 
A couple of days later, Kelsey recorded that more Indians had arrived; now he had 
twenty-four people to "maintain." 
In this journal entry, three things are clear: the factory was in regular contact and 
exchange with the Hayes River Captain, to whom Knight had made his promise; the 
Captain and his kin had not themselves fallen on hard times that winter; and other 
Indians, who were "allmost Starv'd," had turned to the factory for support before their 
condition became a matter of last resort, making clear the consequences of staying close 
to York Factory in accordance with Knight's request (and Kelsey's "order").86 Without 
an indication of the conversation between the "allmost Starv'd" Indians and Kelsey, we 
cannot discern the basis for their reliance on the post: Were they asserting a demand for 
relief based on a particular promise given by Knight or Kelsey? Were they seeking help 
as part of their relationship with the English traders more generally? And a related 
question, were their actions bound or guided by the Hayes River Captain's promises? If 
they were bound by his negotiations with Knight, it seems unlikely that they would so 
quickly forget a promise upon which they relied in making significant changes to the 
location of their wintering grounds. And in Kelsey's ready accommodation of them, it is 
85 York Factory Post Journal, HBCA, B. 239/a/4 (25 February 1717). This is a paraphrase of the journal 
entry. 
86 Kelsey's "order" that the Indians not go to Churchill might also reflect the HBC need to keep a measure 
of control over who attended at which trading post for the sake of maintaining adequate supplies, among 
other reasons. Regardless, the Company was trying to exercise control over the home Indians and affecting 
their wintering spots to satisfy its own objectives. 
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apparent that he knew he was obliged to assist the lowland Cree to ensure that they 
adhered to his "order" to avoid the new Churchill River post. It is nevertheless 
remarkable that, in Kelsey's record of these transactions, the express agreement to 
"maintain" these people had already fallen out of his consciousness or at least was 
deemed too unimportant to mention to his superiors. A commitment extracted from the 
Hayes River Cree by Knight had already been reconfigured as a one-sided command. 
By !sham's time in the 1730s and 1740s, the HBC's memory of any specific 
promises and corresponding obligations to provide food appears to have disappeared into 
what had become a regular feature of the relationship with home Indians. In 1738, Isham 
provided a glimpse of this aspect of the local exchange in a letter responding to queries 
from the company's governing committee in London regarding provisions at the factory. 
In it, he justifies the practice of supporting the home Indians by referring to their mutual 
dependence: 
As to provisions given to starved Indians exclusive of trade, it is oatmeal only, 
which we had repeated orders to support, and our own preservation is concerned 
in their's which falls heaviest upon our hunters, whom we sometimes keep too 
long for the season in order to hunt for use whereby they are sometimes surprised 
by the frost before they can reach the winter grounds, so that it would be inhuman 
not to support them. 87 
This and other statements by Isham reveal his understanding that, for Indians who hunted 
for the factory, the danger of famine increased due to the impact of this work on their 
seasonal migrations. His sense of obligation, however, does not appear to spring from the 
87 Davies, supra note 83 at 263. 
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promise made by Knight or any other part of the initial arrangements made with local 
populations. Instead, he isolates the practice of giving food from other aspects of the 
trade, explaining it as rooted in a moral obligation not to let fellow humans starve, 
particularly when this risk results from work done to support one's own survival. 
In this passage, it is also clear that Isham was trying to justify expenses in terms 
his superiors would comprehend. Thus, he may have had a better understanding of how 
the local Cree perceived this obligation-whether based on a particular promise or not -
than the passage reveals. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that, at some point 
during his tenure at York Factory, Isham had taken an Indian wife.88 Her identity is not 
known, but she was probably related to the factory's hunters, and therefore the obligation 
to provide relief may have resonated with Isham as a matter of kinship, regardless of 
whether it was understood on English or Cree terms. Even if the substance of the 
exchange is the same, an obligation based on kinship derives from a different order of 
relationship, suggesting also a different intersocietal space than the symbiotic commercial 
interdependence evident from a plain reading oflsham's statement. However, given that 
not all HBC traders were as knowledgeable or connected as Isham, the probability 
remains high that at least some of them saw the practice of giving relief only as a matter 
of colonial or Christian obligation toward a poor and uncivilized people. 
88 The records reveal very little of Isham's private life on Hudson Bay, but he and his Indian wife had a 
son, Charles Thomas Isham, who was born in 1754 or 1755. For more information on both men, see John 
English and Real Belanger, eds., Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000) s.v."Isham, James," by E.E. Rich, and s.v. "Isham, Charles Thomas," by Jennifer 
Brown, online: Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online <http://www.biographi.ca/indexe.html>. 
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There are fewer clues available to probe lowland Cree understandings of the HBC 
obligation to provide relief, other than what has already been suggested. Drawing these 
suggestions together establishes three bases upon which the lowland Cree might have 
expected relief from the HBC, none of which necessarily excludes the others. First, there 
were the specific promises discussed above. Reinforced by the practices of later traders, 
these would have encouraged trust and reliance, which in tum would have allowed the 
HBC post to become a resource in local Cree trade and support networks. Thus, explicit 
contract-like obligations might have given seed to general norms and expectations. 
Second, the lowland Cree may have expected relief as an element of the company's 
commitment to them when 'it first entered into "leagues of friendship" and was allowed to 
settle in the York Factory region. Here, general expectations would not have grown out of 
specific commitments: instead, the obligations would have been relational from the 
outset, though they might still have arisen from express undertakings, like those made by 
Radisson and Knight. As a source of obligation, "friendship" is similar to the kinship 
relations established through marriage or adoption. However, the record indicates that, 
for a majority of lowland Cree, the trading post remained a secondary support to their 
existing networks. This suggests limits to the scope and closeness of the relationship with 
the HBC for a large section of the regional indigenous population. Such limits in tum 
indicate that, even if relationships were the source of the obligation to provide relief for 
some Cree, it was not necessarily relevant to all lowland Cree or to all who sought relief 
from the HBC. 
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Third, the dynamics of status may also have been a source of Cree expectations of 
relief, for HBC factors presented themselves as the wealthy friends of the lowland Cree. 
If the factors wished to maintain this rank and their influence among local populations, 
they were required to share their wealth. Although potentially demonstrative of all three 
types of obligation, the gifts and pre-hunt feasts that accompanied the annual spring 
goose hunts illustrate this dynamic. Status as a source of normativity is notable because, 
unlike the previous two types of obligation, it derives more completely from the 
normative frameworks of the lowland Cree. 
These possibilities - specific promises, kinship/friendship, status, and an 
interdependent relationship built upon repeated practices - all carry potential for a 
measure of convergence as well as divergence in the parties' understanding of the sources 
and meaning of the normative practice of providing food. The convergence and 
divergence in the case of status is particularly interesting. Isham' s humanitarian 
explanation can be connected to the HBC's status as representing a superior, Christian, 
society. According to lowland Cree sensibilities, status was earned in ways and for 
reasons that differed from those of the English: the HBC traders achieved status through 
generosity and needed to continue to be generous to maintain their standing as respected 
and important friends. In the conceptual world of the traders, status was hierarchical and 
unchanging. In the conceptual world of the lowland Cree, it was fluid and dependent 
upon actions. But in both worlds, the practice of providing provisions and relief 
reinforced HBC status and founded an obligation to continue. In this example, the 
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complexity of finding shared meaning in an intersocietal normative realm becomes 
apparent, with mutually appropriate practices potentially reinforcing distinctive 
normative perceptions rather than encouraging the growth of a shared foundation. 
Furthermore, this example highlights the potential for important normative differences to 
persist in intersocietal spaces even where there are elements of convergence that develop 
through practices over a long period of time.Returning to the second type of "starvation" 
that appears in the records - starvation as greeting - we find, at first glance, a strong 
possibility of shared understandings. The record indicates that several HBC traders 
clearly knew what was expected of them when an Indian arrived at the factory to trade 
during the winter. From !sham's dialogue, to Cameron's comment that giving food 
equated with etiquette, to Norton's remark that it was a "compliment" oflong standing, 
the traders knew that providing some food, and particularly biscuits and prunes (along 
with a pipe and tobacco), was an essential pre-trade practice without which "friendly 
relations" would be difficult to maintain. However, how did the traders understand the 
greeting itself, and what might the Indians have meant by it? From most accounts, it 
seems that the traders took the practice as a given - as a matter of business and of 
keeping "their" Indians away from French traders threatening from further inland. It 
fulfilled their orders to treat the Indians well, "fayre usage" being a golden rule of 
conduct for HBC staff in the region. 89 Thus, HBC traders' adherence to this form of 
89 See, for example, the London committee's instructions to Governor Bridgar regarding his conduct at Port 
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greeting was perhaps only a "when in Rome, do as the Romans do" approach, such that 
its meaning was limited to the fact of the practice. The protocol acquired a normative 
dimension for HBC traders because it was how things were done, not because it was 
understood or respected. And though some of the more experienced and wiser traders 
probably realized that, in some contexts, the Indians who used this expression were not 
literally starving, others might have missed this subtlety and would have surmised that 
their trading partners were truly a miserable lot. 
For the lowland Cree, however, the practice carried meanings beyond the 
obligatory force acquired through repetition. In any society, protocol and etiquette 
support culturally defined relationships by providing appropriate words and actions to 
recognize, reinforce, and honour them. Thus, behind the normalcy of the greeting, a 
particular relationship was being articulated and reinforced. Black-Rogers suggests that 
the language of starvation, begging, and pity functioned as a self-humbling device, with 
humbling reinforcing a relationship and asserting associated obligations.90 But what was 
this relationship? 
We have already surveyed the use of friendship and/or kinship at the foundation 
of at least some of the European relationships with the lowland Cree. Regardless of their 
proper characterization, these relationships were regularly celebrated and renewed 
Nelson: "You must bee carefull to carry your Selfe with prudence humanity and justice towards. the 
Natives." Letter (15 May 1682) in Rich, supra note 36 at 36 [emphasis in original]. See also Isham: "I find 
goode usage and civility agrees well with these Natives, - if they grow obstobilious [obstreperous?], a 
Little correction, then sweatning makes them pliant." Rich, supra note 61 at 81. 
90 Black-Rogers, supra note 81 at 367-68. 
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through protocols that accompanied the spring goose hunt, in which feasts figured 
prominently. These protocols were similar to the ceremonies through which the 
relationships were first formed in 1682, in which support and prosperity were promised 
(at least by Radisson). By comparison, the greeting ritual that began with "I'm hungary" 
(as described by Isham) was a scaled-down affair that featured a quick gift of food and 
tobacco before the traders got down to business. Nevertheless, the gift of food recalled 
the symbols of friendship and promises of support from the original and annual 
ceremonies .. By symbolically recalling the foundation of the relationship, the practices 
may have served to situate the routine trading activities within the framework of that 
relationship and the commitments it entailed. The normative meaning of the idiom might 
thus be traced to the terms of the HBC presence in the region, even if the lowland Cree 
were alone in retaining any memory of those terms. 
As we saw earlier, the HBC's participation in ceremonies was driven largely by 
pragmatism, aimed at securing its position against the French. After the competing claims 
of the French and English were resolved, any recollection of the leagues of friendship 
disappeared from the HBC records: there were no tally-sticks and no recognition of the 
company's trading partners' demands as a condition of its continued presence on Cree 
land. Given this, and given British attitudes toward the colonial enterprise generally, it 
seems safe to conclude that the HBC traders' understanding of the greeting protocols 
remained pragmatic, perhaps occasionally finding normative resonance within their own 
moral universe, as, for example, in obligations of hospitality, but no longer related to 
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their foothold on the coast of Hudson Bay. Thus, the greeting protocols appear to have 
been close to a bare but still obligatory practice, with meanings remaining distinct. 
By contrast, some evidence indicates that lowland Cree memories of the original 
agreements remained strong (or at least stronger than those of the HBC) and continued to 
shape their normative expectations. Few recorded situations directly recall or test these 
foundations, but one incident documenting a breakdown of the trading relationship in the 
York Factory region allows us to make these interpretive connections. 
In 1712, Fort Bourbon (the French name for what became York Factory, still 
under French control at that time) had suffered interruptions and shortages in supplies 
due to the wars in Europe. Chief Trader Nicolas Jeremie was therefore reluctant to trade 
his limited store of dry foods and gunpowder with the local population, wishing "to keep 
it as a safeguard for my own life and the lives of my men."91 In this context, Jeremie sent 
out a party of his own people to hunt. In his words, these men 
camped near a party of natives who were starving and who had no powder ... 
These natives, considering themselves dared by the reckless way my men were 
shooting every kind of game, and feasting before their eyes without sharing 
anything, made a plot to kill them, and seize what they had. 
They [the Indians] invited them [the Frenchmen] to a night revel in their 
cabins. The two Frenchmen went there without any suspicion of the trap which 
had been laid for them. The other six slept peacefully, supposing themselves to be 
in perfect safety, and knowing nothing of the treachery plotted against them. 
When the guests at this dread banquet were going to go back to their camp, the 
91 Nicolas Jeremie, Twenty Years of York Factory, I 694-17 I 4: Jeremie's Account of Hudson Strait and 
Bay, ed. by R. Douglas and J.N. Wallace (Ottawa: Thorburn and Abbott, 1926) at 39. 
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traitors surrounded them with daggers and big knives in their hands, and stabbed 
them, unarmed as they were, without a chance for their lives.92 
The Indians then killed the others who were asleep nearby and "pillaged" what they could 
find among the French. One of the French hunters, who survived by feigning death, 
crawled back to Fort Bourbon to tell Jeremie this tale. 
In the fallout from this incident, Jeremie reported that "[t]hese barbarians, hungry 
for goods, came to Fort Phelipeaux [on the New Severn River] where they found nobody, 
and everything they came across they plundered and ravaged. Eleven hundred pounds of 
powder, which I had not time to get taken to Fort Bourbon was carried away by them, 
and it was all that we had left."93 Jeremie and his remaining men stayed huddled at the 
fort for the rest of the winter, sure that these "traitors" would seek them out and attack. 
But no attack ever materialized. Several years later, the Indians who were involved in this 
incident came to trade at York Factory while it was under Governor Knight's command. 
In a journal entry stressing the importance of keeping the factory well stocked, Knight 
commented that "after [these Indians] killd [the French] they broke open their warehouse 
and to show them they did not value their Goods for they broke and tore what they found 
and throwd and Scattered 7 Barrells of Powder in the Water so that their design by that 
was to show that they could Live without their Goods and discourage them from comeing 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. at 40. 
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here any more."94 Knight's account contradicts Jeremie's report that the Indians had 
taken the remaining French supplies of powder, and in doing so, it reveals that the attack 
was a message to the French to pack up, go home, and not come back. 
The historian E.E. Rich gives these events a pragmatic interpretation, suggesting 
that the Cree turned against the French due to lack of supplies such as powder and shot, 
which had caused them to go hungry.95 It is true that access to goods lay at the foundation 
of all these relationships, as Radisson's original promise makes clear: "thou wilt not die 
of hunger ... for I bring thee merchandise." But the fact that supplies were destroyed, in 
an obvious attempt to send a message, suggests that more than hunger was at issue. 
Lytwyn has said that the killings were more probably motivated by the refusal of the 
French traders to share food with the lowland Cree.96 His interpretation can be taken 
further. Jeremie's frequent use of "traitor" in his report indicates that he viewed the Cree 
as allies, but he may not have understood that, on Cree rather than French terms, he 
would have been expected to share provisions with the Cree, even when shortages 
threatened the French livelihood. And his account suggests that the French traders may 
have violated other Cree norms in their manner of hunting, "shooting every kind of 
game." 
94 York Factory Post Journal, HBCA, B. 239/a/2 (22 August 1716), quoted in Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 132. 
95 Rich, supra note 32 at 414. 
96 Lytwyn, supra note 2 at 132. 
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One thing is evident: the French violated a basic norm of their relationship with 
this group of Cree, who responded in kind. And although Knight's comments were a self-
serving, expense-justifying story intended for his superiors, his fear of a similar fate is 
tangible. He understood that these Cree took it upon themselves to demonstrate that there 
were rules the Europeans must obey if they wished to remain friends, living in the Cree 
homelands. 
5. Conclusion 
These interactions, and the traces they left in the HBC records, allow us to 
glimpse the normative practices that shaped relations between Europeans and the lowland 
Cree on the shores of Hudson Bay. It is not possible, at this remove, to delineate these 
relationships exactly or to describe the norms of this intersocietal space with absolute 
precision. Instead, ambiguity is the defining characteristic of the latter - if only because 
the investigation has been conducted through one-sided accounts of events written 
several centuries ago. But this study has nevertheless been revealing. It has shown that 
friendship, kinship, and alliance connected the European traders to particular groups of 
lowland Cree; that these links were, for the most part, strong and resilient; that they were 
founded on negotiation, protocol, and exchange, informed to some extent by each party's 
normative referents; that they were maintained through protocols that evoked the 
formative agreements; and that the substantial satisfaction of the parties' normative 
expectations reinforced these relationships by fostering reliance and trust. In particular, 
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the provision of food was not solely a matter of dependence or charity. Nor was it simply 
the expression of functional interdependence. It was a key substantive and symbolic 
ingredient in the normative dimensions of the local exchange. The innumerable acts of 
sharing, promising, demanding, and giving gifts of food recalled links between local 
trade and the relationships formed when Europeans first arrived in the York Factory 
region, anchoring the intersocietal normative space. 
From the negotiations in the late seventeenth century to the later dialogues 
between Isham and Indian traders, one sees individuals, indigenous and nonindigenous, 
acting as agents in the creation and management of the relationships that defined the 
intersocietal space. This study shows how they negotiated their grounding in one 
normative world while engaging in social, political, and economic activities with people 
who did not share that world. The picture that emerges is of a working intersocietal space 
in which normative expectations that were shared at the level of practice were not always 
shared at the level of meaning. This was an intercultural space that fits White's 
conception of the middle ground as an environment in which "one took the convergences 
one could find" but with no particular requirement that the meanings behind these 
convergences were ever sorted out. This persistence of normative difference suggests that 
the dominant approach was not one of invention during the period studied. Instead, 
participants adapted to the demands and responses of the other, often with limited insight 
into the other's normative frame. Their worlds did not merge - Cree worlds did not 
become normal to HBC traders, and English worlds did not become normal to the Cree -
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although the extent of integration and mutual understanding varied from individual to 
individual, depending on experience and insight. 
In spite of dynamics that maintained different normative worlds, appropriate 
practices and parallel sensibilities allowed intersocietal obligations to grow, supporting 
relations in which divergent meanings were, perhaps, a defining characteristic. Working 
from a point of limited understanding, HBC traders - the more precariously positioned of 
the parties - were careful to conform to the expectations of their trading partners. With 
some traders, the possibility of a common meaning was undoubtedly closer at hand, but 
with others, the possibility was remote. What is clear is that, even if normative 
understanding was achieved on the ground, only the bare practices or practices 
explainable in European terms became institutionalized and shared with company bosses 
and colonial masters across the Atlantic. And the impoverished and one-sided 
understandings of these practices have been perpetuated in both history and policy. 
That there was no complete "meeting of the minds" should surprise no one: 
perfect agreement is, after all, an ideal concept in both law and political theory. However, 
the fact that relations could continue, governed by practices taken by all parties to be 
obligatory in the face of fundamentally different premises, is a valuable insight. It 
reminds us to resist treating intersocietal norms as a comprehensive, positive body of law 
that crystallized in a "golden age" of Native-newcomer relations. Nor were the norms a 
hollow shell. Both lowland Cree and HBC traders had expectations and recognized 
obligations; but these norms and obligations were not understood in the same way, 
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backed by the same reasons. In the end, this study portrays intersocietal normativity as a 
space of physical coexistence and normative difference, a space that required active 
negotiation, adaptation, and renewal to maintain its vitality. Consent was a limited 
agreement to engage and an ongoing commitment to making the engagement work. 97 
Originally published in a volume committed to exploring consent in a manner that 
goes beyond unsophisticated notions of a moment of original consent, it is ironic that this 
chapter examines events that may be as good an approximation of original consent as can 
be discovered historically in a settler state. The irony, however, is superficial. Although 
this investigation has identified some early moments of agreement between lowland Cree 
and French and English traders, it has also demonstrated that the consent contained in 
those moments is iterative, thin, and incomplete. The more formalized and discrete 
instances of agreement are stranded and unmeaningful in isolation from their interplay 
with processes that built trust, maintained relationships, and created conditions in which 
working agreements, not strictly dictated by the balance of power, might be achieved. 
Consent was embedded in the carrying out of protocols (imperfectly understood) and the 
substantive fulfillment of past agreements and promises, a view that echoes Jeremy 
Webber's observation that consent may be a process or project that can intensify or 
atrophy over time.98 Moreover, this interplay anticipates and grounds the characterization 
97 Note the similarity of this idea to relational forms of consent, as discussed by Jeremy Webber, 
"Meanings", supra note 8. In particular, consent in these relationships occurs between people (and peoples) 
who remain distinct and who need not reach a deep level of agreement to work together. 
98 Ibid. 
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of treaties as ongoing relationships, which, as James Tully emphasizes, are negotiated in 
a "much broader field of consent and dissent, and a much broader range of practices of 
consent and dissent. "99 These observations are significant for scholars and advocates who 
seek to ground the sovereignty of settler societies in the consent of indigenous parties. 
99 Tully, "Consent", supra 14 at 249. For treaties, see e.g. Mark Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain: 
Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History After Marshall" (2001) 24 Dalhousie Law Journal 75; 
Borrows, supra note 11; James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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Chapter 4: "It would only be just": A Study of Territoriality and 
Trading Posts Along the Mackenzie River, 1800-1827* 
In the early nineteenth century, the British Empire did not have much interest in the 
Mackenzie River- the Deh Cho as the Dene call it. Until settlers became aware of the 
area's oil resources in the early twentieth century, it was known mostly for the Franklin 
expedition's ill-fated search for a Northwest Passage. The Great River was transferred to 
the Dominion of Canada as part of the North-Western Territory in 1870,1 but it was still 
some time before settl~rs frequented the region. In the early period, only fur traders 
maintained a presence, and British territorial claims to the western sub-arctic 'bore no 
relationship whatever to the complex legal and quasi-legal rules that governed' relations 
between the indigenous and European traders on the ground (Ford 2010: 18). 
This chapter presents a case study of the legal and quasi-legal order governing 
relations along the Deh Cho in the early nineteenth century. It focuses on the 
establishment of Fort Good Hope by the North West Company (NWC) and later the 
Hudson's Bay Company (HBC). The Companies' negotiations with the Dene about 
trading post location reveal neglected operative norms of territoriality and governance -
on a trading rather than settler frontier. Here, I review the establishment of Fort Good 
• In Lisa Ford & Tim Rowse, eds, Between Indigenous and Settler Governance (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2012) 35. 
1 Imperial Order-in-Council admitting Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory into the Dominion of 
Canada, 23 June 1870. 
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Hope before exploring the normative frameworks of both European and Dene traders. I 
argue that the European fur traders - whether they realised it or not - worked largely 
within Dene law and jurisdictions to establish and maintain their presence in the Dene 
territories. In contrast to the creative misunderstandings and enduring convergences of 
Richard White's 'middle ground' (White 1991: 52, 84), the intersocietal norms that 
supported trade at Fort Good Hope were characterized by syncretic adaptations and static 
misunderstandings that did not significantly alter Dene territorial or governance norms. 
These norms cannot be adequately appreciated through western models of 
territorial governance. Hunter-gatherer societies such as the Dene had distinct territories 
but without sharp geo-political boundaries; they lived in distinct political communities 
but land rights or entitlements were not necessarily delimited by membership or territory 
and their governance institutions were not coercive (e.g. Ingold 1999 and Nadasdy 2002). 
Indigenous political forms are also obscured by our research materials - largely written 
accounts recorded by European fur traders and explorers. I therefore use ethnohistorical 
methods, including ethnographic materials and Dene stories, to bring Dene perspectives 
and Dene law into sharper view through the distortions of historical records. 2 
I identify the indigenous traders in the chapter with the names by the English and 
French record-keepers. This choice has been made out of necessity: Dene political and 
territorial configurations have shifted over time, rendering a proper delineation of 
2 For criticisms of'upstreaming' in ethnohistory, see e.g., White 1991: xiv. Contrast White (1999): 109; 
116-7; and Clendinnen (2003): 133. 
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implicated indigenous groups and their territories to their present-day descendants 
beyond the scope of this study. 
1. Fort Good Hope and the Fur Trade in the Mackenzie River District 
European traders reached the Mackenzie River at the end of the eighteenth 
century. NWC traders found the land less rich in furs than they had hoped: significant 
numbers of beaver pelts - the most lucrative fur - came only from the Liard River region, 
with less valuable pelts dominating returns from Great Bear Lake and the northern 
reaches of the Mackenzie (Keith 2001: xii). The remoteness and harsh climate of the 
region made it difficult to supply. Company traders nevertheless complained about the 
Indians' "indolence" and blamed them for the low productivity of the region. 
NWC traders were generally well-received in Dene territories. They brought trade 
goods, such as flints, kettles, and later guns which made Dene lives easier. Other items, 
such as beads, added to symbolic and decorative materials already used and traded 
(Krech 1982: 431). Moreover, the footprint of the NWC traders in Dene lands was quite 
small. Few stayed after they retired, and those that did were often the French or Iroquois 
engages who had been sent en derouine, a practice of spending winters in the camps of 
the Dene (Brown 1980: Chapter 4).3 Wintering in the Dene camps allowed engages to 
form close, sometimes familial relations with their indigenous trading partners. Although 
this practice gave rise to abuses, engages generally helped cement relationships by being 
3 For, e.g., Jean-Baptiste Laprise was an engage who appears to have never left the Mackenzie District 
(Keith 200 I: 404-6). 
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absorbed into Dene society rather than challenging it (see generally Brown 1980: ch 4). 
Further, unlike settlers, traders did not threaten Dene access to land and resources. 
Disease aside (e.g. Krech 1982: 192), the NWC's appearance along the Deh Cho did not 
threaten the Dene, their lifestyles, or their lands. 
The story of Fort Good Hope begins with the NWC but ends with the HBC. The 
post was founded in 1806 by Alexander McKenzie, nephew and namesake of the famous 
explorer. By 1806, the NWC had established trade with the Slavey, Dogrib Indians, and 
some groups of Hare Indians in the southern parts of the Mackenzie, but had not yet 
reached the Loucheux, the most northerly Dene people (Keith 2001: 13-18). Fort Good 
Hope was built to bring the trade to the Loucheux. 
Relying heavily on French employees, Indian interpreters, and established Indian 
friends, McKenzie established contact with the Loucheux at the Trading River in the 
summer of 1806. He promised to return to establish a trading post there, but broke his 
first promise within days when he instead established a post more than 100 miles south at 
Bluefish River.4 The Loucheux participated in trade notwithstanding McKenzie's breach 
of faith; the Bluefish River post was significantly closer to them than any other trading 
establishment (see Map 3). 
4 The estimate of distance is based on Shepard Krech' s map of the region (Krech 1982: 430). 
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Map 3: Upper Mackenzie District trading posts, 1800-1827 
Cartographer: Eric Leinberger 
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Within approximately six years, the trading post was relocated from Bluefish 
River north to the confluence of the Hare Indian and Mackenzie Rivers, where it was 
renamed Fort Good Hope (Krech 2003: 190). It was later relocated twice after the NWC 
merged with the HBC in 1821. In 1823 it moved from the Rapids in Hare territory to 
around the Trading River in Loucheux territory. 5 In 1827, it moved back to the Rapids. 
According to Krech, the 1823 'New' Fort Good Hope was built to make the trade more 
accessible to the Loucheux, again reflecting the fort's original purpose (Krech 2003: 
191 ). Trading company records about the 1811 and 1823 moves do not exist, but the 
discussions generated in 1827 provide a rich source for examining the norms governing 
the establishment of trading relationships and trading posts. 
2. Setting Up Shop: Welcoming Strangers Into Dene Lands 
McKenzie's 1806 meeting with a group of over 50 Loucheux set the normative 
stage for the trading relationship that followed (Keith 2001: 240). Trade was preceded by 
dancing and with the passing of 'a few words' in which the parties shared their concerns 
and expectations. The Loucheux party expressed concern that McKenzie did not have 
sufficient trade goods, but McKenzie reassured them he 'had plenty of goods[,] that the 
only thing they wanted to get [from the Loucheux] was Beaver for which I would give 
them any of my goods Except my Guns' (ibid: 240-1). The Loucheux responded that 
'they did not expect to get such valuable articles as that but hoped the Esquimaux would 
5 The precise location of the post in Loucheux territory is unclear from the trading post records. 
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not come to attack them while I [McKenzie] was there'(ibid). The Loucheux repeatedly 
expressed concern that Fort Good Hope would, given periodic hostilities between the 
Loucheux and MacKenzie Esquimaux, fall prey to attacks - perhaps angling to have a 
trade in guns. McKenzie promised to 'come to the same place next spring,' instructing 
those gathered 'to have all their peltries & provisions there' and promising 'that if they 
were able to maintain a fort that they should have one'(ibid). To this, the Loucheux 
responded that 'they were not able to hunt for a fort that they often wanted 
themselves' (ibid). 
McKenzie followed fur trading convention by recognizing a trading captain (or 
chief) from among the Loucheux. Trading leaders were identified by companies for their 
charisma and, sometimes mistakenly, their influence, in the hope that they would succeed 
in bringing people - and pelts - to the fort to trade.6 Their status was recognized with 
gifts and protocols that potentially enhanced their position within their own community, 
particularly if they redistributed the gifts in accordance with leadership norms of 
generosity found across many hunter-gatherer societies. From the Loucheux, McKenzie 
chose a man named Yakiban, whom he described as 'the Greatest Raskall amongst them' 
(Keith 2001: 241 ). 
Customs and ceremonies, such as the recognition of trading chiefs, signalled the 
norms governing trading relationships. In Cree and Anishnabek territories, for example, 
6 See Morantz 1982 and Promislow 2008. Regarding the Dene specifically, see Helm 2000: 167-87. 
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pipe ceremonies established and renewed brotherhood, a status necessary to trading 
relationships and that potentially entailed other obligations as well (Wallace 1954: 31). 
Apart from McKenzie's note that an hour of dancing preceded trading, we know little of 
the ceremonial protocols that accompanied trade between the NWC and the Loucheux. 
Twentieth-century writers suggest dances were (and are) important events for Dene. Dene 
drum dances 'commemorate the arrival of important persons to the community and 
... acknowledge the return of kinsmen' (Asch 1975: 246). They might also express some 
ambivalence; Loucheux dances and songs 'honoured the visitors and at the same time 
expressed a threatening or defiant tone' (Slobodin 1962: 69). In contrast, George 
Blondin, a Dene elder, explains that '[t]here is such a good feeling at drum dances; 
everyone is smiling and laughing and they remember they are all one family under the 
Creator' (Blondin 1997: 60). These contemporary viewpoints suggest that the dance 
McKenzie witnessed was more important than he imagined. Like the pipe ceremony 
elsewhere, it celebrated the arrival of the traders and the formation of a trading 
relationship, but may have also entailed a tension between newfound brotherhood and the 
otherness of strangers. 
The commitments made in the 1806 conversation also illuminate normative 
expectations of the trading relationship, particularly when contrasted to earlier Hudson 
Bay trading experiences. In 1682 Pierre Esprit Radisson reported a protocol-rich 
conversation with the Chief of the local lowland Cree people when he settled the first 
French trading post along the Hayes River. The Chief reportedly adopted him as kin and 
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promised loyalty. Radisson responded in kind, forming an alliance that encompassed 
trade and diplomatic ties tantamount to those expected of a kin network. He also 
promised the Cree protection against famine, if only by bringing trade goods to their 
lands. By their mutual promises and gift-exchange, Radisson understood that he and the 
Cree had both cemented 'the great bond of friendship' and secured permission to build a 
trading house in the Hayes River peoples' lands (Promislow 2010: 85-6). 
In contrast, McKenzie did not promise an alliance to defend the Loucheux. He 
specifically excluded guns from their exchange, perhaps because the NWC also wanted 
to trade with the Esquimaux, or perhaps because military alliances were unnecessary in 
the absence of imperial competition. For whatever reason, the NWC must have been 
confident that trade in guns was not essential to establishing trading friendships along the 
Mackenzie River. Unlike Radisson and the Cree, McKenzie and the Loucheux evidently 
did not commit to mutual support in the necessities of life, notwithstanding the 
Loucheux' s statement that they were 'often wanting.' Instead, McKenzie demanded that 
the Loucheux return with 'peltries & provisions' to support a trading establishment in 
their lands. From McKenzie's perspective, provisioning was not the two-way obligation 
of a kin-like alliance; it fell to the Loucheux as part of the commercial exchange. In 
comparative perspective, the terms of friendship sought by McKenzie look very light. 
The Loucheux response suggests that they too sought a limited friendship. The 
Loucheux stated that they 'were not able to hunt for a fort' and that they 'often wanted 
themselves.' Read together, it seems that the Loucheux told McKenzie bluntly that they 
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could not provision a trading post within their midst (Cf Keith 2001: 241, note 113). 
Later records from Fort Good Hope also demonstrate the Loucheux preference that the 
post be self-sustaining, reinforcing the interpretation that the friendship with the new 
traders did not extend to a shared subsistence. Whether this inability was because their 
resources were not sufficient, or because they did not have the time, ability, or desire to 
support outsiders is unknowable. 
These conversations demonstrate that traders were welcome, but other incidents 
indicate that the Dene also expected the NWC to meet certain obligations. From 1807-
1815, revenues from the Mackenzie River District declined and the Dene were 
withdrawing from trade (Keith 2001: 57-8). The war of 1812 and exceptionally cold 
weather (1810-1821) affected already tenuous supply routes from Montreal, and the 
NWC's battles with the HBC over its Red River Settlement strained the company's 
resources even further. Cold weather may also have restricted Dene engagement in trade. 
Bad conditions were accompanied by violence: Fort Nelson postmaster Alexander 
Henry Jr, his family, and four employees were killed by three Dene (Slavey) brothers in 
winter 1812113. The NWC abandoned the fort and 'some proposals were made among the 
Gentlemen Proprietors to retaliate.' However, importantly, the NWC did not pursue 
vengeance or compensation, nor did it seek the trial of the offenders under common law, 
136 
though it knew their identity (Masson 1960, vol. 2: 109). 7 Indeed, the brothers were 
received at Fort Liard nine years later as if nothing had happened (Keith 2001: 439). In 
doing so, they departed from common practice in fur trade country; traders often sought 
vengeance or compensation from the perpetrators' relatives after such incidents according 
to indigenous law (Foster 1994 and Reid 1999). Instead local NWC traders identified 
with indigenous law differently by blaming Henry's ineptitude and supply problems for 
the violence, perhaps an acknowledgment that the Dene-set terms of the trading 
relationship had been breached (Masson 1960: 109, 126; Keith 2001: 65). 
NWC withdrawal from the District in 1815 was not well-received by the Dene. 
Wentzel noted that the Company's order to evacuate the district 'was ... done ... to the 
great hazard of our lives, for the natives having got wind of the move, had formed the 
design of destroying us on our way out.' 8 No adverse incidents were recorded, however, 
and Wentzel reported a warm welcome from the Dene when he led a trading party down 
the Mackenzie the following year (Keith 2001: 18). 
3. Location, Location: Subsistence and Territoriality 
Subsistence concerns dominated the conversations around the relocation of Fort 
Good Hope in the 1823 and 1827, and through them we can glimpse the importance of 
Dene strategy and normativity to the trading relationship. Securing enough food for the 
7 The Canada Jurisdiction Act, 1803 provided for such a trial in Upper or Lower Canada, but see Foster 
1990 who argues that this legislation was intended to address European rather than indigenous violence. 
8 W. F. Wentzel, "Account of Mackenzies River with a Chart From Mr. Wentzel" (Keith 2001: 362). 
137 
northern trading posts was a constant concern for the NWC, "due in part to the poor 
understanding the traders had of the distribution and habits of the animals in particular 
regions and in part to plain ineptitude. Other problems stemmed from natives not 
provisioning the posts" (Krech 1982: 432). Clearly, the Loucheux maintained their 
expectation that the post be self-sufficient, despite company pressure. Further south, 
NWC representative John Thomson met similar expectations in establishing the Rocky 
Mountain Fort in the fall of 1800. His choice of location was criticized by Big Chief, the 
Rocky Mountain trading leader, who told him that: 
[They were] not Built in the proper place, as he intended that the Fort should 
have been further down about half a Days march, at a Much more convenient 
place where there is a River quite close out of which [the NWC] might take a 
sufficient quantity of Fish every spring & Fall to feed all hands (Keith 2001: 42). 
Krech blamed the failure of the Trading River location on famine conditions and 
illness amongst the Dene during its brief existence there (Krech 1982: 432). Such 
complaints were frequent in 1825 and 1826. However, the record also suggests that the 
Loucheux were disinterested in provisioning the post, whether or not they suffered 
famine. It seems that three of the trading post's regular hunters- Capot Blanc, Capot 
Rouge and Misere - were not Loucheux but Hare Indians, serving the Fort before and 
after the move into Loucheux territory.9 Also, in the lead up to the 1827 relocation back 
to Hare territory, the Loucheux Chief, Barbue, seemed to sympathise with, and even 
9 Caport Rouge is identified as Hare on 1 August 1825, HBCA 8. 80/a/3. Capot Blanc and Misere are not 
identified as clearly, but their associations in the trading post record suggest that they were also Hare. 
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support, the move. When Fort Good Hope Chief Trader Charles Dease raised the issue 
with him during the summer of 1825, Barbue is reported to have said that "it was the old 
Chief that asked for its removal and that he would say nothing on the subject but if the 
Whites starved where they were it would only be just that they should build where they 
could procure a livelihood."10 
While Barbue' s comments register his distaste for the relocation, they align with 
the advice that the Rocky Mountain Big Chief and the Loucheux gave NWC traders 
decades earlier. The Dene consistently indicated that they had limited time, interest, or 
ability to support both their families and these newcomers. Barbue's stance may merely 
have responded to difficult climatic conditions in the 1823-1827 period, or it may have 
reflected a view that the trading post was not well situated within Loucheux territory. 
Dease, however, did not report conversations about alternate locations in Loucheux 
territory, suggesting that Barbue was not overly interested in relocating the post on 
Loucheux lands. 
Barbue's reference to "justice" also raises a normative aspect of the trading 
relationship. Sharing was (and remains) a dominant Dene ethic (Blondin 1997: 72), but 
this did not mean simply sharing food; it meant sharing resources so that one's family 
could be self-sufficient. Consequently, denying access to adequate means of self-support 
would be unfair. Accordingly, the newcomers were expected to be self-sufficient and 
10 Ltr from C Dease to E Smith, 31 August 1825, HBCA B 200/b/a [emphasis added]. 
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were given both permission and information necessary to access provisions. The HBC 
traders may have missed the normative subtleties of Barbue's response and its re-
assertion of the conditions of trader presence first stated to McKenzie twenty years 
before. Instead, the HBC continued to seek Barbue's agreement to the relocation, 
reflecting their own normative and pragmatic investment in Loucheux consent, but also 
attemp,ting to enforce indigenous provisioning commitments as the HBC saw them. As 
Edward Smith, the Mackenzie District Chief Trader commented, 'we will at least 
[receive] some benefit from having made the proposal. It will make them more punctual 
in bringing in Supplies of Provisions.' 11 
After several more conversations with both Hare and Loucheux, the traders 
secured the Fort's relocation at a meeting in spring 1827. Both the Little Chief (chief of a 
Hare band) and Barbue had gathered at Fort Good Hope, representing some but certainly 
not all of the Hare and Loucheux who frequented the post. 12 Smith invoked Dene notions 
of fairness when he explained that the Company needed to relocate the fort because of 
'the difficulties we Experience in coming this distance twice a year, the risk of their 
supplies being stopped by the Ice, together with the General Scarcity of Provisions to 
subsist the people during the long Winter Seasons.' 13 He encouraged the Loucheux to 
visit the fort after relocation, offering the same 'reduced prices' to which the Dene in the 
11 Ltr from E Smith to C Dease, 3 October l 825, HBCA 8 200/b/a. 
12 The Old Chief, mentioned by Barbue, died in January l 826 (Fort Good Hope Trading Post Journal, 27 
March l 826, HBCA, 8. 80/a/3). 
13 Fort Good Hope Trading Post Journal, 2 June 1827, HBCA 80/a/6. 
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more southerly parts of the Mackenzie were accustomed. All in all, Smith's news was 
well received: 'The Loucheux present consented more readily than I expected they 
would ..... As to the Hare Indians[,] nothing could have given them greater pleasure & 
they did not conceal their Satisfaction.' 14 The move back to the Rapids followed swiftly 
after this meeting and trade resumed at the old location by the end of June. 
The reasons for Loucheux's consent may not have been solely normative; 
Barbue's advanced age and illness in 1827 may also have impeded his capacity to act 
against the move (Krech 2003). The Company's official explanation for the move, 
meanwhile, was that the Loucheux were afraid of going so close to the Esquimaux, an 
explanation that seems baseless. No Esquimaux attacks on the Fort were recorded, the 
Loucheux had guns by this time, and the reported conversations do not mention 
Esquimaux aggression. 15 
The role of Hare and Loucheux relations in facilitating this move were also 
obscure to the HBC, though their records do signal their significance. When the 
Loucheux, including Barbue and a party from the lower Loucheux band, visited the fort 
soon after the move, the Hare greeted them and 'came down to see the Loucheux and 
have a dance which is their custom of showing a friend by disporition,' 16 This ritual 
14 Ibid. 
15 The company position was reported by Governor George Simpson, quoted in Krech from HBCA D 
4/92/fo. 29. It probably derived from Sir John Franklin's "unwelcome reception" from the Inuit in 1826 
rather than from Loucheux-Inuit relations (Krech 1982: 433). 
16 Fort Good Hope trading postjournal, 28 June 1827, HBCA B 80/a/6. Note "disporition" appears to be a 
version of "disport" meaning to amuse, entertain or divert. 
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confirmation of Hare and Loucheux friendship facilitated the Loucheux' s continued 
attendance at Fort Good Hope for at least the next 13 years, when the HBC finally 
established a trading post elsewhere in Loucheux territory .. 
4. Territoriality and Governance Along the Deb Cho 
Reflecting on the importance of subsistence and the nature of inter-Dene relations, 
we can begin to piece together what the location and relocation of Fort Good Hope tell us 
about territoriality along the Deh Cho. Territoriality implies some measure of control 
exercised by a group over a specific region (Elden 2010: 757), a quality not easily 
discerned from this portrait of the Mackenzie District. In the seventeenth century, 
Radisson understood the chiefs as exercising authority over the land on which the trading 
posts were built. By the nineteenth century, in the absence of imperial competition, the 
NWC traders still sought (and occasionally ignored) the consent and assistance of 
important men in locating trading posts, but they tended not to secure authorization for 
their presence on Dene lands. Nineteenth-century trading companies also harboured some 
territorial aspirations: they sought to carve up the territories they traded in, and to assign 
particular groups of Indians to particular forts. Traders such as Wentzel mapped 
approximations of indigenous group territories according to their limited geographical 
and demographic knowledge (Keith 2001: 74-5). In the 1820s, the HBC governing 
council listed 'the Indians and freemen considered appertaining to each District 
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throughout the Country.' 17 Foreshadowing Indian agents' and treaty commissioners' lists 
but lacking the force of colonial law, these maps and lists sought to assign a trading 
location to each Indian to prevent Indians from evading their debts by travelling to 
different trading posts year to year. Companies also used gifts to try to instil loyalty, 
occasionally refused to trade with indigenous traders who attended the "wrong" trading 
establishment, and tried to influence Dene trading patterns through the institution of the 
trading chief. Their efforts were thwarted by Indian mobility. 
The negotiations about the fort's location expressed more about Dene territoriality 
than the traders noticed. Reading trader records with more recent ethnographic studies 
allows us to read through the information in the traders' reports. Like the territorial 
sensibilities of Radisson and later traders, Dene territoriality also involved governance 
structures, strategies of control, and spatial sensibilities. Dene governance, however, was 
decentralized and non-coercive; leadership was not confined by strict geo-political 
boundaries. Moreover, inferring principles of governance from the actions of Dene 
trading chiefs such as Barbue requires cautious interpretation. Traders may not have 
correctly identified leaders, their territories, nor understood the leaders' authority to 
govern. 
At the regional level, it is tempting to describe Dene groups like the Hare and 
Loucheux as 'tribes', but ethnographers such as June Helm warn against it, because these 
17 Ltr from E Smith to M Macpherson, 15 April 1825, HBCA B 200/b/a. 
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'regional groups' lacked governance structures or regular coordination above the band 
level (Helm 2000: 167-8). Bands, according to Helm, were groups of people who hunted, 
travelled and camped together, often composed of two or three nuclear families (ibid: 
169). Chiefs with regional or 'tribal' influence emerged only occasionally. 18 
Nevertheless, there were clear regional identities amongst the different Dene groups, 
demarcated by distinct dialects of the Dene language. 19 Within these regional groups, 
membership was fluid with kin affiliations serving as an "entree to band units", but as 
Helm notes, "[a] kindred has no 'shape' or boundaries" (Ibid. 168-9). Thus, kin relations 
may have anchored band membership but kin did not create geopolitical boundaries for 
the basic (band) or larger (regional group) units of Dene political community. Even 
without geopolitical boundaries, people and bands still belonged to particular places more 
than others. Such attachments were evident when Dene hired to hunt for the post deserted 
the fort or requested leave to return to their lands and families, to their homes. 20 They 
may have had many reasons for leaving the fort - including occasional rough and 
disrespectful treatment by the NWC or others - but they also had places they needed to 
be, places strongly associated with their relations and their relations' seasonal camps. 
18 Helm identifies Akaitcho, a famous Yellowknife who assisted the first Franklin expedition, as a leader 
with wide influence, but not a 'tribal leader in any overtly recognized sense' (Helm 2000: 167-68). 
19 Language and other divisions amongst the people are explained and reflected in various origin stories. 
See, e.g., the Tlinchodene/Dogrib story- 'The Mountain Which Melted' (Petitot 1976: 23). 
20 See, e.g., Capot Blanc's expression of a desire to "go on his own Lands and join his relations," 26 
January 1824 Fort Good Hope Trading Post Journal, HBCA B 80/a/2. See also 18 December 1824, when 
Le Canard, a young Hare Indian is hired as a hunter but leaves within a few days because he misses his 
father too much (ibid, HBCA B 80/a/3). 
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The trading post records suggest that boundaries were defined more by the 
friendship status than by geography. The ceremonial welcome of the Loucheux by the 
Hare when Fort Good Hope returned to Hare lands in 1827 can be interpreted to support 
this model of jurisdiction; as can the Loucheux' s acceptance of, and assistance to, Hare 
hunters when the post was located in Loucheux lands. When Dene travelled - for trade or 
other reasons - they traversed and used resources in what the traders identified as the 
territories of other regional groups; yet no permissions were required, nor were there 
adverse consequences so long as friendships were in good standing. It required effort to 
maintain friendship; it could not be taken for granted. Hostilities between regional groups 
(other than the Loucheux and Hare), as well with the Inuit, were reported by traders and 
are confirmed in Dene stories (Blondin 1997: 93, 149). 
We can distil Dene spatial sensibilities and relationships from Dene stories that 
NWC traders Wentzel and George Keith dismissed as fanciful. Dene stories identify 
special places, particular resources, and where important events took place. The story of 
The Copper Woman, for example, tells how a Chipewyan Dene woman who lived 
amongst the Inuit for many years brought copper into Dene lands and situated it at the 
place where she sank into the earth - a place named in the story as 'Sat in the Same Place 
Mountain' (Helm 2000: 286-289). Some Dene stories are about particular resources, such 
as a fishery where the Johnny Hoe River empties into Great Bear Lake. There, elders 
report that 'the Dogribs would begin building a fish weir from the east side, and the 
Slaveys from the west. When they met in the middle, they would celebrate with a feast' 
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(Sahtu 2000: 88). 
Embedded in these stories are ethics of sharing resources, respect, and other 
principles which shaped and reflected Dene territoriality-their moral and legal 
responsibilities in relation to land, kin, neighbours, and friends. As the Sahtu Heritage 
Sites and Places Joint Working Group explains in their report, 
Traditional place names serve as memory 'hooks' on which to hang the cultural 
fabric of a narrative tradition. In this way, physical geography ordered by named 
places is transformed into a social landscape where culture and topography are 
symbolically fused (Sahtu 2000: 21 ). 
Viewing geography as social landscape rather than geopolitical topography enables us to 
comprehend a territoriality of shared lands and shared authorities. If both the lands upon 
which the trading posts were located and the trading posts themselves were understood to 
be shared resources, then the NWC and HBC did not require 'local authorities' to 
sanction a decision about Fort Good Hope's location. The decision was not a local one, 
nor were there local authorities attaching to a bounded geopolitical territory. What 
decision-making authority (or influence), then, would a trading chief such as Barbue have 
had over the use of the lands to which he and his band were particularly attached? 
Chief Sonfrere from Hay River was asked such a question in the early 1970s, when 
he gave evidence to support Dene's efforts to register a caveat over 400,000 square miles 
of land in Re Paulette et al and Registrar of Land Titles (1973), 42 DLR (3d) 8 (Re 
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Paulette).21 His answers aptly stated the legal principles that were obscured by the 
historical record. When questioned about various bands' rights to different geographic 
areas, Chief Sonfrere explained through a translator that 
although the boundaries are not written on maps and not drawn out on 
maps, the people from each community realizes and respects other 
people's areas; although they are not written, although they are not drawn 
on maps, they have respect for each other's areas, and he realizes how 
much the people from Fort Smith use it as well as the people from Fort 
Providence, but when it comes to helping each other it does not matter, 
they help each other (trial transcripts from Re Paulette: 121-22). 
When questioned about whether foreigners would have rights to use his band's area to 
hunt and fish, he responded 'I personally alone by myself cannot make such a decision. I 
have to consult other chiefs across the Territories and then we are going to discuss it and 
reach a decision on that sort of thing' (transcripts from Re Paulette: 122). And, finally, 
when asked about how a group of white people coming into his hunting and trapping area 
without permission would make him 'feel,' he answered, 'If such a thing is going to 
occur, they should consult with me, and I will consult with my people and there will be a 
decision made in such a thing, but they should never just barge in like that' (transcripts 
from Re Paulette: 125). 
Consultation and respect were and are the two key principles guiding the Dene in 
their land and resource use. Under these principles, determining the location of trading 
posts in the early nineteenth century required consultation with the bands and groups 
21 Though the Chiefs succeeded in having the Dene interest in land recognized as cognizable at law, their 
effort to register a caveat failed on appeal: Paulette v The Queen (1976), [I 977] 2 SCR 628. 
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affected. Thus, it was not necessarily a problem if traders dealt with individuals who 
lacked the political authority to grant permission, as Dene norms required these 
individuals to consult their band and friends about the decision. The trading companies' 
adherence to the principles of consultation and respect may have been marginal in some 
cases, but such consultation likely went on between Dene people - such as between 
Barbue and the Old Chief-regardless of their participation. The NWC and HBC 
muddled along sufficiently to establish friendships, engage in trade, and, usually, 
maintain their welcome according to Dene rules. 
The relative impermanence of individual traders, the occasional mobility of the 
forts within Dene territory, and their lack of interest in resources beyond furs and food, 
would also have been consistent with the territorial and governance principles of their 
Dene hosts. The traders' practices in the Mackenzie River District did not advance a 
colonial agenda. They were merchants more than colonists, adding to and adjusting Dene 
practices to accommodate their trade. They may have changed some Dene norms by 
recognizing trading leaders and introducing new trade goods, but such change was of 
limited scope. Many individuals traded outside of the relationships with particular trading 
leaders and the trading leaders lacked authority to remake Dene territorial authority into 
the companies' image of jurisdiction. Similarly, the companies were not able to 
encourage Dene to specialize in a provisions trade, though a few Hare Indians were 
employed as fort hunters. The normative frame regarding territory and land use - that of 
sharing resources to support self-sufficiency-remained intact. Territoriality and 
148 
governance authority along the Mackenzie River remained firmly on Dene terms in the 
early nineteenth century. 
5. Conclusions 
This study confirms much that is already known about colonial claims in settler 
states: sovereignty was not achieved merely by its assertion and indigenous systems of 
law and governance remained in place after contact. What this study adds is a closer look 
at the interaction of indigenous and British legal and quasi-legal rules, particularly about 
territory and governance authority, in a geographic and political context far removed 
from settler activity. It demonstrates that in trading contexts, indigenous legal and 
political systems were not just left intact, but provided the operative norms for 
indigenous-newcomer relations. 
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Chapter 5: Treaties in History and Law* 
Treaties between the Crown and indigenous peoples are, according to Canadian 
jurisprudence, historical phenomena. To identify particular treaty rights, the 
jurisprudence requires us to look for a historical moment of common intention. 1 The 
primary constitutional significance of the treaty also emanates from this moment. The 
legal problem is diagnosed as one of empirics; the solution is thus found through 
historical inquiry. Historians, on the other hand, have taken issue with how courts have 
interpreted and relied on history in treaty cases. 2 According to historians, treaty histories 
are diverse, encompassing both strong and weak relationships, and a spectrum of 
bargaining positions on the part of both indigenous and Crown parties. Moreover, 
historians' interpretations of treaties often illuminate only incomplete, tenuous and 
questionable moments of agreement. With the legal emphasis on common intention and 
the historical emphasis on context and the rarity or fleeting nature of common intention, 
the two fields of knowledge and the national narrative they each produce are out of sync. 
• Unpublished at time of submission. 
1 R v Sioui, [1990] I S.C.R. I 025 [Sioui]; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 [Marshall]; R v Morris, 2006 
sec 59, [2006] 2 scR 915. 
2 Arthur J. Ray, Telling it to the Judge. Taking Native History to Court (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2011); J. R. Miller, "History, The Courts and Treaty Policy: Lesson from 
Marshall and Nisga'a" in Dan Beavon, Jerry P. White & Paul Maxim, eds., Aboriginal Policy Research: 
Setting the Agendafor Change (Ottawa: Thompson Educational Publishing Inc., 2004) 29 [Miller, 
"Lessons"]; and William C. Wicken, Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall 
Junior (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). 
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Alongside the legal and historical accounts of treaties, numerous indigenous 
groups, scholars, and public commissions identify treaties as critical to reconciliation, 
including establishing post- imperial or post-colonial foundations for the Canadian state. 3 
In their treatments, the negotiated and consensual aspects of historical and modem 
treaties and related treaty processes are the cornerstone in efforts towards indigenous self-
determination and reconciliation between the Crown and indigenous peoples. Those who 
have signalled the promise of treaties variously describe them as processes of dialogue 
and recognition, and as a mechanism through which the ideal of a society founded upon 
consensual relations can be approximated. Whether formulated through the filters of 
Western political philosophy and history, or through indigenous intellectual and political 
traditions, advocates conceive treaties as a dynamic, ongoing relationship anchored by 
shared commitment to that relationship and the attendant mutual recognition and respect. 
3 See, e.g., Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2001) [Macklem, Indigenous Difference]; James Tully, Strange Multiplicity. 
Constitutionalism In An Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) [Tully, Strange 
Multiplicity]; John Borrows, "Ground-Rules: Indigenous Treaties in Canada and New Zealand" (2006) 22:2 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 188 [Borrows, "Ground Rules"]; James [sakej] Youngblood 
Henderson, "Empowering Treaty Federalism" (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 241 [Henderson, "Treaty 
Federalism"]; Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996) [RCAP]; Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council, with 
W. Hildebrandt, D. First Rider and S. Carter, The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996) [Treaty 7]; Office of the Treaty Commissioner of 
Saskatchewan, "Statement of Treaty Issues: Treaties as a Bridge to the Future" (October, 1998), online: 
<http://www.otc.ca/ ABOUT TREATIES/The Statement of Treaty Issues/ > ; Justice Linden, Report of 
the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007, vo14, online: 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inguiries/ipperwash/report/vol 4/pdf/E Vol 4 Summary 2.pdf 
>;Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties. Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law 
Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2012). 
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From these perspectives, treaties present both legal and political problems that demand 
solutions that take the past, present, and future into account. 
What bearing should history have on the determination of the legal significance of 
treaties? What contributions do history and law make towards a politics of treaties 
capable of achieving their promise? Is it, and why is it, a problem to have different 
narratives of treaties emerging from law and history? Law, history and political theory all 
contribute to the national narrative of Canada. Within each of these disciplines 'official 
history' favouring colonial powers has been challenged by greater inclusivity of 
indigenous and other perspectives, resulting in small shifts that broaden and change that 
narrative. But these changes are uneven and incomplete, and indigenous perspectives and 
traditions (which may not manifest the same disciplinary divides) may remain poorly 
incorporated. This is particularly true in law, which has a privileged place in this inter-
disciplinary dialogue. Law calls on history to inform treaty rights decisions and often sets 
the course for further historical study on indigenous-Crown relations. Law then sets the 
course for treaty negotiations, setting the parameters of treaty politics even as judges urge 
the parties to find negotiated solutions. With the coercive force of the state behind it and 
the role of courts as public authorities, the narrative that emanates from courts has a 
controlling impact on the public history of treaties. When law, history and political theory 
collide through the law, the legitimacy and character of the national narrative is at stake. 
This paper explores the conceptualizations of treaties in history and law, assessing 
these conceptualizations against the promise of treaties as well as their influence on each 
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other. I will argue that the promise of treaties is better served by greater coherence in the 
conception of treaties between the different fields, and in particular, a conception that 
takes its lead from the accounts of treaties as defining and constitutive of dynamic 
relationships. By canvassing treaty histories and survey-style discussions of historical 
treaties, I will demonstrate that treaty typologies remain largely on colonial terms. I will 
argue for a re-organization of this schema in favour of one that situates and explains 
particular treaties in relation to evolving relationships rather than evolving colonial 
interests. The review of legal accounts of treaties and treaty rights will illustrate doctrinal 
expectations of a one-dimensional empirical history, and argue for re-situating history 
within legal analysis towards a more explicitly normative treaty rights jurisprudence. This 
legal argument is not new, although it is drawn from a more explicitly inter-disciplinary 
approach and will offer some variation on the prescription with more attention to 
remedial avenues.4 Although the argument is not new, there are new or renewed 
impetuses for this discussion : consultation and negotiation processes in aboriginal and 
Canadian public law proliferate;5 the death knell sounds frequently for treaty processes 
4 For related arguments regarding the need to re-consider how history shapes aboriginal and treaty rights, 
see Brian Slattery, "The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" (2007) 38 Supreme Ct. L. Rev. 595 
[Slattery, "Generative Structure"]; Mark D. Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty 
Meanings in Law and History After Marshall" (2001) 24 Dalhousie Law J. 75 [Walters, "Covenant 
Chain"]; and John Borrows, "(Ab)Orignalism and Canada's Constitution" (2012) 258 Supreme Ct. L. 
Rev.(2d) 351 [Borrows, "(Ab)Originalism"]. 
5 Dwight Newman has suggested that the development of the duty to consult may ultimately impede the 
development of aboriginal rights doctrines, which define the scope of any duty to consult: The Duty to 
Consult. New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 2009) at 26-27. 
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that are taking far too long;6 and, implementation problems continue even where modem 
treaties have been concluded.7 These ongoing and new developments give rise to a need 
for a conceptual map capable of showing the linkages between them and suggesting the 
path forward. 
To arrive at these arguments and outline the connections between the promise of 
treaties and the understanding of treaties in both history and law, this paper will need to 
wade through several methodological minefields and debates that have dogged aboriginal 
rights jurisprudence. Treaty rights (and aboriginal rights more generally) have posed a 
particular challenge to what constitutes a productive relationship between law and 
history. Particularly animated in debates surrounding aboriginal title, legal scholars from 
New Zealand and Australia especially have contested the historical justiciability of 
aboriginal title, claiming that a properly historicist legal history of the doctrine renders 
legal arguments about the continuity of aboriginal title in the common law tradition 
suspect. 8 Other scholars, particularly from Canada, have viewed the continuity of 
aboriginal title as a matter of both legal history and legal argument, situating the 
6 See, e.g., Justine Hunter, "Treaty commissioner suggests shutdown," The Globe and Mail, 13 Oct 2011, p. 
S 1; and James M. Lornie, Final Report with Recommendations regarding the Possibility of Accelerating 
Negotiations with Common Table First Nations that Are in the BC Treaty Process, and Any Steps Required, 
submitted to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 30 November 2011 [Lornie 
Report]. 
7 See, e.g., Inuit of Nunavut v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 NUCJ 11, 2012 CarswellNun 16 (WL) 
[Nunavut]. 
8 See, e.g., Paul McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common law. A History of Sovereignty, Status, and 
Self-determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) (the common law doctrine of aboriginal title 
did not emerge as law until the 1970s); and Mark Hickford, "'Vague Native Rights to Land': British 
Imperial Policy on Native Title and Custom in New Zealand, 1837-53" (2010) 38 The J oflmperial and 
Commonwealth History 175. 
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historical account of aboriginal title within legal discourse and noting that the interpretive 
parameters of law, as well as disputes about the character of law, are part of the account 
of its history. 9 Their respective insistences on the controlling significance of historical 
versus legal accounts assume different relationships between law and history, and, 
presumably, different underlying views of what serves the ends of justice or 
reconciliation (or simply, legal arguments) in the present. 
These debates transfer into inter-disciplinary conversations, where the potential 
for clashes between historical and legal methodologies manifest in historians' discomfort 
with the interpretive selectivity and finality required of history in aboriginal rights cases 
and the judicial treatment of the nature of historical knowledge more generally. 1° Further 
methodological challenges are introduced by indigenous conceptions and methodologies 
of law and history, which the disciplines of law and history have both struggled to 
recognize and accommodate. 11 And finally, the disciplinary perspective of political 
9 See, e.g., Mark D. Walters, "Histories of Colonialism, Legality, and Aboriginality" (2007) 57 University 
of Toronto Law J. 819. Other scholars who have emphasized the legal and historical continuity of 
aboriginal rights in their work include Kent McNeil, Brian Slattery, and John Borrows. 
10 See citations in supra note 2; Alex Reilly & Ann Genovese, "Claiming the Past: Historical 
Understanding in Australian Native Title Jurisprudence" (2004) 3 Indigenous Law J. 19; and Joel R. 
Fortune, "Construing Delgamuukw: Legal Arguments, Historical Arguments, and the Philosophy of 
History" (1993) 51 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 80. 
11 See, e.g., John Borrows, "Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral Tradition" (2001) 39: l Osgoode 
Hall L. J. 2 [Borrows, "Listening"]; Val Napoleon, "Delgamuukw: A Legal Straightjacket for Oral 
Histories?" (2005) 20 Canadian J. of Law & Society 123 [Napoleon, "Straightjacket"]; Bruce Granville 
Miller, Oral History on Trial. Recognizing Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2011) [B Miller, Oral History]; Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Reconciliation and Its Historiography: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts" (2001) 7 UTS Review 6 [Chakrabarty, "Reconciliation and Its Historiography"]; 
and Miranda Johnson, "Honest Acts and Dangerous Supplements: Indigenous Oral History and Historical 
Practice in Settler Societies" (2005) 8 Postcolonial Studies 261. 
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philosophy changes the shape of the debate about the relationship between law and 
history to focus on the normative weight of history, and historical injustice in particular, 
in the formulation of present-day legal or constitutional rights, and in democratic politics 
more generally. 12 Moving between all of these methodologies and disciplinary concerns 
requires attention to their similarities and contributions to the formation of national 
narratives. 
Grappling with these various disciplines, methodological intersections, and 
related strands of critique is a vital step in arriving at a more coherent account of treaties. 
This paper will attempt to move through them one by one, starting on this path by 
exploring the promise of treaties as drawn from a variety of scholarly accounts of the 
constitutional significance of treaties. Next, the discussion will tum to history, both to 
provide some descriptive anchors for the Canadian experience of treaty making as well as 
to consider the narrative impressions left by treaty histories, with particular emphasis on 
what I refer to as "survey accounts" that give summary shape the diversity of treaty 
histories. The final section of the paper will tum to the legal account of treaties, 
considering the doctrinal history as well as the interpretive principles that guide the 
12 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, "The Half-Life of Treaties: Waitangi, Rebus Sic Stantibus" (2006) 11 Otago 
Law Review 161, and regarding Aboriginal rights more generally, Jeremy Waldron, "Indigeneity: First 
Peoples and Last Occupancy" (2003) 1 New Zealand J. of Public and International L. 55; Dwight G 
Newman, "Prior Occupation and Schismatic Principles: Toward a Normative Theorization of Aboriginal 
Title" (2006-2007) 44 Alta. L. Rev 779; Duncan Ivison, Postcolonial Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Tully, Strange Multiplicity, supra note 3; Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, eds, 
The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008); and James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
vol 1. 
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determination of treaty rights. These discussions will close with reflections on judicial 
approaches to treaties that can better support a coherent national narrative and thus also 
better support the promise of treaties beyond the courts. 
1. The Promise of Treaties: Treaties as Constitutional Narrative 
Legal and political theorists, both indigenous and non-indigenous, have looked to 
a long history of treaty-making in North America to provide alternative constitutional 
narratives - a mix of legal, moral, and historical story-telling (and argument) aimed at 
articulating the foundations of a post-imperial constitutional order. In their discussions, 
the constitutional character of treaties has several overlapping dimensions. First, treaties 
represent a constitutional event, providing a "credible alternative to the doctrine of 
discovery as a source of legitimacy for European assertions of sovereignty in North 
America." 13 Second, treaties create a framework for working together within or between 
political communities, giving rise to descriptions of treaties as relationships and 
processes. And third, through these frameworks, treaties generate intersocietal (and 
constitutional) norms and meanings that also guide the conduct of the relationship. In this 
section I canvass these three constitutional dimensions of the promise of treaties to set the 
stage for the later discussions of treaties in history and law. 
13 Macklem, Indigenous Difference, supra note 3 at 156. 
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i. Treaties as Constitutional Event 
Courts have generally avoided a definitive account of the constitutional event 
marked by treaties, in part because courts have taken a broad approach to what counts as 
a treaty and the circumstances and nature of each treaty vary according to time and place. 
More significantly, the courts have carved out sui generis space for Crown-indigenous 
treaties. 14 This sui generis status distinguishes Crown-indigenous treaties from their 
international law counterparts, thereby avoiding the need to inquire into the sovereign 
status of the parties required to form treaties under contemporary international law - a 
status that historically may have been as or more elusive for the Crown than for 
indigenous parties.1 5 Our current law, however, has nineteenth-century starting points in 
which courts characterized treaties as confirming if not accomplishing the subjection of 
indigenous peoples to the Crown, and as a distribution of power and protection from the 
Crown to indigenous peoples. This juridical history will receive more attention in the 
third section of this paper. At this point in the discussion, however, it is important to raise 
the doctrinal treatment to contextualize the accounts that will be reviewed below, which 
14 R v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387 [Simon]: "an Indian treaty is an agreement sui generis which is neither 
created nor terminated according to the rules of international law" (at I 03 7). 
15 In Sioui, supra note 1, the treaty in issue pre-dated the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and was primarily 
concerned with peace and alliance between the Huron and the British. The Court commented that "[a]t the 
time with which we are concerned [Crown] relations with Indian tribes fell somewhere between the kind of 
relations conducted between sovereign states and the relations that such states had with their own citizens." 
The sui generis approach permitted the Court to avoid difficult issues regarding the status of the Crown's 
sovereignty at the time (not yet established, as the Attorney General for Quebec pointed out). It should also 
be noted that these concerns arise from the present construction of state sovereignty in international law 
and that the law of nations in the mid-eighteenth century might have evaluated the capacity of indigenous 
nations differently. 
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react to the unsatisfactory account of the acquisition and nature of Crown sovereignty in 
Imperial and Canadian constitutional law. 
Alternative accounts of the constitutional events marked by treaties place greater 
significance on the role of treaties in the acquisition of Crown sovereignty and the 
formation of the Canadian state. Treaty federalism, advanced by James [Sakej] 
Youngblood Henderson and Keira Ladner, is a prominent narrative that emphasizes 
treaties as the most significant feature of a constitutional theory that is grounded in North 
American experience. 16 Henderson first presented his treaty federalist argument in 1994 
when he argued treaties are the source of the Crown's powers within treaty lands, 
creating a treaty order in which the treaties are on par with the Constitution Act, 1867 that 
divided jurisdiction amongst provincial and federal legislatures. 17 More recently, he has 
re-asserted his arguments, grounding the pre-treaty environment in indigenous legal 
16 Henderson, "Treaty Federalism", supra note 3; Keira Ladner, "Treaty Federalism: An Indigenous Vision 
of Canadian Federalisms" in Fran~ois Rocher & Miriam Smith, eds, New Trends in Canadian Federalism, 
2d ed (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2003) 181. Jean Leclair has pointed out weaknesses in the 
treaty federalism narrative, and in particular that it fails to bring non-treaty indigenous people (i.e., Metis 
people and non-status and urban aboriginal people) into the revamped federation for which it advocates: 
Jean Leclair, "Federal Constitutionalism and Aboriginal Difference" (2005-2006) 31 Queen's L. J. 521. His 
view is in part premised on what I would argue is an overly historical understanding of treaties. Some of his 
concerns may be addressed by the broad view of treaties discussed in this paper. Other concerns raised by 
Leclair relate to how indigeneity has been constructed by law and policy, resulting in different and uneven 
access to constitutional protections among indigenous peoples. These topics are beyond the scope of this 
paper. See generally: John Borrows, "Physical Philosophy: Mobility and the Future of Indigenous Rights" 
in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the Law. Comparative 
and Critical Perspectives (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009) 403; Val Napoleon, 
"Aboriginal Discourse: Gender, Identity and Community" in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent 
McNeil, eds, ibid, 223; and Sebastien Grammond, Identity Captured by Law. Membership in Canada's 
Indigenous Peoples and Linguistic Minorities (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2009). 
17 Henderson, "Treaty Federalism", ibid. 
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regimes by reviewing treaties within indigenous nations or confederacies. 18 He supports 
the judicial direction towards finding "shared meaning" in interpreting treaty rights and 
argues for institutional reform and a negotiated implementation of the treaty order. In his 
view, the potential of treaties to support a postcolonial constitutional order depends 
"upon a reliance on consensual values and dialogical processes." 19 
Other legal scholars share the essential argument that legitimate foundations for 
the Canadian state can only be grounded on the consent and participation of indigenous 
nations obtained through treaties, a view that recognizes the pre-existing sovereignty of 
indigenous nations and the continuation of some degree of sovereignty post-treaty.20 As 
will be reviewed in the second section of this paper, treaty histories encompass a wide 
variety of experiences and agreements, including occasions that suggest fraud and abuses 
on the part of the Crown and disagreement regarding the meaning and significance of 
particular treaties. The variety of historical experience suggests that treaty federalist and 
treaties-as-consent narratives may potentially be destabilized by historical accounts that 
contradict such narratives. Should potentially a-historical accounts be relied on as 
cornerstones of Canadian sovereignty? In relation to Henderson's narrative, Mark 
18 James [sa'ke:j] Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2007) [Henderson, Treaty Rights]. 
19 Ibid. at 1005. 
20 See, e.g., Borrows, "Ground Rules" supra note 3; Macklem, supra note 3; Kent McNeil, "Negotiated 
Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian Territorial Rights in the 
Pacific Northwest" in Alexandra Hannon, ed, The Power of Promises. Rethinking Indian Treaties in the 
Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008) 35-55 [McNeil, "Negotiated 
Sovereignty"]; and Gordon Christie, "Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation" (2000-200 I) 26 
Queen's Law J. 143 [Christie]. 
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Walters has commented that his "legal arguments would collapse without the historical 
foundations" on which his narrative is built.21 Walters resolves the concern for the 
potential lack of historicism in Henderson's account by pointing out that lawyers and 
historians belong to different interpretive communities, and that lawyers such as 
Henderson treat law in history as a normative concept rather than an empirical one. As 
such, Henderson's argument regarding the legal and constitution effect of treaties is 
judged from "an amalgam of historic commitments interpreted today with a view to the 
coherence ... of the present legal order."22 Thus, the demand for the past to be brought into 
line with a standard of consent exists in the present. 
The problems and consequences of potential disjunctures between the specificity 
and pastness of a historian's account on the one hand and the presentist generality of the 
accounts by legal scholars on the other will be further discussed in the later sections of 
this paper. For now, the focus is on political theory, which offers other ways to consider 
the relationship between law and history around the issue of consent. First, the normative 
weight of consent in accounts of treaties as a constitutional event can be taken to demand 
that weak or incomplete treaties and fraudulent acts in this history be addressed through 
reconsideration and renegotiation in the present. James Tully, for example, suggests: 
Just because a particular practice of consent, such as a treaty with a non-European 
authority, is surrounded by force and fraud, it does not follow that the practice of 
treaty making loses its authority. As with any kind of contract, what follows is 
21 Walters, "Covenant Chain", supra note 4 at 93. 
22 Ibid at 94. 
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that the honour and duty of the Crown require that the specific violation of the 
treaty caused by the force or fraud must be remedied in some manner .... If 
anything, the very fact that one can distinguish between a consensual treaty and 
force and fraud strengthens, rather than weakens, the practice of treaty making. 23 
In these comments, Tully shifts the idea of consent from a moment in time to something 
that emerges over time. He differentiates between points of agreement and commitment 
to the forums through which those points of agreement are worked out. This shift 
suggests that consent itself may be more of a process than an event. It also anticipates the 
second constitutional dimension of treaties to which we now tum our attention. 
ii. Treaties as Framework/Relationship/Process 
The appeal of treaties has attracted the attention of numerous constitutional 
theorists in recent years. For Tully, for example, the historic treaty-making patterns and 
policies of colonial North America, which he terms "treaty constitutionalism," provide an 
exemplar of three conventions he contends are required to support a post-imperial 
constitutionalism: mutual recognition, continuity, and consent.24 In such accounts, the 
process of treaties is as or more important than treaties as historical, constitutional event. 
What "actually happened" in 1760, 1854, or 1899 matters less than that treaties were 
made on those dates because treaties convey mutual recognition between the parties and 
23James Tully, "Consent, Hegemony, and Dissent in Treaty Negotiations" in Jeremy Webber & Colin M 
Macleod, eds, Between Consenting Peoples. Political Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2010) 233 at 238 [Tully, "Consent"]. 
24James Tully, Strange Multiplicity, supra note 3 at 116-117, ff. 
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consent to deal with each other (a less momentous moment of consent to be sure). As 
Patrick Macklem explains, treaties are 
instruments of mutual recognition .... The treaty process is a means by which 
competing claims of authority and right can be reconciled with each other by each 
party agreeing to recognize a measure of the authority with the other .... As an 
instrument of mutual recognition, a treaty is an ongoing process, structured but 
not determined by the text of the original agreement, by which parties commit to 
resolving disputes that might arise in the future through a process of dialogue and 
mutual respect. 25 
Treaties are thus not simply or primarily historical markers of significant moments in the 
formation of the Canadian state, but also a lasting commitment to a mechanism for 
renewing and maintaining a just Crown-aboriginal relationship. This conception of 
treaties in tum leads to critiques of the emphasis on achieving certainty and finality in 
modem treaty processes. Instead, scholars have argued that renewed relationships and 
ongoing processes of negotiation should be the aim of contemporary treaty processes. 26 
These accounts draw on and are paralleled by diverse accounts of indigenous 
conceptions of treaties and the manner by which they structure and guide relationships. 
Two-Row Wampum (Gus-Wen-Tah) is well known for its elegant expression of the 
Haudenosaunee conception of the treaty relationship between their confederacy and 
European newcomers. The two parallel strips of purple shell beads on this wampum belt 
25Macklem, Indigenous Difference, supra note 3 at 155. See also Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 18. 
26 See, e.g., Mark L. Stevenson, "Visions of Certainty: Challenging Assumptions", Speaking Truth to 
Power: A Treaty Forum (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2001) 113; Andrew Woolford, Between 
Justice and Certainty: Treaty Making in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); and Ravi de 
Costa, "History, Democracy, and Treaty Negotiations in British Columbia" in Alexandra Harmon, ed., The 
Power of Promises. Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2008) 297. 
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are explained as representing continued autonomy while the white rows represent peace, 
friendship and respect, suggesting that autonomy of both indigenous and settler political 
communities is supported by their interdependence and mutual support. 27 The covenant 
chain is another well-known Haudenosaunee legal concept that was widely used in 
relations between the British and First Nations in the Great Lakes region. The links of the 
chain describe "notional links of kinship, an extrapolation of the clan unit that was the 
basic building block of local, national and confederal aboriginal political 
organizations."28 The chain was not self-maintaining, but rather required frequent 
attention through councils and diplomatic practices to keep it "bright."29 Both Two-Row 
Wampum and the covenant chain convey a feature of indigenous conceptions of treaty 
that has been broadly noted: treaties are best understood as "vital, living instruments. "30 
Constitutional theorists have borrowed heavily from this characterization of treaty as 
relationship to arrive at their accounts of treaties as a dynamic, ongoing constitutional 
process. 
A further aspect of indigenous conceptions of treaty that is relevant to 
understanding their constitutional dimensions is the frequent emphasis on the sacred 
character of treaties. Ceremonies and protocols, such as pipe ceremonies, that 
27See, e.g., John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002) at 149-150; Walters, "Covenant Chain" supra note 4 at 82. 
28Walters, "Covenant Chain" ibid. at 81. 
29 Ibid. at 82-83. 
30RCAP, supra note 3, vol. 1, chpt. 3 at 37. See also Robert A. Williams Jr., Linking Arms Together. 
American Indian Treaty Visions of law and Peace, 1600-1800 (New York; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997) [Williams, Linking Arms]. 
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accompanied the negotiation of treaties expressed the sacredness of the negotiations and 
their outcome. 31 Sacredness also signifies the permanence of the peace and friendship 
established through the agreement. 32 The Supreme Court has adopted this language, 
frequently stating that treaties are sacred agreements, made up of solemn promises. In the 
jurisprudential context, the Supreme Court uses this language to assert both the legally 
binding nature of these agreements as well as their permanence. 33 Permanence is a 
necessary part of the characterization of treaties as constitutional, since constitutions, by 
their very nature, are built to last.34 But which aspects of a treaty are permanent, and thus, 
constitutional? How do we identify and work with the evolutionary aspects of treaties 
while respecting their permanence? 
Litigants asserting particular treaty rights locate this permanence in specific terms 
and rights (both before and afters. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982). The jurisprudence 
follows their lead. However, the conception of treaties articulated by indigenous voices 
31 See, e.g., Treaty 7, supra note 3 at 7 and Williams, Linking Arms, ibid, chpt 2. 
32See, e.g., Treaty 7, ibid. (peace alliances were "binding for all time"). 
33See, e.g., R. v. Sioui, supra note I at I 063 ("It would be contrary to the general principles of law for an 
agreement concluded between the English and the French to extinguish a treaty concluded between the 
English and the Hurons. It must be remembered that a treaty is a solemn agreement between the Crown 
and the Indians, an agreement the nature of which is sacred .... The very definition of a treaty thus makes it 
impossible to avoid the conclusion that a treaty cannot be extinguished without the consent of the Indians 
concerned."). 
34 The sacredness of treaties also connects treaties to religion, made more apparent through ceremonies that 
accompany treaty making. Such ceremonies (e.g., pipe ceremonies) often involve connecting the actions of 
the leaders to spiritual realms, situating them in creation and recalling the sources or nature of their 
authority. While.beyond the scope of this paper, it is also helpful to recall the deep religious roots of 
European political authority in Europe as well as in America (regarding the latter, see, e.g., Brian Slattery, 
"Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North American" in John 
McLaren, A.R. Buck, & Nancy E. Wright, eds, Despotic Dominions: Property Rights in British Settler 
Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 50) [Slattery, "Paper Empires"]. Thus, the sacredness of treaties 
presents another dimension of constitutionality by recalling the sources of political authority. 
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does not require that permanence attach to particular terms. Instead, permanence attaches 
to the living relationship that is the central defining feature of the treaty.35 Particular 
terms operationalize that relationship, and as "solemn promises," cannot be put aside 
lightly or without the consent of the indigenous parties. But any working relationship 
requires adjustment overtime, and thus a conception of treaty as relationship requires, as 
a corollary, some flexibility in its terms. 
The variety of terms available to describe treaties in indigenous languages 
reinforces this claim. Indigenous languages specifically appear to distinguish between 
types of agreements on the basis of whether the agreements were fixed or open for 
additions and evolutions. As historian John Long explains, "Oral agreements were not 
fixed or final; they were revisited when circumstances warranted. Hunting territories, for 
example, had sometimes to be adjusted. When a man died, others might not want to hunt 
on his land, for 'the animals leave the territory in search ofhim."'36 Similarly, the Treaty 
7 Elders state that alliances for the purposes of trade did not carry with them the same 
binding and immutable character of peace alliances,37 and the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples reports that "in the Ojibwa language ... there is a difference between 
Chi-debahk-(in)-Nee-Gay-Win, an open agreement with matters to be added to it, and 
35 For a related discussion of indigenous constitutional practices, see Borrows, "(Ab)Originalism", supra 
note 4. 
36 John S. Long, Treaty No. 9. Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010) at 346 [Long, Treaty 9], citing Brian Craik, 
"Making a Living in the Bush: Land Tenure at Waskaganish" (1986) 28 Antropologica 175. 
37 Treaty 7, supra note 3 at 7. 
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Bug-in-Ee-Gay, which relates to 'letting it go'. According to the oral tradition of the 
Ojibwa, the Lake Huron Treaty of 1850 was to be 'added to' ."38 Conceptions and 
language that portray an evolving relationship also illustrate this specificity and 
sophistication. The covenant chain set in motion a framework through which differences 
were attended to and further negotiations were fostered, and thus reaffirmed the peace 
and alliance it expressed.39 Similarly, James Henderson reports that the Treaty of Niagara 
was conceptualized by the Ojibwa "as a helping agreement (wechizinchikewina) or 
creation of a helping system (apichchikan)."40 These accounts of treaties suggest a fine 
balance between maintaining the fundamental shape of a relationship defined through a 
treaty and allowing that relationship to grow, shift, and adjust to changing conditions 
over time. It is a process that has been likened by some scholars to the "living tree" 
metaphor that has, since the 1930s, described constitutional interpretation in Canada.41 
The tensions inherent in maintaining stability and preserving the consensual 
foundations, while allowing growth and change within a relationship are further 
elaborated by accounts of how consent grounds the legitimacy of democratic political 
communities. Political theorist Duncan lvison explains that because individuals are 
embedded in relationships and interdependencies to which they either did not or could 
38RCAP, supra note 3 vol. 1, chpt. 3, at 28, online: < 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071207025829/http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg 11 e.html#3 7> . 
39 Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain", supra note 4 at 82-85 
40 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 18 at 228. 
41 Borrows, "Ground-Rules," supra note 3 and Walters, "Covenant Chain", supra note 4 at 94. 
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not have consented, we should not look for "evidence of primal or continuing consent" 
but rather "evidence of contestablity - for the capacity of people to effectively contest 
those norms or actions acting on them and to alter or shape their course in different 
ways."42 Thus, consent itself becomes a process rather than an event. 
Moving such approaches into the realm of treaties, many constraints on the 
possibility of a 'true' moment of consent are evident. As many observers have noted 
regarding historical treaty negotiations, First Nations may not have had much choice 
about whether to take a treaty or not43 and contemporary negotiations and implementation 
processes continue to be constrained by numerous markers of power imbalance between 
First Nations and the Crown.44 Tully identifies these present-day conditions as the 
"problem of hegemony", whereby treaty negotiations are circumscribed by legal, 
political, and economic institutions that have been imposed on indigenous peoples and by 
discursive traditions defined by Western theories that justified colonial authority and 
42Duncan Ivison, "Consent or Contestation" in Jeremy Webber & Colin M Macleod, eds., Between 
Consenting Peoples. Political Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 188 
at 193-4 [emphasis in original]. This view stems from lvison's argument that to "we are embedded in all 
manner ofrelationships and forms of interdependency to which we did not (and could not) consent. And so, 
our focus shifts from an emphasis on the presence or absence of consent to the nature of those relations and 
interdependencies." 
43 See, e.g., Rene Fumoleau, As Long As This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty I I (I 870-
1939) (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, [Foreword 1973]); Long, Treaty 9, supra note 36; Michael Coyle, 
"Marginalized by Sui Generis? Duress, Undue Influence and Crown-Aboriginal Treaties" (2008) 32 
Manitoba L. J. 34 [Coyle, "Marginalized"]. 
44 See, e.g., Murray Browne, "The Promise ofDelgamuukw and the Reality of Treaty Negotiations in 
British Columbia" in Maria Morellato, ed., Aboriginal Law Since Delgamuukw (Aurora, ON: Canada Law 
Book Co., 2009) 465-505 [Browne]; Andrew Woolford, Between Justice and Certainty: Treaty Making in 
British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); and, Gabrielle A. Slowey, "Unfinished Business: Self-
govemment and the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement Thirty Years Later" in Yale D Belanger, ed., 
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada. Current Trends and Issues (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 
2008) 206; Lomie Report, supra note 6. 
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continue to underpin global political and economic regimes.45 Under these conditions, 
treaty negotiations do not take place on a level playing field and there is little room to 
dispute the boundaries of the negotiations. Nevertheless, Tully contends that parties 
should not reject negotiations: "The aim of entering into negotiations is precisely to 
change unequal circumstances ... To reject negotiations because of the unequal initial 
conditions is to be taken in by the false normative ideal of negotiation among free and 
equal partners that serves to obscure the real world of negotiations among differentially 
free and unequal partners. "46 Parties must therefore challenge the agenda and boundary 
conditions of negotiations and reject the notion that the field of negotiations is fixed by 
the boundaries of official treaty processes. Thus, Tully includes actors within 
governmental and judicial institutions, negotiations in other contexts, and indigenous and 
non-indigenous peoples contesting those institutions through a variety of actions in 
national and international arenas as all contributing to the discursive field of treaty 
negotiations. From these premises, Tully arrives at a picture of treaty processes that 
encompass "a much broader field of consent and dissent, and a much broader range of 
practices of consent and dissent" which unpredictably shape "ongoing and open-ended 
relationships among unequal partners that are continually modified by their practices of 
consent and dissent, agreement and disagreement, and negotiation and renegotiation. "4 7 
45 Tully, "Consent", supra note 23 at 241 . 
46 Ibid. at 247. 
47 Ibid. at 249 [emphasis in original]. 
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Tully's approach emphasizes treaty processes as political processes. As 
constitutional rather than ordinary political processes, the politics of treaties constitute 
political communities: indigenous, non-indigenous, and the presumably federated 
communities formed through their interactions. Tully points out that non-hegemonic 
treaty processes demand that not only the process, but also the boundaries and shape of 
the communities constituted and reconstituted through these processes must be 
contestable. Further, the centrality of contestability in treaty processes suggests that the 
interests and values of treaty parties may not become merged or reconciled. 
Most fundamentally, a non-hegemonic view of treaty processes should allow for 
the contestation of sovereignty - how it was acquired, and its present form and 
legitimacy. Referring to the difference between politics and "the political" in the political 
theories of Hannah Arendt and Chantal Mouffe, Andrew Schaap explains, "the concept of 
the political refers to a certain potentiality within politics according to which 
commonality emerges out of difference. In other words, the political refers to a dynamic 
inherent within political action by which a 'we' comes to be articulated."48 This is a 
useful distinction to bring to treaties, and particularly with Schaap's emphasis on 
agonism and concerns to not presume reciprocity in dialogues within divided societies 
(such as a dialogue involving historically aggrieved and persistently unequal treaty 
48 Andrew Schaap, "Agonism in Divided Societies" (2006) 32 Philosophy & Social Criticism 255 at 271 
[Schaap]. 
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partners) and to maintain the dynamic of contestation.49 A non-hegemonic approach to 
treaties will thus recognize treaty processes as politics and the hoped-for transformation 
upon a treaty settlement as an expression of the political. The latter aspiration is for a 
utopian ideal that may not manifest even while parties' participation in treaty processes 
suggests that at least some notion of the political "we" has already emerged. 50 The risk of 
not giving such a wide berth for difference within and around treaty negotiations is the 
potential of hegemonic forces to push the emergence of a more complete and settled 
"political moment" even further away. 
Political theorists thus urge us to understand the constitutional moment of treaties 
to be an ongoing one, to conceive of treaty processes broadly, and to accept that as much 
dissent as consent might be present within a given treaty. These political accounts stand 
in contrast to juridical narratives that tend to emphasize finality, the accomplishment of 
discrete treaties, and a jurisprudence focussed on treaty rights defined by discrete 
moments of "common intention." We will return to these contrasts in sections two and 
three of the paper, but we first tum to the generative aspect of treaties, a third 
49 For the adaptation of agonism to address democratic politics in pluralist societies, see Monique Deveaux, 
"Agonism and Pluralism" (1999) 25 Philosophy & Social Criticism 1. 
50 According to Schaap, the idea of 'the political' represented here is more Arendt than Mouffe. Mouffe's 
view of the political embeds dynamics of ongoing disagreement (perhaps the treaty moment that is), while 
theorists have interpreted Arendt's view of the political as expressing a more of utopian, aspirational, or 
transformative 'we' (capturing perhaps the hopes and expectations embedded in treaty processes and why 
such processes are so often perceived as a disappointment). See Andrew Schaap, "Political Theory and The 
Agony of Politics" (2007) 5 Pol Studies Rev 56. 
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constitutional dimension of treaties that builds on the analysis of treaty processes and 
relationships. 
iii. Treaties as Generative 
Drawing on Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, Robert Williams Jr describes 
the multi-nation and multicultural world of colonization as "held together by the 
jurisgenerative force of the common interpretive commitments to a law created and 
shared by the different peoples of Encounter era North America."51 Within this world, 
treaties and indigenous diplomatic traditions were important forces regulating and 
producing an emerging shared normative context.52 Similarly Brian Slattery and Jeremy 
Webber have situated treaties as part of a larger set of intersocietal processes. 53 Brian 
Slattery describes Canadian constitutional foundations as "organic," suggesting North 
American as well as British origins for our constitutional traditions. Those North 
American origins include a body of "intersocietal law" arising from "interaction of 
Aboriginal nations and British and French officials in eastern North America during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."54 To this body of law, Slattery adds the 
philosophical foundations of the natural law tradition, through which principles of justice 
51 Williams, Linking Arms, supra note 30 at 28. 
52 See, e.g., Walters, "Covenant Chain", supra note 4 at 88-89. 
53 Brian Slattery, "The Organic Constitution: Aboriginal Peoples and the Evolution of Canada" (1996) 34 
Osgoode Hall L J lOl[Slattery, "Organic"]; Jeremy Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: 
The Emergence of Normative Community between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode 
Hall L J 623 [Webber, "Relations"]. 
54 Slattery, "Organic" ibid. atl09. 
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become intertwined with the intersocietal custom to inform the present day content of 
Aboriginal rights. For Webber, aboriginal rights "are the result of the interaction between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, and the process of reflection on that 
experience .... They constitute a set of norms that are fundamentally intercommunal, 
created not by the dictation of one society, but by the interaction of various societies 
through time."55 In contrast to Slattery, however, Webber sees this process as one of 
practical reason, emergent from processes of interaction and reflection on that interaction, 
without resort to overarching principles of justice. 
Many accounts of aboriginal rights identify the sources of aboriginal and treaty 
rights as distinct, juxtaposing the consensual basis of treaty rights with the customary 
basis of aboriginal rights. 56 Slattery's and Webber's accounts, however, suggest a close 
relationship between the two types of rights. Aboriginal rights emerge from a larger field 
of intersocietal normativity, a field grounded in both negotiated (treaty-based) as well as 
customary norms. 57 The inclusion of a broader field of norm generation in accounting for 
55 Webber, "Relations" supra note 53 at 638. 
56 See, e.g., Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at447-8: "Aboriginal 
rights and the Treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples differ in both origins and structure. Whereas Aboriginal 
rights flow from the historic use and occupation of land by Aboriginal peoples, Treaty rights are those 
contained in official agreements between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Treaties thus create 
enforceable obligations based on the mutual consent of the parties." Leonard Rotman's critique of the 
transfer of the Sparrow justification test from aboriginal rights to treaty rights is similarly premised on 
treaty rights as negotiated in origin (Leonard I. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treaty 
Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test" (1997) 36 Alta L Rev 149). 
57Webber does not address the relationship between treaty and other Aboriginal rights explicitly. However, 
his account of intercommunal normativity considers early land purchase agreements and other instances of 
explicit negotiation, which indicates a fluidity between negotiated and customary norms. A similar caliber 
of negotiations will be discussed later in this paper as examples of early treaties. 
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the constitutional significance of treaties has parallels with Tully's description of the 
broader fields of treaty discourse in contemporary contexts. It also anticipates the 
discussion below of treaties in history, in which I argue that Canadian treaty-making has 
generally been iterative in nature, building upon experience, reflection, and previous 
rounds of negotiated relationships and accommodations. Generative accounts thus situate 
treaties in broader processes of norm formation between societies. As such, these 
narratives place less significance on moments of consent as founding a post-colonial 
constitutional order, emphasizing instead the formation of a constitutional order that 
draws on both indigenous and European contributions and traditions. 
All of the different accounts of the constitutional dimensions of treaties addressed 
above draw on historical experience to suggest the path forward. In these accounts, 
treaties are both constitutional politics and constitutional law, and they provide a 
narrative frame in which to understand the Crown-aboriginal relations, aboriginal rights, 
and the potential for post-colonial constitutional foundations. As narrative frames, 
however, they do not directly address the proper balance between fidelity to historical 
commitments and evolution through present-day treaty processes required to support 
dynamic treaty relationships and processes of consent and dissent. Moreover, against 
these ideals, locking-in particular treaty rights via constitutional protection - the one 
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constitutional aspect of treaties presently recognized at law58- may seem at odds with the 
aspirations of most of these constitutional narratives. We will return to consider the 
jurisprudential prescriptions that emerge from these narratives in the third part of this 
paper. But first, we tum to consider treaties in history to ground the historical ~xperience 
that has informed these constitutional narratives and to understand the narratives that are 
produced by the discipline of history itself. 
2. Treaties in History 
At this point in the discussion, it will be helpful to ground the theoretical accounts 
of treaties with a "descriptive" account of treaties in history. However, as will be rapidly 
apparent from this overview, treaty histories are not simply descriptive. History is an 
interpretive discipline encompassing a range of methodologies. Thus, what constitutes a 
"treaty" in history, and, more contentiously, the nature of relations expressed by a treaty 
and the materials relevant to understanding such things, are matters of interpretation. 
It is also not easy to discuss Canadian treaty histories in a generalized manner 
given the chronological and geographic scope of such an endeavour. Jim Miller remarks 
that "[ w ]hile there are several studies that look at specific treaties, ... there is none that 
58 Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and affirms "existing aboriginal and treaty rights 
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada". 
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surveys the entire field. "59 Nevertheless, the need for benchmarks for understanding 
treaties - particularly in law - has led to valiant attempts to summarize treaty-making into 
eras and/or types. These efforts include Miller's recent contribution aiming to remedy the 
void he identified. In light of the aims of this paper, it is the shape of the narrative that 
flows from generalized accounts that is of most interest in this discussion. The story of 
treaties at a general level forms a baseline from which treaty interpretation proceeds and 
the conceptual unity against which particular treaty rights are interpreted. This section 
therefore proceeds by addressing dominant historiographical themes and then reviewing 
survey approaches that attempt to provide a birds-eye view of Canada's treaty-making 
experience. I will then move on to critique these accounts, drawing on the constitutional 
narratives of treaties in the previous section to argue that Canada's treaty-making history 
is .better expressed by the concept of "treaty processes" rather than "treaties." 
i. Themes 
Treaty-making has arguably been central in indigenous-Crown relations in North 
America from first contact and continuing on today. It is one of the most persistent 
features of both colonial and Canadian state relations with indigenous peoples. Beyond 
that, summary statements about treaty histories should be made cautiously. There was, 
59 J. R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2009) at xi [Miller, Compact]. 
177 
after all, no uniform experience of colonization in what became Canada. As Sarah Carter 
describes, these former British colonies and possessions were characterized by a 
Diversity of Aboriginal people, their varied environments and resources, and 
... unique patterns of contact with newcomers [which] meant that there was no 
single or monolithic pattern of encounter with settlers. Aboriginal land for 
agriculture was desired by settlers in many localities, but not in others where 
Aboriginal labour was necessary to extract resources, and where the land did not 
invite intensive settlement, as in the massive territories of the fur trade well into 
the twentieth century ... Nor did the Imperial government pursue a consistent, 
uniform policy toward the colonies of British North America; rather, there was an 
ad hoc set of responses to local conditions, which were in part the result of 
initiatives, politics, and diplomacy of Aboriginal nations seeking to direct the 
structure of their relationship with the British.60 
In light of such regional, cultural, and chronological variations in colonial experience, 
any attempt to briefly describe or summarize treaty histories will come up short. 
Nevertheless, amongst related and neighbouring peoples, regions, and eras, and even 
across different ones, there are remarkable similarities of experience to be found. 
In sharp contrast to the "corrective" narratives canvassed in Part 1, which 
emphasize the generative and transformative potential of treaties, accounts of treaties in 
history have been a significant component of the larger narrative of indigenous 
victimhood at the hands of British colonizers. Early accounts assumed that First Nations 
were powerless and their circumstances tragic, 61 accounts that accepted and perpetuated 
60 Sarah Carter, "Aboriginal People of Canada and the British Empire" in Phillip Buckner, ed., Canada and 
the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 200 at 200 [Carter]. 
61 See, e.g., Fumoleau, supra note 43; George F.G. Stanley, "The Indian Background of Canadian History" 
(1952) 31 Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association 14; For brief discussions of 
this type of historiography see Jean Friesen, "Magnificent Gifts: The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of 
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the persistent colonial myths of "the passive, unsophisticated Indian who easily submits 
to superior European technologies" and "the perceived right and legal authority" of the 
colonial powers to acquire the subject territories. 62 Since the 1980s, treaty histories have 
attempted to move past these colonial tropes by emphasizing both indigenous and 
colonial perspectives in treaty negotiations in full historical and cultural context, 63 
paralleling developments in the historiography of indigenous-settler relations more 
generally.64 Histories that take this approach pay greater attention to the parties' 
individual and collective knowledge and strategic calculations in historical context, 
allowing regional and chronological variations in the power balance to come to the fore. 
They attempt to avoid what Alexandra Harmon calls the "outcome-oriented perspective 
the Northwest 1861-76" (1986) series 5, vol l Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 41 [Friesen], 
and Long, Treaty 9.supra note 36. 
62 Paul W. DePasquale, "Refractions of the Colonial Past" in Paul W. DePasquale, ed., Natives and Settlers, 
Now and Then: Historical Issues and Current Perspectives on Treaties and Land Claims in Canada 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press and Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/Revue 
Canadienne de litterature comparee, 2007).xv at xx iii and xx iv. 
63 See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 61; Robert J Talbot, Negotiating the Numbered Treaties. An Intellectual & 
Political Biography of Alexander Morris (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2009); Sarah Carter, Lost 
Harvests. Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1990) at 54-57 . 
64 See, e.g., Daniel K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?" (1993) 50 The William and Mary Quarterly 379; 
James Axtell, Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999); Richard White, The Middle Ground. Indians, Empires, 
and Republics in the Great Lakes Regions, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) [R 
White, Middle Ground]; Germaine Warkentin & Carolyn Podruchny, eds., Decentring the Renaissance: 
Canada and Europe in Multidisciplinary Perspective, 1500-1700 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001); John S. Lutz, Makuk. A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008). 
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on power relations" from eclipsing a more subtle and grounded view of treaties in 
history.65 
Even with greater attention to context and participant agency, colonial interests 
such as the acquisition of land continue to be central to how the meaning and significance 
of treaties are often conveyed.66 Such interpretations bring attention to the naked power 
of the British colonizers and the injustices of this past, emphasizing the unconscionable 
power relations that accompanied many treaty negotiations and the breaking of treaty 
commitments, or ineffective enforcement of treaty rights that often followed immediately 
after treaties were made. There is no doubt that such interpretations remain viable 
historical interpretations, notwithstanding historiographic trends that emphasize 
indigenous contributions to treaties. 
The decentring directions from indigenous-settler studies suggest that treaty 
histories should not fall into an 'either/or' dichotomy; treaties were neither entirely 
reflective of indigenous traditions, power and interests nor of colonial ones. These 
directions leave some treaty historians grappling with how to reconcile indigenous 
65 Alexandra Harmon, "Introduction. Pacific Northwest Indian Treaties in National and International 
Historical Perspective" in Alexandra Harmon, ed., The Power of Promises. Rethinking Indian Treaties in 
the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008) 3 at 18. 
66 See, e.g., John Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003) chptr 4; Dorothy V. Jones, license for 
Empire. Colonialism by Treaty in Early America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) [Jones, 
License for Empire]; Patricia Seed, "Three Treaty Nations Compared: Economic and Political 
Consequences for Indigenous Peoples in Canada, the United States, and New Zealand" in Paul W. 
DePasquale, ed., Natives and Settlers, Now and Then: Historical Issues and Current Perspectives on 
Treaties and land Claims in Canada (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press and Canadian Review of 
Comparative Literature/Revue Canadienne de litterature comparee, 2007) 17-32 [Seed]. 
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influence and perspectives with colonial ones in their interpretations of treaty meanings. 
Indeed, some historians do not interpret the historical treaties as having produced shared 
meanings, or common or middle grounds. 67 John Long, for example, opens his detailed 
consideration of Treaty no. 9 with an either/or proposition - "Was it a trick or a treaty? 
Was treaty-signing in far northern Ontario simply a ruse, whereby the Indigenous 
signatories were fooled into signing a complex legal document that took away their 
rights? Or do their signatures signify their agreement to more general promises that 
constitute an oral agreement, misunderstood by most Canadians?"68 His book-length 
exploration of these issues shows a treaty history that encompasses abuses by the colonial 
powers as well as contributions by the indigenous parties attempting to shape the process 
and substantive commitments undertaken. He ends with reflections on concerns and 
unresolved issues in the present and calls for modem revision of Treaty no. 9, an end 
point that recalls the presentist orientation of the constitutional narratives and their 
insistence that the meaning and significance of historic treaties are still being worked out 
67 See, e.g., Sidney L. Harring, '"There Seemed to Be No Recognized Law': Canadian Law and the Prairie 
First Nations" in Louis A. Knatla & Jonathan Swainger, eds., Laws and Societies in the Canadian Prairie 
West, 1670-1940 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 92-127 [Harring, "No Recognized Law"], Sarah Carter, 
"Aboriginal People of Canada and the British Empire" in Phillip Buckner, ed., Canada and the British 
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 200-219 at 215 (regarding the numbered treaties in 
particular). 
68 Long, Treaty 9, supra note 36 at 3. 
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today.69 This potential for seemingly opposing interpretive lenses to co-exist is a caution 
to bring forward into the review of survey treatments of historical treaties below. 
ii. Taxonomies and Chronologies 
Historians have not generally been interested in surveying the breadth of treaty-
making experience in Canada. Historiographical trends towards deeply contextual studies 
of indigenous-settler relations do not make this type of project more likely. Instead, it is 
lawyers whose discipline demands summary descriptions of Canada's treaty-making 
traditions. Such overviews help contextualize a given treaty against a general 
understanding of treaties and suggest how one treaty history might relate to others. They 
also provide the backdrop for discussions of colonial policy development and aboriginal 
rights. Generalized overviews about the nature of historic treaties thus provide a basic 
narrative against which aboriginal rights are understood in law if not history. As a result, 
historical overviews of treaties should be approached critically, with awareness that their 
significance may echo well beyond debates of a historiographical nature. 
Canadian history is reported to encompass more than 500 historic treaties. 70 A 
common method for summarizing this history divides treaty-making into pre- and post-
69 The adhesion of McLeod Lake Indian Band to Treaty 8, signed in 2000, also illustrates that historic 
treaties can be a matter of active present expansion and/or negotiation (on line: < 
http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr/firstnation/tsekani/default.html ); See Robert Irwin, "Treaty 8: An anomaly 
revisited" (2000) 127 BC Studies 83 (Irwin notes that the agreement was reached in 1999). The adhesion 
settled the Band's land claims, and now the Band is pursuing self-government through the BC Treaty 
process (online: < http://www.bctreaty.net/nations/mcleod.php > ). 
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1850, which sets the Robinson treaties on the northern shores of Lake Superior and 
Huron as the dividing marker. 71 Alternatively, the treaty timeline is divided by 
confederation, with the post-confederation era coinciding with the negotiation of the 
numbered treaties in the old northwest. 72 Confederation as a divider emphasizes a change 
in colonial authority from colonial governments to the new Dominion government. By 
contrast, 1850 more clearly marks the beginning of a new phase of treaty-making in 
which treaties covered larger territories. The earlier date also signifies the completion of a 
shift in the subject matter of treaties from alliance to land that began with the Royal 
Proclamation on 1763.73 Alliances, generally known as 'peace and friendship treaties,' 
established or re-affirmed peace through establishing mutual military support or 
70Donald Purich, Our Land: Native Rights in Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1986) at 96 [Purich]. 
This number is specific to what Purich calls "land deals" struck since the 1700s. He also notes that "over 
half a dozen of treaties of peace and friendship were signed before 1763 between the British and the 
Indians" (ibid.) Even with this large number, Robert J Surtees notes that, prior to the modem treaty-making 
era, "[o]nly about one-half the lands of Canada have been the object of a formal cession agreement, or 
treaty, between the Indians and federal government" ("Canadian Indian Treaties" in William C. Sturtevant, 
ed., Handbook of North American Indians, vol 4 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978) 202 at 202. 
71 See D. N. Sprague, "Canada's Treaties With Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 23 Manitoba Law J 341 
[Sprague]. 
72 See, e.g., James [sakej] Youngblood Henderson, "Empowering Treaty Federalism" (1994) 58 Sask. L. 
Rev. 241 at 248, who divides treaty models into Georgian and Victorian, perhaps as a way to emphasize the 
relationship between Monarch and First Nation, but notes the Victorian model as post- confederation rather 
than post-1850. See also Hamar Foster, "Canada: 'Indian Administration' from the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 to Constitutionally Entrenched Aboriginal Rights" in Paul Havemann, ed., Indigenous Peoples' Rights 
in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 1999) 351 [Foster, "Indian 
Administration"]; and The Constitutional Law Group, eds., Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed (Emond 
Montgomery, 2010) at 613. The latter two divide treaties into 3 eras: pre-confederation, post-confederation, 
and modem. 
73 See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2012 Student ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 
28-34; Sprague, supra note 71; Mark D. Walters, "Promise and Paradox: The Emergence of Indigenous 
Rights in Canada" in Benjamin J. Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds., Indigenous People sand the 
Law. Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009) 21 at 
34-35; and Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition. Native Title and Cultural Change (Sydney: The 
Federation Press, 2008) at 48-51. 
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neutrality. Such agreements often included or set the stage for trading commitments with 
indigenous peoples, which were an important element of maintaining peaceful relations 
in at least the eighteenth century. 74 They also often encompassed terms of goodwill, 
protection, and continued access to the resources required to maintain indigenous 
livelihoods, as exemplified in the 1752 and 1760-61 treaties with the Mi'kmaq, at issue in 
the R v Simon75 and R v Marshall76 decisions respectively. 
The characterization of these agreements as peace and friendship treaties does not 
recognize that, in spite of an absence of land cession terms, the agreements addressed 
land and territory as matters of jurisdiction. Such agreements may have specified colonial 
boundaries or they may have addressed the establishment of new settlements; the British 
treaty with the Mi'kmaq in 1726 is an example. It included clause III: "That the Indians 
shall not molest any of His Majesty's Subjects or their Dependents in their Settlements 
already made or Lawfully to be made."77 William Wicken reads this clause against the 
post-1713 Treaty of Utrecht context in which this treaty was negotiated, suggesting that 
the British did not have exdusive jurisdiction over Mi 'kma'ki where lands were occupied 
by both Mi'kmaq and Acadians and that Mi'kmaq would have expected the lawful 
processes required by the treaty to have included their consent to new uses of their 
74 Jones, License for Empire, supra note 66 at 97. 
75 Simon, supra note 14 . 
76 R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 [Marshall]. 
77 Cited in William C. Wicken, Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial : History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 118 [Wicken, Mi'kmaq Treaties]. 
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lands. 78 In Wicken' s interpretation, "the intent of the treaty was to create norms of 
behavior that would enable co-existence between the British and the Mi'kmaq in Nova 
Scotia."79 As we will return to below, this interpretation of a so-called peace and 
friendship treaty has strong parallels to indigenous interpretations of the later numbered 
treaties. 
In survey treatments, the post-1850 and post-confederation period is typified by 
treaties that dealt with large expanses of territory and many Indian nations or tribes. The 
written terms address land surrenders, annual presents or annuities, commitments to set 
aside reserves, and continued access to Crown lands for harvesting activities until taken 
up for settlement. They are thus presumed to be different in scope and nature than the 
eighteenth-century peace and friendship agreements. The numbered treaties have also 
been further divided by some historians into the first seven "settlement treaties" (1871-
1877) and the later three "northern resource development" treaties ( 1899-1921 ), drawing 
attention to the different impetus for colonial action in these two time periods. 80 
Between these two main types of treaties, some surveys attend to the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 and treaties in Upper Canada in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. 81 Following the formalization of British treaty-making policy in the 
Royal Proclamation, scholars note a transitional era in which a critical shift occurs after 
78 Ibid. at 118-130. 
79 Ibid. at 127. 
80 Long, supra note 13 at 32, citing James Morrison. See also Miller, Compact, supra note 59. 
81 See, e.g., Miller, Compact, ibid. and Foster, "lndian Administration", supra note 72. 
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the war of 1812 when the British need for military support from indigenous allies waned 
and settler pressures for land increased. 82 Prior to 1812, the move from the peace and 
friendship format towards the geographically limited land cession agreements of the 
second period was already in progress. 83 Further changes were introduced in the later era, 
replacing one-time payments with annual annuities - which Miller has noted was 
introduced to reduce the financial burden of treaty-making on the colonial treasury - and 
connecting treaty-making to the creation of reserves. 84 Regardless of changing colonial 
interests, treaties continued to encompass terms reflecting indigenous concerns to retain 
access to wildlife and fish harvesting areas and waterways. Similarly, the fourteen 
Douglas Treaties on Vancouver Island from the 1850s85 reflected many of the elements 
of the contemporaneous Robinson treaties in Ontario but retained some of the character 
82 Miller, ibid, chptrs 3, 4; Foster, ibid. at 359. 
83 Miller, ibid. See also Long, supra note 13 at 24-6. 
84 Miller notes that First Nations began demanding reserves as they grew more skeptical of the Crown's 
promises in light of increasing settler pressures and lax enforcement of earlier agreements (Miller, 
Compact, ibid, at 103). Commitments to set aside reserves first appear in the text of a treaty in the 1850 
Robinson Treaties, but earlier treaties also created reserves as part of cession negotiations: e.g., the 
reservation of Manitoulin Island in the 1836 Treaty negotiated by Sir Francis Bond Head (ibid. at 106-9); 
and Treaty 29 between the Crown and the Chippewas in 1829, as discussed in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v 
Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 51 OR (3d) 641, (2001] 1 CNLR 56, at paras 66-79 (Ont Sup Ct) 
[Chippewas of Sarnia (trial)]. The Haldimand Tract of 1784, purchased from the Mississauga of the Credit 
and granted to the Six Nations for their loyalty to the British, is also cited as an early reserve (RCAP, vol I 
supra note 3 at Part One, Chapter 6, online: 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071211050833/http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg 13 e.html#43>. 
85 Hamar Foster and Alan Grove argue that there may be a fifteenth Douglas Treaty made in 1862 between 
the Cowichan and Governor Douglas. Their archival research shows that Governor Douglas made treaty-
like commitments and promises to deliver the necessary presents and compensation to the Cowichan to 
facilitate settlement on Cowichan lands by non-aboriginal people. Governor Douglas' promises and 
commitments were not fulfilled. ("'Trespassers on the Soil': United States v. Tom and A New Perspective 
on the Short History of Treaty Making in Nineteenth-Century British Columbia" (2003) Summer:l38/139 
BC Studies 5 1 ). 
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of the earlier Upper Canada surrenders in that these agreements were limited in 
geographic scope and involved one time payments. 86 
Miller's recent book-length historical survey of Canadian treaty-making is much 
more detailed than many of the 'snapshot' surveys noted above, but it is both the level of 
detail and his approach that provide a different sense of this history. Importantly, 
although many scholars note the evolving nature of Canadian treaty history, Miller's 
categorizations are less neat as he traces the chronological development of treaty-making 
with colonial interests that moved from east to west. This approach allows for more 
overlap between types and eras of treaty-making, allowing a sense of the continuity and 
change that has characterized this enduring practice. His survey is also more inclusive, 
incorporating fur trade "commercial compacts" as part of the early period of treaty 
history. He notes that indigenous nations would not trade without the establishment of 
peaceful relations, and thus these 'commercial agreements' overlap in both chronology 
and character with the peace and friendship agreements of the eighteenth century. Such 
agreements have generally been left out oflegal surveys of treaty history, perhaps 
because the Crown was not the treaty-making entity. Not all trading companies had 
authority from the Crown that would be commensurate with treaty-making powers. 
86 Miller discusses these BC treaties as distinct from other Canadian traditions, noting that Douglas was 
provided with sample agreements from the New Zealand Company's dealings with the Maori rather than 
any samples from Upper Canada (Miller, Compact, ibid. at 147). Although the BC experience is 
undoubtedly distinct, experience in other parts of the British Empire informed activities in the east as well. 
Canada's treaty-making traditions need to be understood as developing out of or alongside American, 
French and other precedents. 
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Indeed, Miller's account distinguishes between agreements made by the North West 
Company and the Hudson's Bay Company on this very point, excluding the former from 
at least "official" treaty history. 87 The Hudson's Bay Company's Charter, on the other 
hand, purported to bestow the Company with territorial and governance authority in 
Rupert's Land, encompassing sufficient authority to make treaties on behalf of the 
Crown. 88 Regardless, the argument for inclusion of the fur trade era in treaty history does 
not depend on the perfect legal authority of either the European and indigenous treaty-
makers in the fur trade era. The argument does not require such treaties to be individually 
justiciable. Instead (or in addition) fur trade treaties are significant as part of an iterative 
process of treaties that made subsequent treaties possible. 
87 He notes that even the North West Company made a 'formal' treaty at Thunder Bay when it meant to 
purchase land, but excludes this agreement from being "strictly speaking, a treaty" because the North West 
Company did not represent the Crown (ibid at 87). 
88 The legality of the Company's Charter was always contentious, but never finally tested in a court of law. 
See generally, Kent McNeil, "Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Nations of Rupert's Land" ( 1999) 
Spring/Summer:37 Manitoba History 2; Hamar Foster, "Forgotten Arguments: Aboriginal Title and 
Sovereignty in Canada Jurisdiction Act Cases" (1992) 21 Manitoba L. J. 343; Hamar Foster, "Long-
Distance Justice: the Criminal Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts West of the Canadas, 1763-1859" (1990) 34 
Am. J. of Legal History 1; Kenneth M. Narvey, "The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763: The Common 
Law and Native Rights to Land Within the Territory Granted to the Hudson's Bay Company" (1974) 38 
Saskatchewan L. Rev. 123), and Geoffrey S. Lester, The Territorial Rights of the Inuit of the Canadian 
Northwest Territories: A Legal Argument (D.Jur. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
1981) [unpublished] at 1309-73; Robert Baker, Law Transplanted, Justice Invented: Sources of Law for the 
Hudson's Bay Company in Rupert's land, 1670-1870 (Master's Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1996) 
[unpublished], chptr 2; and Edward Cavanagh, "A Company with Sovereignty and Subjects of its Own? 
The Case of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1763" (2011) 26 Can. J ofL. & Soc'y 25 [Cavanagh, 
"HBC"]. 
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Including fur trade era treaties brings geographies frequently left out of treaty 
surveys - such as northern Quebec89 and British Columbia- into the picture before the 
modem era. New France and the early colony of Quebec are also often left out of surveys 
of the country's treaty-making traditions.90 Sebastien Grammond explains the differences 
of Quebec's treaty history as stemming from two points of legal history: first, the 
assumption that the Indian provisions of the Royal Proclamation did not apply to the 
colony of Quebec; and second, the lack of a requirement to seek indigenous consent to 
land cessions within French colonial law or policy.91 But these differences simply mean 
that treaties in Quebec were not land cession agreements, not that there were no treaties 
of note. Indeed, important treaty rights cases have arisen from the geography of present-
day Quebec.92 Similarly, British Columbian territory beyond Vancouver Island (Douglas 
89 Maps of Canada's historic treaties routinely leave the province of Quebec blank; see, e.g., the 
Department of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs, which lists 18th century peace and friendship treaties from 
the Maritimes in its resources on historical treaties, but no such treaties from Quebec: < http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/al/hts/tgu/index-eng.asp > , even though a list of resources about treaties in what became Quebec 
are provided elsewhere: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/hts/res/rbi/gbc-eng.asp >. 
9° French diplomatic relations with indigenous peoples are, however, well-represented in the literature on 
indigenous-settler relations. See, e.g., R White, Middle Ground, supra note 64 ; Gilles Havard, The Great 
Peace of Montreal of 1701 : French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeeth Century (Montreal & Kingston : 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); and, Gilles Havard, Empire et Metissages: Indiens et Fran~ais 
dans le Pays d'en Haut, 1660-1715 (Sillery, Paris: Les Editions du Septentrion et Presses de l'universite de 
la Paris-Sorbonne, 2003). 
91 Sebastien, Grammond, Les traites entre l'Etat canadien et !es peuples autochtones (Cowansville, 
Quebec: Editions Y. Blais, 1995), chpt. 1. Contrast Kenneth M Narvey, "The Royal Proclamation of7 
October 1763, the Common Law, and Native Rights to Land within the Territory Granted to the Hudson's 
Bay Company" (1974) 38 Sask L Rev 123, who argues that ungranted, unceded lands within existing 
colonies and territories, such as Quebec, were subject to a similar reservation in favour of the Indians in 
spite of their geographic exception from the Indian provisions. 
92 Sioui, supra note 1. The treaty in issue was made by General James Murray with the Huron of Lorette in 
1760. For discussion of the treaty, see Miller, Compact, supra note 59 at 74-5 and R v Cote, [ 1996] 3 SCR 
139 (The treaty right claim was based on a 1760 at Swegatchy and Caughnawaga between the Algonquins 
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Treaties) and the northeast comer (Treaty 8) can be connected to the larger treaty-making 
tradition through the significant history of fur trade relations there before settlers 
arrived. 93 Acknowledging this aspect of BC history refocuses attention away from the 
colonial policy-makers that set BC's Indian policy on a different trajectory from the rest 
of the western Canada to an older tradition of negotiated trading relationships. 
Miller's inclusion of the fur trade era builds on the remarks of numerous 
historians who argue that relations between indigenous and European fur traders in the 
100-200 years preceding treaties set the stage for at least the numbered treaty 
negotiations. Sidney Harring, for example, has related the fur trade era to First Nations 
understanding of treaties as sharing agreements, noting that "[t]here are substantial oral 
histories of Native understanding of these treaties. Most of them can be corroborated by 
the logic of the time. It must be clear, for example, that, having shared the Prairies with 
Euro-Canadian fur traders for two hundred years, Native people must have seen the 
treaties as recognizing that pre-existing relationship."94 Arthur Ray, Jim Miller and Frank 
Tough expand this argument, suggesting that pre-treaty fur trade practices provide an 
and the British. The Supreme Court declined to determine whether this treaty gave rise to a treaty right (at 
para 88)). 
93 See Duane Thomson & Marianne Ignace, "'They Made Themselves Our Guests": Power Relationships in 
the Interior Plateau Region of the Cordillera in the Fur Trade" (2005) Summer: 146 BC Studies 3 [Thomson 
& Ignace]. 
94 Harring, "No Recognized Law", supra note 67 at I 02. 
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essential baseline against which to understand the numbered treaties. 95 As Arthur Ray 
explains: 
The fur-trading institutions and practices that cemented this relationship, 
particularly the gift-giving and negotiating traditions and the treaties that Canada 
had already negotiated to the east in the area·of present-day Ontario ... , served as 
models for treaty negotiations in the 1870s ... As a result, the treaties included 
provisions that had been central features of the classic, pre-1870s fur trade.96 
In addition to the gift-giving and negotiating traditions noted by Ray, the central features 
of the trading regimes emphasized by these authors as connecting to the later treaties 
include the rights to access lands and resources that indigenous peoples granted their 
European and Canadian trading partners,97 the practices of recognizing trading chiefs 
with gifts of clothing and pipe ceremonies,98 and the practices around sharing medicines 
95 Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller & Frank J. Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A Documentary History of 
Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) at 3 [Bounty and 
Benevolence]. 
96 Arthur J. Ray, Telling it to the Judge. Taking Native History to Court (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2011) at 69 [Ray, Telling it]. Ray (ibid. at 87) notes that Teitelbaum J did not 
address this argument in his dismissal of the land sharing arguments put forward by Samson Indian Band 
and Nation in Victor Buffalo v Canada, 2005 FC 1622, [2006] 1 CNLR 100 [Victor Buffalo], appeals 
dismissed, Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada, 2006 FCA 415, [2007] 3 FCR 245, and 2009 
SCC 9, [2009] 1 SCR 222 (on appeal, the case was joined with a related action brought by the Ermineskin 
Indian Band and Nation and focused on claims that the federal Crown had breached its obligations in 
managing funds earned from oil and gas royalties). 
97 Bounty and Benevolence, supra note 95, chpt 1. See also Long, Treaty 9, supra note 36, chpt 1 ;Thomson 
& Ignace, supra note 93; and Janna Promislow, '"It would only be just': A Study of Territoriality and 
Trading Posts Along the Mackenzie River, 1800-1827" in Lisa Ford & Tim Rowse, eds, Between 
Indigenous and Settler Governance (London & New York: Routledge, 2012) 35 [Promislow, "It would 
only be just"]. 
98 Bounty and Benevolence, ibid. See also Long. Treaty 9, ibid, and Janna Promislow, "One Chief, Two 
Chiefs, Red Chiefs, Blue Chiefs: Newcomer Perspectives on Indigenous Leadership in Rupert's Land and 
the North-West Territories" in Hamar Foster, Benjamin L. Berger, & A.R. Buck, eds., The Grand 
Experiment: Law and Legal Culture in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 55 
[Promislow, "One Chief, Two Chiefs"]. 
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and assisting each other in dealing with illness, which have a particular correspondence 
with the written medicine chest provision of Treaty 6. 99 
In a slightly different take on how the fur trade relates to treaties, John Foster 
suggested that the relationship constituted a "compact" between the traders. 100 Similarly, 
Jean Friesen described the relationship formed through trade, which she identifies as a 
political and diplomatic act, as a form of alliance, as "treaty trade, an institution of Indian 
origin [that] served both trader and Indian."101 This argument emphasizes the negotiated 
form of the relationship that supported the trade as a form of treaty itself. 102 It also might 
be taken to reflect the "contracts" and "leagues of friendship and peaceable cohabitation" 
that the Hudson's Bay Company instructed its earliest traders to make with the natives of 
the lands in which they wanted to settle a trade and, if possible, purchase the lands. 103 
The significance of these early treaty-trade relationships in Rupert's Land was not simply 
the establishment of good relations with trading partners; the English traders also needed 
99 Bounty and Benevolence, ibid. at 8. There are other specific terms in the treaties which might be 
connected, in a similar manner, to fur trade practices. For example, indigenous traders were "outfitted" 
annually with the equipment for their fall and winter hunting and trapping needs and Treaties 4 through l 1 
included written terms securing gifts of ammunition and/or twine to support their hunting, fishing and 
trapping activities. Educational promises and provisions regarding famine relief might also be explored. 
Regarding the latter, see ibid at 138-9. 
100 John E. Foster, "Indian-White Relations in the Prairie West during the Fur Trade Period - A Compact?" 
in Richard Price, ed., The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
1999 [1979]) 181. 
101 Friesen, supra note 61 at 44. 
102 See Janna Promislow, "'Thou wilt not die of hunger ... for I bring thee merchandise': Consent, 
Intersocietal Normativity and the Exchange of Food at York Factory, 1682-1763" in Jeremy Webber & 
Colin Macleod, eds., Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the Meaning of Consent 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 77 [Promislow, "I bring thee merchandise"]. 
103 Discussed in Bounty and Benevolence, supra note 95 at 4; Miller, Compact, supra note 59 at 12-14, and 
Promislow, "I bring thee merchandise", ibid. at 86-7. 
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their alliances with local peoples for colonial/military purposes (as in Mi'mak'i/Acadia), 
to gain a foothold in the vast territories in which French traders were also present. Indeed, 
the Hudson's Bay Company relied on its "leagues of friendship" in legal disputes with 
the French over Rupert's Land leading up to the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713. 104 In the end 
result, both of these arguments - fur trade as essential context and source of insights into 
a set ofrelations that would have influenced at least First Nations expectations of treaty, 
and fur trade relationships as involving and embodying (peace and friendship) treaties 
themselves - bring the fur trade into treaty history. And regardless of which argument 
prevails, both importantly suggest that treaty-making is an iterative process, in which 
earlier relationships shape what is possible and desirable when the time comes to 
reformulate and rearticulate the terms of relationship. 
Less novel than including fur trade compacts, but equally significant in treaty-
making histories, is Miller's inclusion of the post-1975 comprehensive claims process in 
his account. 105 Linking historical traditions to contemporary developments is important 
for understanding the context for contemporary negotiations processes and for legal 
argument, as courts begin to grapple with the interpretive frame to bring to so-called 
modem treaties. 106 However, there is room to consider what connects the eras beyond the 
104 Promislow, "I bring thee merchandise", ibid. at 87 and footnote 44. 
105 Miller, Compact, supra note 59. See also Foster, "Indian Administration", and CLG, supra note 72. 
106 Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 SCR 103 [Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses, 2010 SCC 17, [2010] 1 SCR 557, 
and Eastmain Bandv Robinson (1992), 99 DLR (4th) 16 (Fed CA), Iv. to appeal refused, [1993] 3 SCR vi 
(SCC). In Special Rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martinez's report for the UN, he avoids the term "treaties" in 
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fact of official treaty-making activities. For example, the delineation of modem versus 
historic, is consistently demarcated by Miller and others by a 50-year gap between the 
Williams Treaty of 1923 and the James Bay Accord of 1975, which overlooks adhesions 
that took place during these 50 years: Saulteux, Cree and Chippewa (Ojibway) bands 
signed adhesions to Treaty 6 between 1944 and 1956; Treaty 9 was significantly 
expanded by an adhesion in 1930, after the boundaries of Ontario were extended in 
1912. 107 These adhesions extended existing agreements to new nations and, occasionally, 
new territories. Overlooking them as part of treaty history also overlooks the motivations 
and perspectives of the new treaty peoples in favour of colonial attitudes during this 
period, which assumed Indian polities were a fading artifact of the past and that treaties, 
once signed, required little further attention. 108 
naming what are commonly identified in Canada as modem treaties, preferring instead to call them 
"constructive arrangements". This language choice signals the Rapporteur's view of these agreements as 
wholly domestic nature and limited in terms of the reach of the negotiations (capable of establishing only 
delegated governmental powers), in contradistinction to the constitutional nature and international status of 
historic treaties which, in his assessment, were recognized under the Law of Nations: Study on Treaties, 
Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations (UN 
Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1999) at para 145 [Martinez, UN Report]. While I'm 
sympathetic to the Rapporteur's concerns about the hegemonic frame within which "so-called" modem 
treaties are negotiated, my approach in this paper is to take an expansive view of treaties, bringing a variety 
of forms of negotiation under the umbrella of treaties rather than being concerned to identify a particular 
form or scope of agreement that may be called a treaty. As a result, my reference to "so-called" is intended 
to signal concerns regarding the categorization of "modem" rather than "treaty". 
107 James Morrison, "Treaty Research Report - Treaty No. 9" ( 1986), prepared for the Treaties and 
Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, online: < http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/ 1100100028859>. 
108 Morrison, ibid., notes that the Treaty 9 adhesions were motivated in part by the need for bands to split 
into smaller units than the treaty bands created in 1905, to suit the government's reserve policy and to 
reflect the traditional hunting band's hunting groups. For some discussion regarding Treaty 9 adhesions, 
see Long, Treaty 9, supra note 36 at 84-91. The adhesion of the McLeod Lake Indian Band to Treaty 8 in 
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Modem treaties are not simply distinguished from historic treaties by chronology; 
they are also differentiated by their scope and conditions of negotiation, or so it is 
generally presumed. As Binnie J recently emphasized in Little Salmon/Carmacks First 
Nation: 
Unlike their historical counterparts, the modem comprehensive treaty is the 
product of lengthy negotiations between well-resourced and sophisticated 
parties .... The increased detail and sophistication of modem treaties represents a 
quantum leap beyond the pre-Confederation historical treaties ... and post-
Confederation treaties ... The historical treaties were typically expressed in lofty 
terms of high generality and were often ambiguous .... Modem comprehensive 
land claim agreements, on the other hand, starting perhaps with the James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975) ... were .. .intended to create some 
precision around property and governance rights and obligations. 109 
Justice Deschamps provided a different view in her concurring reasons, rejecting the date 
of signature of a treaty or categorization of treaty type as determining the interpretive 
approach that should be taken, noting that s. 3 5 does not differentiate between treaties in 
this manner, and "that it would be wrong to think that the negotiating power of 
Aboriginal peoples is directly related to the time period in which the treaty was 
concluded." 110 On closer examination, and with respect for Binnie J's clear desire to 
launch a new and better era of aboriginal-Crown relations, Deschamps J's view of the 
evolution of treaty-making has greater correspondence with the historical record. 
2000 is also a challenging case to fit into the standard understanding of the split between modern and 
historic; see Irwin, supra note 69. 
109 Ibid. at paras 9 and 12. 
110 At para 116. UN Special Rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martinez noted in his 1999 report numerous 
conditions around the negotiation of the James Bay Agreement that give rise to concerns about the 
consensual nature of that agreement: Martinez, UN Report, supra note 106 at paras 137-8. 
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As noted above, some interpretations of eighteenth-century treaties, such as 
Wicken's interpretation of the 1726 Mi'kmaq-British treaty, demonstrate intentions to 
create norms of co-existence around "property and governance rights and obligations," 
even if such norms were not defined precisely. 111 The difficulty of reaching such 
interpretations of the treaty through the historical record, rather than from the written 
terms of the treaty, does not erase this historical content. Consider also self-government. 
The federal government's now dated 1995 policy on self-government considers such 
negotiations to be an "add-on" to historic treaties, stating specifically that historic treaties 
will not be re-opened. 112 Indigenous scholars, on the other hand, have argued that treaties 
were agreements between sovereign political communities, a fact that implies recognition 
of First Nations self-government and supports s. 35 treaty self-government rights. 113 
Modem treaties, by contrast, make self-governance rights explicit in their written terms, 
institutionalizing and protecting various forms or pieces of indigenous governance or 
joint indigenous-public government decision-making. The difference may again be 
primarily between written (modem) versus unwritten terms (historic), with lingering 
disputes about the scope of the historic treaties. Moreover, the detailing of self-
government jurisdictions and institutions in the modem agreements coincides with the 
growing complexity of the modem administrative state. Is the detailed nature of the self-
111 See also Promislow, "It would only be just", supra note 98. 
112 The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of 
Aboriginal Self-Government, online: < http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100 I 00031843#ext> 
113 See, e.g., Henderson 1994, supra 3; Ladner, supra note 16. 
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government provisions a reflection more of the changing nature of treaties or of the 
changing nature of government?114 If we also take into account the significant federal 
policy changes around the parameters of self-government negotiations in the modem 
era, 115 we might see that at least the early twentieth-century northern resource 
development treaties (Treaties 8-11) as having more in common with the treaties of the 
1970s through the early 1990s than the typical division between modem and historic 
treaties suggests. 
One final concern about how the modem treaty era has been presented in treaty 
surveys to date is the adherence to official federal treaty policies and processes in how 
treaties are characterized. 116 Many historians recognize treaty-making experience as 
inclusive of "informal" treaty processes, exemplified by the authors noted above 
connecting fur trade practices to treaty histories. 117 Many constitutional theorists 
114 One might compare the shift to the Constitution Act, 1867 and note how little was specified in the text 
about how the provincial and federal governments might work together, amongst other things. Does this 
absence mean the Constitution Act, 1867 is unsophisticated? 
115 From limited co-management arrangements (James Bay, 1975; Gwich'in and Sahtu, 1993 and 1994 
respectively) to independent legislative bodies (Nisga'a, 1998; Tli'Cho, 2005). For an overview of the 
comprehensive land claims process, see Christopher Alcantara, "To Treaty or Not to Treaty? Aboriginal 
Peoples and Comprehensive Land Claims Negotiations in Canada" (2007) 38 Publius. The Journal of 
Federalism 343. 
116 See, e.g., Miller, Compact, supra note 59 and Foster, "Indian Administration", supra note 72. Many of 
the developments discussed in this paragraph are very recent, following after Haida Nation v British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida Nation]. It may be sometime 
before they become absorbed into survey examinations of modern treaty-making. 
117 For a related exploration in relation to New Zealand, see Richard P Boast, "Recognising Multi-
Textualism: Rethinking New Zealand's Legal History" (2006) 37 Victoria Univ. Wellington L. Rev. 547 
[Boast, "Multi-Textualism"]. Although Boast's exploration focusses on written agreements, his analysis 
points out how exclusive attention to the Treaty of Waitangi misses other important agreements, 
particularly from Maori perspectives, that also serve as "foundation[s] ofrelationships with the New 
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recognize a broad idea of "treaty processes," as discussed in the first section of this paper. 
Even the Supreme Court has recognized the connections, when in Mikisew Cree First 
Nation v Canada (Minister of Heritage) 118 Binnie J commented that the duty to consult 
applies to the implementation of the Crown's rights to take up land for settlement and 
other purposes under Treaty 8. 119 Thus processes beyond the treaties, such as 
consultation, are required to make the treaty work. Meanwhile, a plethora of quasi-treaty 
agreements and processes have cropped up, particularly at the provincial level. 120 British 
Columbia's policies embrace "incremental treaty agreements," 121 which focus on sharing 
economic benefits with First Nations and building trust before final agreements are 
reached. These policies also embrace "reconciliation protocols and agreements," 122 some 
of which notably establish shared decision-making around lands and resources. Neither 
the BC treaty process nor these developments can be understood in isolation; they exist 
only in relation to each other and the ongoing rejection or complaints about the BC treaty 
Zealand State that endure to this day and a benchmark by which the Crown's behavior can be evaluated" 
(at 572). 
118 Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388 [Mikisew 
Cree] 
119 Ibid at para 33. 
120 See, e.g., relationship and revenue sharing agreements such as Quebec's Paix des Braves; online < 
http://www.gcc.ca/issues/paixdesbraves.php >.Regarding enforceability issues, and in the context of 
agreements with Metis, see Jean Te ill et, "A Tale of Two Agreements: Implementing Section 52(1) 
Remedies for the Violation of Metis Harvesting Rights" in Maria Morellato, ed., Aboriginal Law Since 
Delgamuukw (Canada Law Book, 2009) 333. 
121 Online: < http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr/treaty/incremental treaty agreements/default.html>. 
122 Online: < http://www.newrelationship.gov.bc.ca/agreements and leg/reconciliation.html>. 
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process by many First Nations and other commentators. 123 Provincial leadership in this 
area is itself worth noting, and marks perhaps the greatest departure of the modern from 
the historic eras (although, at the same time, continuing the tradition of federal-provincial 
policy differences around treaty-making). 124 These developments suggest that 
consultation and various other forms of agreements need to be considered alongside 
negotiations under federal comprehensive and specific claims policies (and the BC Treaty 
Process), in order to paint a full picture of the broad fields of consent and dissent that 
characterize the modern era of treaty-making in Canada. 
Thus, even under Miller's expanded approach, the surveys that give a basic shape 
to Canada's treaty-making history carry forward the historiographical habits of previous 
generations. Most critically, the distinctions between eras and types of treaties in the 
surveys correspond to the colonial administration's interests in making a treaty in a 
particular time and place (peace and alliance or land or "precision" around land and 
government) and inadequately represent indigenous perspectives. Of course, if the aim of 
the survey is to present a snapshot of colonial policy over time, this emphasis is 
appropriate. 125 However, if the aim of the survey is to provide a birds-eye view of 
123 See Browne and Lomie Report, supra note 44. See also Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group v Canada, 
Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case No. 12.374, Report 
on Admissibility No. 105/09, online: < 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/intemational/htg/documents/HTG%20v.%20Canada%20Admissibili 
ty%20report%20Petition%20592 > and Andrew Woolford, "Transition and Transposition: Genocide, Land 
and the British Columbia Treaty Process" (2011) 4 J of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry 67. 
124 For a summary, see Sprague, supra note 71. 
125 See, e.g., Foster, "Indian Administration", supra note 72. 
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Canada's treaty-making traditions, then such approaches are inadequate for presenting a 
history comprised of both indigenous and Crown experience. The over-representation of 
colonial interests is particularly strong in the continued separation of land from peace and 
friendship treaties and/or fur trade agreements. 126 Many indigenous groups claim that, in 
spite of the surrender clauses in the text in the land cession treaties, they never 'sold' 
their land. This claim is anchored in indigenous beliefs and economic systems, in which 
land is not a commodity that can be sold. Instead, they claim that they agreed to share 
their territories and resources with the newcomers. 127 And while these claims are 
advanced in the present day, there are at least some examples of contestation around 
ownership of land in the historical record as well. 128 
The interpretive divide between sharing and cession has been taken up by several 
historians, particularly those concerned with bringing indigenous perspectives and 
contributions to treaty-making to the fore. They question the historical grounding of such 
126 Noted by Martinez, UN Report, supra note 110 at para 122. 
127 See, e.g., RCAP Report, vol 2, supra note 3 at 45; Treaty 7, supra note 3; R.J. Surtees, Indian Land 
Surrenders in Ontario 1763-1867 (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1984) at 10; and Sharon 
Venne, "Treaties Made in Good Faith" in Paul W. DePasquale, ed., Natives and Settlers, Now and Then: 
Historical Issues and Current Perspectives on Treaties and Land Claims in Canada (Edmonton: University 
of Alberta Press and Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/Revue Canadienne de litterature 
comparee, 2007) 1-16. For discussion of these claims in the treaty jurisprudence, see footnote 134 and 
accompanying text below. 
128 For example, the treaty records from Treaty l and 3 include requests for compensation for lands and 
resources and Treaty 4 includes discussion of grievances with the Hudson's Bay Company, including the 
Company's sale of the territory to the Dominion. See Friesen, supra note 61. For the Treaty 4 record, see 
Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, 
Including the Negotiations on Which They Were Based, and Other Information Relating Thereto (Calgary: 
Fifth House, 1991; first published 1880) at 99-107. 
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claims. Jean Friesen, for example, states that even in light of the unbalanced conditions in 
which the 1871-1877 treaties were negotiated, or perhaps because of them, 
There is no doubt in my mind that at least some of the Indian leaders at the 
treaties were well aware that this was a land sale on an enormous scale ... Most 
writers have assumed either that Indians could not conceive of the sale of 'Mother 
earth' or that they only applied the concept of land use rather than ownership and 
sale. While this may be true for some Indians in some parts of the west, it seems 
more likely that, like the Iroquois in the eighteenth century, they may have been 
developing a variety of conceptual approaches to land and resources, depending 
upon whether they were dealing within the tribe, with other Indians, or with 
Europeans. 129 
Sidney Harring also considered the prairie treaties and wrote that, in general, "[t]he 
concept of the sale of land and its permanent alienation cannot have been known to 
Indians who never held private property .... The First Nations understood the treaties as 
peace and friendship agreements, with specific cessions on some land use rights in return 
for payments in cash and goods from the Crown."130 Nevertheless, in discussing 
problems of translation, and the difficulties this creates for historical interpretation, 
Harring further stated that: 
It is impossible to fully articulate the Indian understanding of these treaties. Part 
of the evidence is contradictory. For example, the Indians at Fort Carlton, 
according to official documents, discussed leasing their land to the whites for four 
years rather than selling the land. This discussion itself would indicate that the 
tribes understood that they were selling the land. But that assumes Indians knew 
what a lease was. Other Indians counseled against selling the land, again 
indicating that the tribes knew they were discussing a land sale. The final 
129 Friesen, supra note 61 at 43 and 49 (emphasis in original). 
130 Harring, supra note 67 at 102. 
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language [of the surrender clauses] seems unambiguous. But it is boilerplate 
language, inserted in all the treaties, and it is not clear how it was translated. 131 
Inevitably, the historian's conclusion is that the historical "truth" of the competing 
claims depends on the context - the particular knowledge and experience of the peoples 
involved, their languages, legal cultures and knowledge of those of their negotiating 
partners, and the larger social, political, and economic context in which the treaty was 
negotiated. Moreover, as Harring suggests, the nature of the historical record rarely 
permits conclusive interpretations of the sort demanded by legal standards on matters of 
dispute. As noted earlier, a historian's interpretation may simply be that the meaning of a 
given treaty was not shared between the parties - a perfectly valid conclusion by 
historical standards. 
Looking for points of mutual agreement as represented by treaty terms and texts is 
an inquiry (im)posed by law, in which the historical inquiry serves or follows from the 
legal one. Although the historiography of treaties now reflects mixed legal and historical 
orientations, historians have traditionally been more concerned with portraying the 
overall context and character of a particular treaty or regional set of treaty negotiations, 
or with the development and practice of colonial policy around treaties. They have 
formulated their questions against intellectual developments such as attending to the 
agency of indigenous peoples in colonial contexts and theoretical debates about the 
131 Ibid. at I 04-5. 
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nature of objectivity and positive historical facts. Legal questions, by contrast, stem from 
an abstracted and normative concept of treaties and treaty rights. A historical 
interpretation of a lack of shared meaning in relation to a given treaty raises legal issues, 
but not necessarily historical ones. And the legal issues raised are potentially 
fundamental: if the parties never reached an agreement on important terms, is it 
appropriate to speak of a treaty having been reached?132 
To date, the interpretive gulf between sharing and cession has not led parties to 
litigate claims that no treaty was formed, perhaps in part because such arguments would 
do little to advance First Nations interests. 133 Instead, the Samson Indian Band and 
Nation, for example, disputed the scope and meaning of only the land cession clause in 
the Victor Buffalo case, arguing that Treaty 6 was treaty of alliance rather than land 
cession. 134 Justice Teitelbaum rejected their argument. Without addressing whether the 
Samson Indian Band and Nation's characterization of the treaty was 'right', we can 
notice that succeeding in their claim required more than proving their specific case. 
Succeeding required that Teitelbaum J accept a more fundamental re-configuration of the 
132 See Kent McNeil, "Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial 
Discretion" (2001) 33 Ottawa Law Review 301at306 [McNeil, "Extinguishment"]. 
133 But note that Saskatchewan Elders have expressed the view that substantial agreement was reached at 
treaty negotiations and so, according to Harold Cardinal and Walter Hildebrant, what is at issue "is not 
whether or not treaties exist, but whether a mutually acceptable record of them can now be agreed upon and 
implemented." (Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrant, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream ls That 
Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000) 
at 59). Donald Purich notes that there has been one challenge to the formation of a treaty that failed at the 
appeal level but does not identify the case (Puri ch, supra note 70 at 110). 
134 Victor Buffalo, supra note 96. Justice Teitelbaum rejected their contention based on the evidence he 
heard and his strong preference for the experts that relied on the written record (ibid. at paras 20, 451-532). 
For discussion, see Arthur J. Ray, Telling It, supra note 96 at 85-87. 
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basic layout of treaty history in Canada which instructs that, by its nature, Treaty 6 was a 
land cession treaty. While these labels hold no legal significance (as noted by Deschamps 
J in Little Salmon/Carmacks), and strong facts should overcome prejudicial academic 
descriptions, a narrative of treaties that does not summarily preclude the Samson Indian 
Band's argument would help set the bar a little lower. Moreover, a survey of treaty-
making in Canada should be capable of accommodating the interpretive dispute that the 
Samson Indian Band and Nation put before the Federal Court and claimed by many other 
First Nations. This dispute characterizes the history of Canadian treaty-making as much 
as the treaties themselves. 
The need to re-shape treaty surveys to encompass both agreements and persistent 
disagreements, draws attention to the strong connections between law and history in this 
area. Consider John Borrows' argument that the Royal Proclamation is best understood as 
part of the Treaty of Niagara of 1764, such that the text of the Proclamation should be 
read in concert with First Nations understandings of the Proclamation upon which the 
Treaty of Niagara is premised and as memorialized by the wampum belts presented by 
the Crown to the nations gathered at Niagara. 135 This argument received a measure of 
135
"Wampum at Niagara: the Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government" in 
Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equity, and Respect for 
Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 155. See also J. R. Miller, "Compact, Contract, Covenant: The 
Evolution of Indian Treaty Making" in Ted Binnema and Susan Neylan, eds, New Histories for Old: 
Changing Perspectives on Canada's Native Pasts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 66 at 78-79 (regarding 
documentary evidence that may support Borrows' historical claim). 
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recognition in the Chippewas of Sarnia case at the trial level, 136 but, in general, the Royal 
Proclamation continues to be interpreted as a stand-alone and unilateral legal 
instrument. 137 And although the Treaty of Niagara is recognized to be part of treaty 
history, Borrows' argument demands that indigenous law and perspectives be taken 
seriously as part of official history, even if in contradiction to historical evidence 
regarding the Crown's actions and motivations. Borrows' argument is not that the Crown 
viewed the Royal Proclamation's legal force as dependent on First Nations' consent at 
the Treaty of Niagara, but that the Royal Proclamation is not a legitimate source of 
Crown authority without their agreement. It is an argument that is simultaneously 
historical and legal: historical in its presentation of First Nations understandings of the 
Proclamation as embodied in the Treaty of Niagara, and legal in its argument that First 
N atiotis' understandings, premised on their own legal systems, are significant to the 
continuing normative import of the Proclamation. The issue of under-inclusion thus 
1361n his reasons on the summary judgment hearing, Justice Campbell wrote: "The Royal Proclamation was 
publicly advanced by the Crown to the Indians as the basis of its Indian policy. This declaration of policy, 
at first unilateral, soon came to be relied upon [by] the Indians and it became a mutually recognized and 
fundamental element of the treaty relationship" (Chippewas of Sarnia (trial), supra note 84). 
137 See, for e.g., the Court of Appeal's more muted statement in the same case: "After setting out its policy 
in the Royal Proclamation, the Crown took extraordinary steps to make the First Nations aware of that 
policy and to gain their support on the basis that the policy as set down in the Royal Proclamation would 
govern Crown-First Nations relations. In the summer of 1764, at the request of the Crown, more than 2,000 
First Nations chiefs representing some twenty-two First Nations, including chiefs from the Chippewa 
Nation, attended a Grand Council at Niagara ... The singular significance of the Royal Proclamation to the 
First Nations can be traced to this extraordinary assembly and the treaty it produced." (Chippewas of Sarnia 
Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), [2000] OJ No 4804 at para. 54, 195 DLR (4th) 135, [2001] I 
CNLR 56 (Ont CA)). See also Justice Linden's approach in the Report of the lpperwash Inquiry, vol. 2 
(2007) at 45-46, online: 
<http://www.attomeygeneral. jus. gov.on.ca/inguiries/ipperwash/report/vol 2/pdf/E Vol 2 CH03 .pdf.>. 
205 
shifts: Given the potential disagreements with Borrows' argument about the legal 
significance of the Treaty of Niagara, how and when should disagreements about the 
legal significance of that treaty be included within histories of treaties? 
This question highlights the difficulty separating the historical view from the legal 
view in this arena. The identification of treaties in history begins from a view of what 
treaties are. That view is likely informed by the historical record itself - what "appears" 
to be a treaty based on the parties reported actions and words at the time. If historicism is 
the goal, then historians should rely on the historical understanding of what treaties were, 
including their legal and political significance, at the time the agreement was forged. If 
the inquiry is sparked by a legal case, then the historical narrative will respond to what 
present legal standards demand of treaties. In either approach, however, views of what 
constitutes a treaty and its legal significance are ultimately filtered through or contrasted 
with ideas of treaty in the present. And in either the historical and present-day legal view 
of treaties, the question of "whose law?" and "whose history?" must be part of the 
inquiry, requiring attention to potential differences between what indigenous and Euro-
Canadian traditions identify as treaties as well as their content and import. 
Indigenous languages, as reviewed in the previous section, illustrate the legal 
aspect of the issue, particularly the resources within indigenous languages (presumably 
historical as well as contemporary) for describing different forms of agreement and 
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distinguishing between changeable and permanent aspects of treaty relationships. 138 Less 
examined is the variation and evolution of the meaning of treaties in English traditions. 
Patricia Seed notes that the word treaty in English "has an historically distinctive 
meaning compared to other European languages."139 Where in other European languages, 
treaty comes from the word meaning dealing with someone face to face or personally, 
English was alone in that 
treaty also signified writing. From the fourteenth century, when the word first 
appeared in English, until the middle of the seventeenth century, 'treaty' primarily 
meant a form of inscription: a story, narrative, written account, treating a subject 
in writing. As a result, any written agreement between two English subjects could 
and indeed was called a treaty, not just an agreement between states (Oxford 
English Dictionary). Hence, while the earliest written agreements between 
English colonists and Native Americans were called treaties, at the time this word 
simply referred to the fact that the agreement (between individuals) was written 
down. The 1621 pact between Massasoit, leader of the Pokanoket near the 
Plymouth colony, was labelled a treaty at the time. But that word does not 
necessarily mean an accord between nations or political authorities but only an 
agreement written on paper. 140 
Seed's observation confirms that the nature, or even presence, of polities behind 
seventeenth-century agreements cannot be assumed. Further, while the term treaty 
potentially signified differently in history, it was also not the only word used to describe 
what treaty surveys generally label as treaties today (although Miller takes care to bring 
in other descriptors - compacts, contracts and covenants). As noted earlier, the Hudson's 
Bay Company instructed its officers to form "compacts" and to purchase their lands and 
138 See discussion above, with text accompanying notes 36 to 41. 
139 Seed, supra note 66 at 20. 
140 Ibid. at 21. 
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rivers of the indigenous peoples they encountered in accordance with their traditions. If 
purchase was not possible, officers were instructed to at least secure a "league of 
friendship and peaceable cohabitation" and the freedom to trade. 141 Other seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century sources confirm that, in this era, the emphasis was on the desired 
relationship or aim - peace, amity, alliance, protection, friendship, trade, subjecthood -
rather than on the form of 'treaty' used to achieve it. 142 Later in fur trade country, the 
language of "settling a trade" described the seemingly more limited aims of the European 
trading companies when they sought out new trading partners and wanted to establish a 
trading post within their territories. 143 
Because the word 'treaty' carries status in international and domestic law, both 
historically and contemporarily, the inclusive approach advocated for in this paper raises 
concerns about spreading that status thin and miscommunicating the legal significance of 
an agreement by artificially labeling all forms of agreements as treaties. 144 There is merit 
to considering what moments of agreement 'deserve' the label treaty from both historical 
and contemporary perspectives. The aim of this discussion, however, is to make sure the 
variations within the different cultural and temporal conceptions of treaties -between 
141 
"Letter to John Nixon" (21 May 1680) in See E.E. Rich, ed., Copy-book of Letters Outward &c. Begins 
29th May, 1680 Ends 5 July, 1687 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1948) at 9 and "Letter to John Bridgar" 
( 15 May 1682) in ibid at 36. 
142 See Mark Walters discussion of terms used in statutes from colonial America: Mark D. Walters, 
"Mohegan Indians v Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and 
Government in British North America" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L. J. 785 [Walters, "Mohegan"] at 793-
795. 
143 See Promislow, "It would only be just", supra note 98 for discussion of the terms of settling a trade 
under the North West Company, which had no British colonial mandate comparable to the HBC. 
144 For discussion see Boast, supra note 117 and Martinez, UN Report, supra note 110. 
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fixed and variable agreements or aspects of agreements; between peace, alliance, and 
subjecthood; between written and oral - are accommodated within surveys of treaty-
making experience. Such debates belong within treaty histories, but should not set 
boundaries around the proper field of inquiry or preemptively situate a given agreement 
within a particular category of treaties. 
The second question, "whose history?" should also give us pause. Up to this point 
in the paper I have blithely assumed readers would understand my references to 'history' 
to mean 'academic history'. Academic history is by no means a narrow field. It has been 
broadened by new methodologies such as ethnohistory and the value of historicist 
expositions of the past have been challenged by intellectual movements, such as post-
structuralism, sub-altem and post-colonial and settler-colonial studies, as well as the 
emergence of memory, all of which question the scope for objectivity, attack positivist 
methodologies, and challenge the dominant linear, pointillist concept of time. 145 Oral 
histories (not indigenous oral histories specifically) have played a significant role in these 
developments in democratizing the field of history, allowing for ground-up perspectives 
145 See discussion in Richard White, "Using the Past: History and Native American Studies" in Russell 
Thornton, ed., Studying Native America: Problems and Prospects (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1998) 217; Gabrielle M. Spiegel, "Memory and History: Liturgical Time and Historical Time" 
(2002) 41:2 History and Theory 149 [Speigel]; Edward Cavanagh, "History, Time and the Indigenist 
Critique" (2012) 37 Arena Journal 16 [Cavanagh, "History"]; and Bain Attwood, "In the Age of 
Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, "Distance," and Public History" (2005) 20 Public Culture 75 
[Attwood]. It should be noted that within academic history, there is also a strong tradition of 
acknowledging the non-positivist nature of historical interpretation and the influence or incorporation of the 
present within historical inquiry even if such approaches do not answer post-structural critiques; see, e.g., 
Lawrence Stone, "History and Post-modernism, Ill" ( 1992) 135 Past and Present 189; and Edward Carr, 
What is History (New York: Vintage Books, 1961). 
209 
to also be viewed as authoritative. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has explained, the discipline of 
history is only one way among many of remembering the past. 146 Of particular interest 
for our purposes are the different temporalities contained within different approaches to 
history. Memory and many forms of oral history emphasize experience and the presence 
of the past today, while academic or traditional historical scholarship insists on drawing a 
line, on keeping "the past in the past."147 The historicism of academic history demands an 
exploration of the specificity of the past as a 'foreign country', which boasts the 
advantage of having "a greater capacity than 'memory' to provide other ways of seeing 
the world." 148 
Reliance on indigenous oral histories attracts and exemplifies these debates and 
concerns. Like memory as a historical discipline, the reliability of indigenous oral 
histories, particularly the potential or tendency of oral histories to "telescope" 
chronologies, has been challenged in both academic and legal forums. But, as many have 
pointed out, there are many forms of recalling the past caught by the term 'oral history', 
and they are not all equal in how they remember the past or in their sense of 
historicism. 149 Nevertheless, indigenous oral histories often exhibit a different truth claim 
146 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe Postcolonial Though and Historical Difference (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
147 Speigel, supra note 145 at 149. 
148 Attwood, supra note 145 at 90. 
149 Bruce Granville Miller, Oral History on Trial. Recognizing Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 26 [B Miller]; Julie Cruikshank, "Oral Tradition and Oral History: 
Reviewing Some Issues" (1999) 3 Canadian Historical Review 403; and Val Napoleon, "Delgamuukw: A 
Legal Straightjacket for Oral Histories?" (2005) 20 Canadian J. of Law & Society 123. 
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than those put forward by traditional academics history. In particular, oral traditions are 
similar to law in that they often involve an element of moral evaluation as part and parcel 
of the claims of historical truth. 150 
iii. Better approaches to treaty histories? 
Above, I canvassed problems in survey presentations of treaty history in Canada, 
and argued that treaty histories should be inclusive of more eras and geography as well as 
different historical methodologies and legal traditions. I have emphasized that in order to 
move beyond colonial perspectives in treaty-histories, typologies and chronologies must 
not obscure ongoing disputes regarding treaty meanings. By contrast, I have presented 
disputed meanings as central to Canada's treaty-making experience - a corrective on 
legally-oriented narratives that emphasize treaties as settled forms of coexistence, the true 
meanings of which just need to be recovered in the present. I have also argued that fur 
trade history and the explosion of contemporary quasi-treaties also belong in our overall 
picture of treaty history, even if not all agreements in such environments merit the legal 
status of treaties on their own. From such starting points, treaties become a matter of 
150 Napoleon argues that what is in issue in courts' problematic reception in courts is the presence of two 
competing legal systems (Napoleon, ibid). In court settings, oral histories are treated as (problematic) 
forms of history not law. Bruce Miller draws a different connection between truth in oral history and truth 
in law. He note similarities between legal standards of objectivity in fact-finding (particularly the 
reasonable man) and some forms of oral history in that they both rely on a community standard employed 
in determining the 'truth' (8. Miller, ibid at 37-8). See also Lori Ann Roness and Kent McNeil "Legalizing 
Oral History: Proving Aboriginal Title in Canadian Courts" (2000) 39 Journal of the West 6, who discuss 
the difficulties of introducing oral evidence to support aboriginal rights claims in court in light of the 
structural and cultural limitations of court processes that cannot properly accommodate the cosmologies 
that inform oral histories. 
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incremental agreement, an iterative process of arriving at a working relationship and 
adjusting to changes of circumstance. Bringing such approaches into surveys of treaty-
making would better align survey histories with the constitutional narratives described in 
the first section, and would also provide a more accurate and fulsome picture of the 
experience of treaty-making in Canada over time. 
With an account of treaties grounded in an iterative development of relationships 
and arrangements for co-existence, we can imagine a different organizing principle for 
attempting to encapsulate our treaty history in short, survey forms. Within a continuum of 
treaty-making, what distinguishes some treaties or agreements from others is the degree 
of departure from previous relationships and agreements. The question to ask in 
classifying the nature of a treaty is whether it was a turning point or a continuation of the 
relationship. Dorothy Jones provided this sort of analysis in her assessment of eighteenth-
century American treaties, noting that by mid-century, there were two primary forms of 
agreement: "belligerency treaties .... in which the chief purpose was to mark the end of 
hostilities by exchanging prisoners and so on; and accommodation treaties, in which the 
terms of coexistence were given formal expression."151 In other words, the treaties either 
changed the nature of the relationship by arriving at terms of peace, or the treaties 
clarified and supported the peaceful coexistence that was already in place. 
151 Jones, License, supra note 66 at 93. 
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Such an approach does not imply that categorization along such lines would be 
easy. The historical experts in the Marshall litigation, for example, disagreed on exactly 
this question. Relying more on Mi'kmaq perspectives, William Wicken argued that in the 
context of the relationship between the Mi'kmaq and the British, the 1760-61 treaty in 
issue in the case must be interpreted in relation to the terms of an earlier treaty from 
1726. 152 His argument was that the 1760-61 agreements were a renewal of the 1726 one. 
Stephen Patterson argued the opposite. Relying more on documentary evidence, he 
argued that the 1760-61 treaties renewed Mi'kmaq-British relations; that along with 
hostilities between 1726 and 1760, the 1760-61 treaties terminated and replaced the 
earlier agreement. 153 The 1 726 treaty was still relevant in his argument, but as a baseline 
against which change can be evaluated. Such disagreements are productive, suggesting 
that how to organize and give a birds-eye view of treaty histories may be contentious. An 
approach based on questions of continuity and change highlights that how one defines the 
relevant context and baseline for a given treaty will impact its interpretation. It also 
emphasizes that, regardless of whether a given agreement is better characterized as a 
renewal of terms of coexistence or a new or sharper reorganization of the terms of 
coexistence, the arrangements that were in place before matter. Under such an approach, 
surveys may not be able to give very much shape to treaty histories, but they would better 
152 Wicken, Mi'kmaq Treaties, supra note 77, chptr 9. 
153 Stephen E. Patterson, "Anatomy of a Treaty: Nova Scotia's First Native Treaty in Historical Context" 
(1999) 48 UNB Law J 41 at 62-63. For a discussion of this academic disagreement, see Douglas C Harris, 
"Historians and Courts: R. v. Marshall and Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial" (2003) 18 Can. J. L. & Soc'y 123 at 
124-5 [Harris, "Historians and Courts"]. 
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convey the complexity and remarkable continuity of treaty-making in Canada without the 
colonial hangover. 
3. Treaties in Law 
Judicial consideration of treaties can be divided into three areas of concern: the 
status of treaties as constitutional events and related status of treaties as creating legally 
enforceable obligations; the definition of treaties recognized in law; and the interpretive 
approach taken to identifying treaty obligations that are, since 1982, protected as treaty 
rights. This section will discuss each of these dimensions of treaties in law in tum, 
beginning with the status of treaties as constitutional events, but with some unavoidable 
overlap between the three issues. The first dimension requires attention to doctrinal legal 
history, including debates about the enforceability of treaties at law. As Paul McHugh 
states, the task of the legal historian (with a historicist aim) goes beyond a sketch of what 
became the dominant doctrinal view: 
Rather than having a monolithic and unified presence, law in the past (as law 
today) had a social and cultural setting that comprised and encompassed 'many 
legalities' that were dynamic sites of iteration and contestation, a collection of 
possibilities shaped by context, rather than chiselled finality. Legal 'truth' existed 
no more in the past, than it does in our present. The disinterested legal historian's 
task, then, is to capture the set of legalities as they occurred in the past, or, in 
other words, to describe the historical framework of legal argumentation. 154 
154 Paul G. McHugh, "The Politics of Historiography and the Taxonomies of the Colonial Past: Law, 
History and the Tribes" in Anthony Musson & Chantal Stebbings, eds., Making legal History: Approaches 
and Methodologies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 164 at 194-5. 
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Thus, although First Nations positions are easily overlooked in this history since they had 
no hand in the key federalism cases that determined the (non)status of treaties as 
constitutional events and had poor access to the justice system more generally, this 
history will endeavour to include their positions on the legality of treaties that have been 
expressed throughout Canadian history. 
We will then move on to the definition of treaties at law, as set out in more recent 
cases considerings 88 of the Indian Act. 155 Finally, this section of the paper will finish by 
considering how courts interpret treaty rights. The aim is to bring these discussions 
together, along with the conclusions of the previous two sections to critique Canadian 
jurisprudence in light of its coherence with treaty histories and the potential of treaties to 
ground a post-colonial constitutionalism. 
i. Treaties and sovereignty: Treaties as constitutional event, the doctrinal history version 
As discussed in the first section, treaties are important to scholars concerned with 
a more secure and just legal foundation for Canadian sovereignty than colonial doctrines. 
These scholars illustrate what the law could be, a vision that does not necessarily accord 
with the current or past state of the law. To arrive at those visions and consider how 
treaty jurisprudence contributes to such aims, it seems important to consider the 
characterizations of the significance of treaties available at law, characterizations that 
155 The Indian Act, RSC 1985, c 1-5 [Indian Act]. 
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have only occasionally hinted that treaties might have a constitutional character that is 
"integral to the very fabric of Canada." 156 
The doctrinal treatment of the status and significance of treaties follows a path 
that is similar to the legal history of aboriginal title as well as stages in the development 
of Imperial common law and international law. In a familiar arc, the dominant view of 
treaties in British North America moves from some degree of legal enforceability in the 
pre-modern period, to non-justiciable political acts by the late-nineteenth or early-
twentieth century, and then returns to justiciability in the second half of the twentieth 
century. It is, to be clear, a legal history of Imperial and colonial character. Although 
principles that direct a generous and liberal interpretation of treaties in favour of Indian 
nations appear to be almost as old as treaty litigation itself,1 57 it is only in the post-1982 
era that Canadian courts have made indigenous perspectives - and potentially, indigenous 
law - relevant to treaty interpretation and aboriginal rights more generally. But the 
(colonial) legal history is far from uniform in its consideration of treaties with indigenous 
peoples and the historical path is not as neat as I have just described. 
156 Gordon Christie, "Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation" (2000-2001) 26 Queen's Law J. 143 at 
15 5 [Christie]. 
157 In the first level arbitration decision on the Ontario v Canada (Annuities Case) (1895), 25 SCR 434, 
[1895] SCJ No 96 (QL) [Annuities Case, SCC, cited to QL] for example, Chancellor Boyd relied on 
McLean J's concurring reasons in Worcester v Georgia, (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515 [Worcester v Georgia], 
in which McLean J stated that "[t]he language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to 
their prejudice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain 
import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter sense" 
(at 582). This principle was generally accepted by the courts in the two appeals from the arbitration 
decision, although not its applicability in this dispute between Ontario and Canada. 
216 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, when the law of nations had not yet 
settled into its later fixations on the state and territorial sovereignty, Indian nations in 
North America were generally conceived as having some status and rights amongst 
nations albeit not the same status and rights as Christian nations. 158 Influenced by the 
developing law of nations, British colonial practice involved treaty-making with 
indigenous peoples in North America, which, in this period, assumed that indigenous 
peoples had the necessary political sovereignty to do so. British assertions of territorial 
sovereignty (primarily against other European powers) were not assumed to bring 
indigenous peoples under British governance, relying instead on treaty-making to achieve 
alliances and set the form of any imperium asserted over Indians in accordance with their 
consent. 159 Corresponding to the multiple forms of treaties in the eighteenth century 
noted in the previous sections, treaties thus defined the degree of jurisdiction or 
protectorship the British colony acquired over the Indian nation, or determined whether 
the nation maintained its political independence within or outside of the colony's 
boundaries. 160 Litigation testing the juridical quality and bindingness of treaties in this 
period demonstrates a full range of argument about the status of Indian nations, their law 
158 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2d ed. (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 19, 
citing Vitoria and Grotius. For a brief discussion of some of the theorists and scholarship, see Craig Bryan 
Yirush, "Claiming the New World: Empire, Law and Indigenous Rights in the Mohegan Case, 1704-1743" 
(2011) 29 Law and History Review 333 at 335-339 [Yirush]. 
159 See Paul G Mc Hugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law. A History of Sovereignty, Status and 
Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) [McHugh, Aboriginal Societies] at 102-3. 
160 Ibid. at 99. McHugh notes that the nature of the relationships found in early American colonies might 
have more to do with native forms than English ones. 
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and their lands. As Craig Yirush remarks in relation to his examination of the Mohegan 
Indians v Connecticut (1705-1773), the Mohegan's legal fight against their dispossession 
~reated a record of a "complex trans-Atlantic debate about indigenous rights in the 
eighteenth-century British world [encompassing] ... concrete disagreements over the 
ownership of land in America, the binding nature of treaties, and the locus of authority in 
the empire." 161 
Treaties in this early era contributed to the British acquisition of sovereignty by 
bringing tribes into peaceful relations with colonies, enabling acquisitions and further 
acquisitions of land, and sometimes bringing the tribes under British imperium. But 
treaties did not generally confirm or establish British sovereignty in one fell swoop. The 
famous decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v Georgia is considered to 
epitomize the pre-modern legal view of the status of Indian nations and nature of treaties: 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political 
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors 
of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by 
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other 
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region 
claimed; and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on 
themselves, as well as on the Indians ... The words "treaty" and "nation" are 
words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative 
proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. 
We have applied them to Indians as we have applied them to the other nations of 
the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense. 162 
161 Yirush, supra note 158 at 339. See also Walters, "Mohegan", supra note 142. 
162 Worcester v Georgia, supra note 157 at 559-60. 
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Thus American Indian tribes were recognized as political communities who relinquished 
some but not all of their sovereignty through treaties. 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 confirmed the existing British policy and 
practice of treaty-making to accomplish surrenders of lands from an Indian band or 
nation. Treaties also remained instruments through which relationships of alliance were 
formed or affirmed. But as settler pressures grew in the nineteenth century, and as the law 
of nations and British imperialism shifted under the influence of the emerging positivism, 
so did judicial treatments of treaties. Tribes lost their status on the international stage and 
were no longer recognized as having the capacity to enter into international treaties. 163 
Further, the rights of the European discoverer shifted from Chief Justice Marshall's 
interpretation of achieving only territorial claims against other European powers that had 
to be completed through war or treaties of cession, to achieving full territorial rights upon 
which the property rights of prior inhabitants persisted only by the goodwill of the Crown 
(until protected by legislation), rendering treaties as a matter of pragmatics and policy 
rather than law. 164 The judicial reflection of these shifts is illustrated by Prendergast CJ's 
reasons in New Zealand in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington in 1877. 165 There, he 
referred to the Treaty of Waitangi as a "simple nullity" in regards to construing the treaty 
163 Anaya, supra note 158 at 30, citing Westlake. 
164 P McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, supra note 159. 
165 (1877), 3 NZ Jur (NS) Sc 72. Wi Parata also denied the existence of any customary native title. After Wi 
Parata, the Privy Council overturned part of this case to hold that an enforceable native title claim existed 
against the Crown under the Native Rights Act in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, [1901] AC 561. For an 
overview, see John Tate, "Tamihana Korokai and Native Title: Healing the Imperial Breach" (2005) 13 
Waikato L Rev 108. 
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as a cession of Maori sovereignty, given his view that "[n]o body politic existed capable 
of making cession of sovereignty, nor could the thing itself exist. So far as the proprietary 
rights of the natives are concerned, the so-called treaty merely affirms the rights and 
obligations which,jure gentium, vested in and devolved upon the Crown under the 
circumstances of the case."166 
These shifts made themselves known in Canadian jurisprudence in the late 
nineteenth century, at first through the federalism disputes between Ontario and the 
federal government. Lord Watson's seminal reasons in St. Catherine's Milling v The 
Queen 167 equated Treaty 3 with a contract that accomplished the surrender of the 
Ojibway's "personal and usufructory" property rights, allowing the Crown's "substantial 
and paramount estate" to become a plenum dominium. 168 Lord Watson then reprised his 
role of articulating lasting principles of Canadian aboriginal law in the Annuities Case, 169 
in which he described the annuities provisions of the Robinson treaties in issue as not 
conveying a right, but rather as a mere "promise and agreement, which was nothing more 
than a personal obligation by its governor, as representing the old province [of Upper 
Canada], that the latter should pay the annuities as and when they become due." 170 
166 Wi Parata, ibid. at 78. 
167 St. Catherine's Milling v Ontario (Attorney General) (1888), 14 App Cas 46, [1888] JCJ No l(QL) 
[cited to QL]. 
168 Ibid. at para 6. 
169 Ontario v Canada (Annuities Case), [1897] AC 199, [1896] JCJ No 4 (QL) [Annuities Case, PC, cited to 
QL]. 
170 Ibid. at para 17. 
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Finally, in the 1929 case of R v Syliboy, 171 Patterson J brought Lord Watson's approach 
together with the removal of indigenous political personality from international law to 
dismiss the enforceability of the Mi'kmaq Treaty of 1752. He dismissed the Mi'kmaq's 
argument that the continuing rights to hunt and fish found in the terms of the 1752 Treaty 
protected them from provincial regulations based on the Mi'kmaq's lack of capacity to 
enter into a treaty as a people, 172 adding, for good measure, that the Treaty of 1752 "was 
not a treaty at all; ... it [was] at best a mere agreement made by the Governor and a 
handful oflndians", thus branding treaties as a form of political agreement that was 
unenforceable at law. 173 
In all of these cases, and in contrast to the earlier era epitomized by Worcester v 
Georgia, the Crown's full territorial sovereignty, imperium and dominium, was assumed 
to be complete both in law and in fact. 174 On these assumptions, treaties were not 
required to secure the Crown's assertions or to bring indigenous peoples in British North 
America under the Crown's jurisdiction. Instead, treaties (and land rights) became 
understood as an expression of goodwill. As executive policy, indigenous rights could 
thus be altered when the will of the executive changed (unless secured by legislation). 
171 R v Syliboy, [1929] 1 DLR 307, [1928] NSJ No 8 (QL) (N.S. Co. Ct) [Syliboy cited to QL]. For 
discussion, see William C. Wicken, The Colonization of Mi'kmaw Memory and History, 1794-1928. The 
King v Gabriel Sylliboy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) [Wicken, Colonization] and 
Macklem, supra note 3 at 138-139. 
172 Patterson J also found that the Governor lacked capacity to treat on behalf of the Crown as a result of 
not having the appropriate delegation of powers from Great Britain (ibid. at para 24 ). 
173 Ibid. at para 23. 
174 See, e.g., Gwynne J: Annuities Case, SCC, supra 157 (in dissent). 
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In spite of these characterizations, it is too much of a leap to suggest that treaties 
were not justiciable in Canada through the nineteenth century; that the executive's 
"personal" goodwill and subsequent actions could not give rise to legally (or equitably) 
enforceable obligations. In some cases, it seems that the courts in Canada assumed that 
treaties were enforceable as some form of trust. For example, in the Annuities Case, the 
focus was on whether the obligation lay with the federal government, as the Supreme 
Court majority and Privy Council held, or had passed with the lands in issue to the 
province of Ontario under s 109 of the British North America Act, 1867, as the dissenters 
and original arbitrators had found. While the treaty promise was characterized as a 
"personal obligation" taken on by the governor representing the Province of Canada, the 
political trusts cases were not relied on and the enforceability of that form of promise by 
the First Nations was not in issue. 175 Indeed, if the obligation was one that could be 
ignored by the governments, there would have been no need to litigate. The assumption 
that treaty rights were to be respected was also evidenced in the negotiations around the 
Natural Resource Transfer Agreements of the 1930s, in which the Crown's ownership of 
lands and resources was transferred from the federal Crown to the western provincial 
Crowns to align their provincial status with that of the original members of 
Confederation. Each of those transfers included a provision protecting treaty hunting 
175 It is worth noting that all of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada assumed that the annuities 
provisions of the Robinson Treaties would be honoured, with principles of equity and trusts figuring 
prominently in their construction of the nature of the Indian interest stemming from the treaty (Annuities 
Case, SCC, ibid.). 
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rights, thereby effecting the first constitutionalization of treaty rights in Canada, 176 giving 
rise to rights that were upheld in regulatory prosecutions soon after. 177 
Dreaver v The King, 178 a case from 1935, marks another point at which a treaty 
was found to be legally enforceable. In this case, the federal Exchequer Court enforced 
the medicine chest provisions of Treaty 6, holding the federal government liable as 
trustee for medically related and other expenses it had charged back to the First Nations' 
accounts. Later in the twentieth century, enforceability of treaties became framed as a 
matter of contract. In the 1979 case, Pawis v The Queen, 179 Ojibway fishers charged with 
violating Ontario fisheries regulations defended themselves (and lost) by claiming the 
regulations were a breach of treaty obligations under the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850. 
The federal court rejected framing the issue as one of trusts, reading the Annuities Case 
through the line of Imperial "political trust" cases in which the trusts are admitted but 
unenforceable at law. 180 The court was willing to contemplate damages for a breach of 
176 Albeit a modified form of those rights, since the wording of the NRTAs has been held to have 
extinguished any commercial hunting rights and expanded the scope of those rights to beyond treaty 
territories to all unoccupied Crown lands within the province: R v. Horseman, [1990] 1 SCR 901at933. 
For discussion see Frank Tough, "The Forgotten Constitution: The Natural Resources Transfer Agreements 
and Indian Livelihood Rights, ca. 1925-1933" (2004) 41 Alberta L Rev 999 and Kerry Wilkins, "Unseating 
Horseman: Commercial Harvesting Rights and the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements" (2007) 12 
Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d' etudes constitutionne l les 13 5. 
177 R v. Wesley (1932), 26 Alta LR 433, [1932] 4 DLR 774, 1932 CarswellAlta 20 (WL) [cited to WL] . 
McGillivray JA also commented on the enforceability of treaty rights at law at paras 57-61. 
178 Dreaver v The King, ( 1935) 5 CNLC 92 (Exchequer Court). In the later 1966 case of Johnston v The 
Queen, (1966), 56 DLR (2d) 749, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal did not treat the medicine chest 
provision generously but nevertheless accepted a contractual model of interpretation that assumed the 
enforceability of treaty provisions against the Crown. 
179 (1979), 102 DLR (3d) 602 (FCTD). See Macklem, supra note 3 at 140, regarding Pawis as a shift to the 
contractual view of treaties. 
180 See, e.g., Kinloch v The Secretary of State for India in Council (1881-82), 7 App Cas 619. 
223 
contract but ultimately held that such an action was unfounded in the case. Thus the 
Syliboy line of reasoning was applied to reinterpret the Annuities Case. Nevertheless, 
Dre aver illustrates that Syliboy' s influence as a precedent in the first half of the twentieth 
century was limited and that differences regarding the legal nature of treaty obligations 
persisted. 181 
Throughout this history, First Nations' perspectives on their treaty rights and 
obligations are not well expressed in the jurisprudence, 182 but it is certainly clear that they 
did not view the treaties as purely political and unenforceable at law. When opportunities 
presented themselves to press their concerns, they took them. For example, First Nations 
witnesses appeared before a special joint committee of Parliament and a 1946 Royal 
Commission to complain that their treaty rights and privileges were binding and were not 
being honoured. 183 Contestations also extend to what treaties accomplished. The Six 
Nations, for example, have steadfastly claimed they are not subjects of the Crown, 
disputing the Crown's view of the implications of their seventeenth- and eighteenth-
181 Indeed, legal commentary on Syliboy from 1929 disagrees with Patterson J's conclusions about the 
capacity of the parties to enter into the treaty: N.A.M. Mackenzie, "Case and Comment: Indians and 
Treaties in Law (Rex v Syliboy)" ( 1929) 8 Canadian Bar Review 561-568. However, Wicken notes that 
because Syliboy was decided just after Parliament restricted the ability of Indians to hire lawyers to pursue 
land claims, it had more significance. He also notes that at least in Nova Scotia, governments relied on 
Syliboy well into the 1970s (Wicken, Colonization, supra note 171 at 7 and 254, Footnote 6). In later cases, 
the decision in Syliboy was interpreted more narrowly, as limited to Patterson J's first finding that the treaty 
was made with a particular band of Mi'kmaq rather than applying to the whole tribe and therefore did not 
extend to encompass the defendant; see, e.g., R v Wesley (1975), 9 OR (2d) 524, 1975 CarswellOnt 452. 
182 See Wicken, ibid., for a book length treatment of the evolution of Mi'kmaq understandings of the 
eighteenth-century treaties. 
183 Canada, "Report of the Commission on Indian Affairs" No. 688 in Sessional Papers (1947) at 3-4, as 
cited by Kerry Wilkins, "'Still Crazy After All These Years': Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty" (2000) 
38 Alta L Rev 458 [Wilkins, "Still Crazy"] at 462, note 20. 
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century treaties. Their objections to the application of the Indian Act to their confederacy 
reached the courts in Logan v Styres 184 in 1959. They expected the Haldimand Deed of 
1784 and the Simcoe Deed of 1793 - documents that granted the Six Nations territory in 
southern Ontario for their loyalty to the British in the American war of independence - to 
support their claims. Instead, the Ontario High Court found that "by accepting the 
protection of the Crown" the Six Nations "then owed allegiance to the Crown and thus 
became subjects of the Crown."185 Contestations and deviations are as much part of this 
legal history as the main line of doctrine that took hold. 
Thus, in the early modern period (and later, in other parts of the British 
Empire 186), treaties were related to the process by which sovereignty was acquired, but in 
late nineteenth-century Canada, this connection was severed in the dominant line of 
judicial opinions. Sovereignty was viewed as complete without the contributions of 
indigenous peoples, and the primary significance of treaties at law was a gesture of 
political goodwill in ensuring a consensual basis for land surrenders, clearing the burden 
of aboriginal title from the otherwise full property rights of the Crown. 187 Under this line 
184 Logan v Styres (1959), 20 DLR (2d) 416, 1959 CarswellOnt 228 (WL) (Ont HC) [Logan cited to WL]. 
For discussion, see Darlene Johnston, "The Quest of the Six Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination" 
(1986) 44 Univ. of Toronto F. of L. Rev. 1 at 20-23. 
185 Logan, ibid. at para 16. Hamar Foster points out that the Court's move from protectorship to 
subjecthood was inconsistent with American precedent and international law principles: Hamar Foster, 
"Forgotten Arguments: Aboriginal Title and Sovereignty in Canada Jurisdiction Act Cases" (1992) 21 
Manitoba L. J. 343 at 345, footnote nine. 
186 See Kent McNeil, Common law Aboriginal Title (New York Oxford University Press, 1989) at 110-133 
for a discussion of treaties. in relation to judicial classifications of whether colonies were conquered, ceded 
or settled. 
187 McNeil, "Extinguishment", supra note 132. 
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of authorities, the treaties might still be understood as constitutional in character. It was 
simply an Austinian sense of constitutionalism, in which the command of the sovereign 
was law and the acquisition of territory and sovereignty through coercive forces was a 
fact of political life, beyond the purview of the rule oflaw. 188 Nevertheless, this line of 
cases should not eclipse the continuing presence of other constitutional traditions, 
represented in the presence of political and legal opinion that the Crown's gestures of 
"goodwill" were actionable and mandatory, and the persistence of indigenous advocacy 
for the enforcement and implementation of their understanding of the treaties. 
By the mid-twentieth century, the dominant judicial approach to treaties began to 
shift again. In 1951, the enforceability of treaties was partially solidified by section 87 
(later 88) of the Indian Act, a provision that extended the application of provincial law 
where it would otherwise not apply in light of federal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian 
Lands. 189 Section 88 makes treaties enforceable by also setting out an exception: the 
extension of provincial laws is subject to the terms of any treaty, thereby making treaties 
enforceable as against the application of provincial laws. Through the jurisprudence on 
section 88, a significant shift in the conceptualization of treaties occurred. In R v. 
188 Jeremy Webber, for example, discusses the political philosophy of Hume, who argues that all political 
authority is historically founded on force : Jeremy Webber, "The Meanings of Consent" in Jeremy Webber 
and Colin M. Macleod, Between Consenting Peoples. Political Community and the Meaning of Consent 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 3 at 3-5 [Webber, "Consent"]. 
189 Under s 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (titled the British North America Act, 1867 before 1982). 
See generally Kerry Wilkins, '"Still Crazy After All These Years': Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty" 
(2000) 38 Alberta Law Review 458 [Wilkins, "Still Crazy"]. 
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Simon, 190 the Supreme Court relegated Syliboy to an artifact of an earlier and outdated set 
of colonial attitudes. The Court moved past this precedent by correcting the capacity 
issues raised by Patterson J and differentiating Crown-aboriginal treaties from 
international treaties by identifying them as sui generis. 191 The sui generis approach 
recognizes the capacity of Indian nations to have entered treaties as political communities 
within the state, but it does not resurrect the American line of authorities (i.e., Worcester 
v Georgia) to address how treaties relate to the acquisition of sovereignty. If anything, the 
sui generis status of treaties in Canada muddied the sovereignty waters. 192 
The introduction of s. 35 in 1982 gave constitutional force to treaty rights and 
increased momentum towards settling longstanding grievances around the meaning and 
implementation of historic treaties. The phrasing of s. 35, however, focused legal 
attention on particular terms and promises in a manner that avoids the more difficult 
questions around the role of treaties in the formation of the Canadian state. In other 
words, the constitutionalization of treaty rights has not addressed the constitutional status 
of treaties themselves. The Supreme Court has only broached this issue in relation to its 
articulation of a constitutional duty to consult and accommodate aboriginal peoples, and 
190 R v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387 [Simon]. 
191 /bid at para 33. 
192 Some commentators view the sui generis status of treaties (and aboriginal rights more generally) as 
potentially helpful in understanding treaties as a product of both British and indigenous legal traditions. 
See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 18 and John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of 
Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta LR 9. For a contrasting view, see Michael 
Coyle, "Marginalized", supra note 43. 
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then only in passing. In the seminal 2004 decision, Haida Nation v British Columbia, 193 
McLachlin CJ commented that 
[t]reaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed 
Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed bys 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 represents a promise ofrights 
recognition .... This promise is realized and sovereignty claims reconciled through 
the process of honourable negotiation. 194 
This comment, coupled with her attention to the difference between de facto and de Jure 
sovereignty (another first in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence), situates treaties as the 
key process by which Crown sovereignty may finally be part of a rule of law that 
encompasses both indigenous and European legal traditions. 195 Thus, Haida Nation offers 
a crack in the door of Canada's constitutional origins which might permit the significance 
of treaties as "integral to the constitutional fabric of Canada" to finally be addressed as a 
matter of law and not just theory. 
ii. Defining treaties at law (domestic) 
Beyond judicial treatments of the constitutional significance of treaties and the 
interpretation of defining treaty rights, the way that Canadian courts have defined treaties 
193 Haida Nation v British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida Nation]. 
194 Ibid. at para 20. 
195 For commentary on this point see Mark D. Walters, "The Morality of Aboriginal Law" (2006) 31 
Queen's L. J. 470 at 513-516 [Walters, "Morality"]; Borrows, "Ground Rules", supra note 3; and Felix 
Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties. Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 
University of Saskatchewan, 2012). For discussion of the difference between dejure and defacto 
sovereignty more generally, see Kent McNeil, "The Meaning of Sovereignty", draft chapter (on file with 
author). 
228 
is also of interest in our multi-disciplinary survey. The s. 35 jurisprudence does not define 
treaties; the question of "what is a treaty" does not occur in a jurisprudence directed at 
particular promises or treaty terms. Instead, this question comes up in the jurisprudence 
around s. 88 of the Indian Act, where direct consideration of what qualifies as a treaty is 
necessary to determine when the exception to the application of provincial law applies. In 
this context, the Supreme Court has taken a remarkably broad approach to what may 
qualify as a treaty in law. 
Avoiding any overarching definition of treaties, the Court has explicitly rejected 
approaches based on subject matter, such as land cessions or peace and friendship. 
Instead, Lamer J (as he was then) stated in R v. Sioui that treaties are identified by "the 
intention to create obligations, the presence of mutually binding obligations and a certain 
measure of solemnity." 196 This broad approach draws directly from R. v. White and Bob, 
in which Norris J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated: 
In [s. 87; nows. 88] "Treaty" is not a word of art and in my respectful opinion, it 
embraces all such engagements made by persons in authority as may be brought 
within the term "the word of the white man" the sanctity of which was, at the time 
of British exploration and settlement, the most important means of obtaining the 
goodwill and co-operation of the native tribes and ensuring that the colonists 
would be protected from death and destruction. On such assurance the Indians 
relied. 197 
196Sioui, supra note 1 at 1044. See also, R. v. Simon, supra note 14. In Francis v the Queen, [ 1956] SCR 
618 the Court rejected international treaties such as the Jay Treaty from falling withins. 88's purview, but 
this does not limit such treaties from being considered under s. 35 (Mitchell v Minister of National 
Revenue, 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 SCR 911). 
197 R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 DLR (2d) 613 (BCCA) at 648-49, affd, (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481 (SCC). 
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Lamer J also adopted five factors extracted from the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision 
in R. v. Taylor and Williams 198 to guide the analysis of the historical context and the 
intent to make a treaty: 1) continuous exercise of a right in the past and at present; 2) the 
reasons why the Crown made a commitment; 3) the situation prevailing at the time the 
document was signed; 4) evidence of relations of mutual respect and esteem between the 
negotiators; and, 5) the subsequent conduct of the parties. 199 These factors incorporate 
attention to the parties' relationships and practices both before and after the agreement in 
issue into the identification of which treaty obligations are relevant at law, reflecting the 
directions emerging from the historical overview in the previous section. 200 
This approach to identifying treaties in the jurisprudence around section 88 
accords reasonably well with the breadth of treaty experience described in the section on 
treaties in history. It does not establish any barriers to arguing that a treaty was made 
regardless of the form of documentation. And it allows for the possibility that treaties 
198 R v Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 OR (2d) 360, [1981] 3 CNLR 114 [Taylor and Williams], Iv. to 
appeal dismissed, [1981] SCCA No. 377. 
199 Ibid. Adopted in Sioui, supra note 1 at 1045. In Taylor and Williams, these factors along with the 
principle of the honour of the Crown were part of the analysis of the binding character and scope of a treaty 
promises that was recorded in the minutes of the treaty negotiations but not in the terms of the treaty 
document. In R. v. Simon, the fifth factor was considered to determine whether the treaty was terminated or 
limited by subsequent hostilities. The Court held that the treaty was not terminated, finding that the Crown 
had not met its burden of proofregarding termination of the treaty (supra note 14 at para 34). 
200 The interpretation of the terms of the 1818 treaty in issue in Taylor and Williams involved dealing with 
several fur trade practices and expectations, including the meaning of the word "milk" and the easily 
misconstrued negotiation tropes of hunger and pity. On the former, see Bruce M. White, "'Give Us a Little 
Milk': The Social and Cultural Meaning of Gift Giving in the Lake Superior Fur Trade" (1982) 48 
Minnesota History 60. On the latter, see Mary Black-Rogers, "Varieties of 'Starving': Semantics and 
Survival in the Subarctic Fur Trade, 1750-1850" (1986) 33 Ethnohistory 354 and Promislow, "I bring thee 
merchandise", supra note 102. 
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evolved through the subsequent conduct of the parties. While the emphasis on the 
Crown's interests in making treaties in the five factors adopted in Sioui may tilt the 
approach to one side, the emphasis on the reliance of the aboriginal parties on the 
promises of the Crown in R. v. White and Bob provides a counter-point that potentially 
connects treaties to discussions of constitutional origins. Most importantly for this 
discussion, it is notable that the notion of a "common intention" between the parties 
regarding the content of particular treaty provisions - which, as we will see below, 
dominates s. 35 jurisprudence - is absent. Instead, mutuality is important only in regards 
to identifying an "intention to create obligations" and the presence of "mutually binding 
obligations," neither of which demands a finding of shared meaning with respect to the 
treaty itself or particular treaty promises. As will be discussed below, the focus on 
"common intention" ins. 35 treaty rights interpretation narrows the expansive approach 
to treaties that emerged from the s. 88 cases. 
iii. Defining treaty rights 
The introduction of s 35 through the Constitution Act, 1982 "recognized and 
affirmed" existing treaty rights, shifting the emphasis of treaty litigation towards the 
scope and nature of particular treaty promises (and once rights are established, whether 
government action infringing those rights can be justified). By this time, a principle of a 
generous and liberal interpretation of the words of statutes relating to Indians was already 
established, adopted from Worcester v Georgia as noted earlier (Annuities Case). In R v 
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Badger,201 Justice Cory summarized the gist of this longstanding interpretive stance as 
follows: 
Treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and any 
uncertainties, ambiguities or doubtful expressions should be resolved in favour of 
the Indians. In addition, when considering a treaty, a court must take into account 
the context in which the treaties were negotiated, concluded and committed to 
writing. The treaties, as written documents, recorded an agreement that had 
already been reached orally and they did not always record the full extent of the 
oral agreement .... The treaties were drafted in English by representatives of the 
Canadian government who, it should be assumed, were familiar with common law 
doctrines. Yet, the treaties were not translated in written form into the languages 
(here Cree and Dene) of the various Indian nations who were signatories. Even if 
they had been, it is unlikely that the Indians, who had a history of communicating 
only orally, would have understood them any differently. As a result, it is well 
settled that the words in the treaty must not be interpreted in their strict technical 
sense nor subjected to rigid modem rules of construction. Rather, they must be 
interpreted in the sense that they would naturally have been understood by the 
Indians at the time of the signing. 202 
One additional principle - the honour of the Crown - has also been brought forward from 
the nineteenth century and is relied on to slightly different effect from the above set of 
principles.203 Specifically, the honour of the Crown directs courts to avoid interpretations 
of treaty commitments that would give the appearance of "sharp dealing" on the part of 
the Crown. 
These well-established principles were last revisited in R. v. Marshall, a case that 
arguably re-focused treaty interpretation from the "generous and liberal" principles above 
to reconstructing a historical mutual intention as the aim of treaty rights interpretation. At 
201 [1996] 1 SCR 771 [Badger]. 
202 Ibid. at para 52. 
203 See, e.g., Norris JA in White and Bob, supra note 197; Gwynne J (dissenting) in the Annuities Case, 
supra note 17 5; and Cartwright J (dissenting) in R v George, [ 1966] SCR 267. 
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issue in Marshall was the truckhouse clause of a 1760-61 treaty and whether it provided 
the basis for a contemporary right to catch and sell fish. The text of the clause in issue 
was spartan, stating only that the Mi'kmaq promised to trade exclusively at the British 
truckhouses.204 The truckhouse system itself was replaced with a (less-expensive) system 
of licensed traders in 1762. The majority judgment, written by Binnie J., reached beyond 
the inadequacies of the written agreement. He drew from historical sources surrounding 
the negotiation of the 1760-61 treaty, such as Mi'kmaq negotiators' plea for the 
truckhouses to furnish them with their necessaries through trade, to support his 
conclusion that the negative covenant contained in the treaty (to trade only at British 
truckhouses) implied a positive Mi 'kmaq right to bring their goods to the truckhouse to 
trade for their necessaries and, consequently, to access the resources that were to be 
traded (in this case, eels). The treaty was thus found to support a modem right fish and to 
sell the products of such traditional activities up to the level of a moderate livelihood. 
Binnie J's judgment emphasized the idea ofreconstructing the parties' common 
intention from a broad view of the historical context of the treaty. He described the aim 
of treaty interpretation as follows: "The bottom line is the Court's obligation is to 'choose 
from among the various possible interpretations of the common intention [at the time the 
treaty was made] the one which best reconciles' the Mi' kmaq interests and those of the 
204 Available online: < http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100029046 > 
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British Crown."205 According to Binnie J, the inequities and differences that imbue this 
treaty history demand that the Court reach beyond the written treaty to imply terms to 
make "honourable sense" of the treaty and to interpret terms once they are found to exist. 
The honour of the Crown was thus critical to how Binnie J arrived at this interpretation. 
As he stated, "an interpretation of events that turns a positive Mi'kmaq trade demand into 
a negative Mi'kmaq covenant is [not] consistent with the honour and integrity of the 
Crown ... [T]he trade arrangement must be interpreted in a manner which gives meaning 
and substance to the promises made by the Crown. "206 Thus, whatever the historical 
intention of the Crown might have been at the time, Binnie J's reasons show that the 
honour of the Crown is capable of both limiting the availability of some interpretations as 
well as implying additional treaty terms, such as access to the resources and harvesting 
activities necessary to participate in the trade secured by the treaty. 
The dissenting opinion, written by McLachlin J (as she was then), accepted the 
trial judge's assessment of the evidence that the common intention was only to create a 
right to trade at truckhouses, not a general right to trade. This conclusion was based 
primarily on the wording of the treaty. McLachlin J favoured an interpretation that relied 
on the historical evidence that the truckhouse system fell into disuse soon after the treaty 
205 Marshall, supra note 76 at para 14 [emphasis in original]. The quote is from Lamer Jin Sioui (supra 
note 92). Interestingly, Lamer J made those comments to introduce a check on the liberal interpretation 
principles that favour First Nations: "Even a generous interpretation of the document, such as Bisson J.A.'s 
interpretation, must be realistic and reflect the intention of both parties, not just that of the Hurons. The 
Court must choose from among the various possible interpretations of the common intention the one which 
best reconciles the Hurons' interests and those of the conqueror" (Sioui, ibid. at 1069) 
206 Marshall, supra note 76 at para 52. 
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so as to render the treaty right to trade obsolete. She claimed that Binnie J's approach 
transformed a "specific right agreed to by both parties into an unintended right of broad 
and undefined scope."207 In spite of their different interpretations of the facts, however, 
McLachlin and Binnie JJ purported to apply the same interpretive principles and 
McLachlin J's nine-point version of the principles is often cited as authoritative.208 
While there appears to be a high degree of judicial consensus about the principles 
of treaty interpretation, the honour of the Crown principle retains an open-ended quality 
that is not surprising given differences in judicial deployment. In Badger, for example, 
Cory J indicated that the integrity of the Crown requires an assumption "that the Crown 
intends to fulfill its promises" and that "[n]o appearance of 'sharp dealing' will be 
sanctioned. "209 This version of the principle is potentially more limited than Binnie J's 
version in Marshall, where the honour of the Crown ensures that promises have 
"meaning and substance." In Cory J's version, the honour of the Crown ensures that 
promises, presumably identified and defined through the other interpretive principles, are 
fulfilled. Thus, the honour of the Crown might bar an interpretation of treaty promises as 
short-term obligations where such promises were delivered with assurances of the 
treaty's longevity- even if a short-term commitment was all the Crown intended or 
expected. By contrast, Binnie J's version the honour of the Crown may inform the 
207 Ibid at para 102. 
208 Ibid. at para 78. 
209 Badger, supra note 201 at para 41. See also Haida Nation, supra note 193 at para 20. 
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content of those promises; as illustrated in Marshall, the principle can ground the 
identification of adjunct rights that were not explicitly promised in the treaty record.210 
Apart from this difference, however, the treaty interpretation principles are well-
established and apparently uncontroversial. 
Academic evaluations of Marshall were, for the most part, cautiously optimistic: 
the principles contained the necessary ingredients for recognizing the "spirit and intent" 
of the treaties beyond the treaty text.211 As Mark Walters commented: "Marshall is 
premised upon the idea that treaties with aboriginal nations are not documents or written 
instruments but rather are relationships - or, more precisely, they represent a shared 
understanding of and commitment to a normative framework for cross-cultural 
relationships."212 One of the reasons for this cautious optimism was the decision's 
clarification that extrinsic evidence, such as oral history or other records relating to the 
context of negotiation, may be used to assist in all cases of treaty interpretation, rather 
than only where the court found ambiguity in the written treaty. Indeed, the principles are 
flexible enough to treat the text as more or less central to the interpretation of the treaty, 
as the historical circumstances require. 
21° For an argument that Binnie J's application of the honour of the Crown went too far in Marshall, see 
Robert Normey, "Angling For "Common Intention": Treaty Interpretation in R. v. Marshall" (2000) 63 
Sask L Rev 645 [Normey]. 
211 See, e.g., Leonard I. Rotman, "Marshalling Principles From The Marshall Morass" (2000) 23 Dalhousie 
L J 5 and Catherine Bell & Karin Buss, "The Promise of Marshall on the Prairies: A Framework for 
Analyzing Unfulfilled Treaty Promises" (2000) 63 Sask L Rev 667. For a contrasting view of Marshall as a 
continuation of a status quo incapable of arriving at the true spirit and intent of the treaties, see Gordon 
Christie, "Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation" (2000-2001) 26 Queen's L J 143. 
212Mark D Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain. Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History 
After Marshall" (2001) 24 Dalhousie L J 75 at 78 [Walters, "Covenant Chain"]. 
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Since Marshall, the Supreme Court has reiterated these principles and emphasis 
on determining a historically pinpointed common intention as the baseline for defining 
treaty rights.213 However, as the gulf between Binnie and McLachlin JJ's interpretations 
in Marshall illustrates, these well-established interpretive principles do not constrain 
judicial interpretation in application. In R. v. Bernard; R v Marshall, 214 for example, the 
interpretation of the same truck.house clause from Marshall was again in issue, but this 
time in relation to logging rather than fishing rights. While the primary significance of 
this case is the discussion of aboriginal title, the quick work of the Court in dismissing 
the treaty claim is of interest for present purposes. The claim was that the truck.house 
clause supported trading rights in relation to the products of any Mi'kmaq traditional 
harvesting activities. The counter-argument was that the clause supported trading rights 
only in relation to items traded at the time of the treaty. The evidence showed that 
although the Mi 'kmaq used wood, they did not conduct much or any trade in forest 
products at the time of the treaty (distinguishing the case from Marshall). McLachlin 
CJ's majority reasons refer briefly to the historical context of alliance surrounding the 
treaty, but strongly rely on the words of the treaty itself in siding with the Crown and 
rejecting the claim: "This [interpretation] is supported by the wording of the truck.house 
clause. It speaks only of trade ..... Nothing in these words comports a general right to 
213 See, e.g., R v Morris, 2006 SCC 59, [2006] 2 SCR 915 at para 18. 
214R. v Bernard; R v Marshall, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220 [Bernard; MarshalfJ. 
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harvest or gather all natural resources then used."215 Text, not relationship, defined the 
scope of the inquiry. Moreover, the text-driven approach ensures that, at their core, treaty 
rights represent historical moments of common intention as determined by the courts, 
whether supported by historical opinion or not. The constitutional significance of treaties 
is thus also conveyed through these artificial moments of consent, a significance that 
stands in sharp contrast to the process-oriented constitutional narratives that give consent 
an aspirational quality. 
Post-Marshall decisions in lower courts also demonstrate a stubbornly text-driven 
approach to interpretation. In Benoit v Canada,216 Victor Buffalo, and Ermineskin Indian 
Band v Canada, 217 for example, the plaintiffs' claims of treaty rights based on oral 
promises (as opposed to terms in the treaty text) were rejected. The treatment of oral 
tradition evidence in these cases is an important aspect of these results. In Victor Buffalo, 
for example, Teitelbaum J preferred the Crown historical expert's approach of using oral 
history evidence as one of many sources or as a check on text in reconstructing "a real 
past independent of what people presently believe it to be,"218 and generally preferred 
written historical accounts over oral tradition as a matter of assessing the weight to be 
215/bid. at para. 20. For a critical discussion of the treaty claim, see John McEvoy, "Treaty Rights and a 
Treaty Table" (2006) 55 UNB L J I 05. 
216 Canada v Benoit, 2003 FCA 236, 228 DLR (4th) 1 [Benoit]. 
217Ermineskin Indian Bandv. Canada, 2005 FC 1623 [Ermineskin], affd 2009 SCC 9, [2009] 1 SCR 222. 
There was no discussion of oral history evidence at the Supreme Court. 
218 Victor Buffalo, supra note 134 at para 454, quoting the Crown's historical expert Dr. von Gemet. Dr. 
von Gemet's approach to working with oral traditions was also accepted by the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Benoit, supra note 216. 
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attributed to the different sources of evidence. As Teitelbaum J noted, such an approach 
is consistent with direction from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence to give 'due weight' 
to oral evidence.219 These principles cannot, in the abstract, designate the weight that 
must be attributed to oral tradition evidence in a given case. Morris, in which the 
Douglas Treaty hunting right was held not to exclude the Saanich Nation's traditional 
practice of night hunting, and the recent Keewatin220 decision, in which the Crown's right 
to take up lands under Treaty 3 was held to be exercisable only with the authorization of 
the federal Crown (reflecting the specific reference to the "Dominion government" in the 
text of this clause), might be held out as counter-points illustrating the capacity of the 
treaty rights jurisprudence to take First Nations perspectives seriously. However, neither 
case involved any controversy over the existence of the treaty rights in issue, and in both 
the key issues were federalism concerns over the jurisdiction of the province in relation to 
treaty rights. 
A text-driven approach to treaty interpretation disappoints because of the limited 
access to indigenous perspectives available through a text that First Nations did not draft 
and often could not read. Moreover, as the previous section on treaties in history implied, 
not all treaties (or treaty promises) were recorded in documentary form. Without 
assuming that the treaty claims in Ermineskin or Benoit had to succeed to be fair, the 
219 Victor Buffalo, ibid. at paras 38-44, 451-453. See also Benoit, ibid. The discussion in Benoit also dealt 
with the need for evaluating the nature of the oral tradition witnesses' expertise and differences between 
indigenous oral traditions. For discussion, see B Miller, supra note 149 at 106-113, and Napoleon, 
"Straightjacket", supra note 149. 
22
° Keewatin v Minister of Natural Resources, 2011ONSC4801 [Keewatin], appeal filed: docket #C54314. 
239 
treatment of the oral tradition evidence in these cases leaves readers (and no doubt First 
Nations claimants) with the impression that their claims were not fully heard. These 
problems and the need for courts to work with oral tradition evidence are well-understood 
by scholars and courts, so we must ask: Why is text-driven treaty interpretation still 
dominant? Why is it so difficult to move beyond this approach? 
The continued dominance of text in the face of principles that direct the 
interpretive efforts away from the text is, in part, an institutional problem. Canadian 
judges demonstrate the limited nature of their collective imagination in their inability to 
conceive of treaties beyond their representation in the written text.221 Documentary forms 
of historical evidence are similar to the forms of evidence judges are accustomed to in 
civil litigation. As such, judges often make their own assessments of historical 
documents, much to the consternation of the expert witness historians who perhaps wish 
their craft was more like a hard science, attracting fewer hobbyists. 222 However, the issue 
is not simply that treaties remain a fundamentally written phenomenon to courts, but that 
221 Keewatin, it should be noted, illustrates a case where the text of the document favoured the First 
Nation's perspective and the historical evidence relied on by Sanderson J showed the treaty signatories to 
be attentive to the text. It should not be assumed that the text of treaties is unimportant to either of the 
parties. 
222See, for e.g., J. R. Miller's lament regarding the enthusiasm Binnie J. shows as an amateur historian in 
his decision in Marshall: "History, the Courts and Treaty Policy: Lessons from Marshall and Nisga'a" in 
Jerry P. White, Paul Maxim & Dan Beavon., eds., Aboriginal Policy Research: Setting the Agenda for 
Change (Toronto: Thompson Educational Pub, 2004) 29. For his part, Binnie J displayed significant 
awareness of the different disciplinary demands of law and history in Marshall, stating "The law sees a 
finality of interpretation of historical events where finality, according to the professional historian, is not 
possible. The reality, of course, is that the courts are handed disputes that require for their resolution the 
finding of certain historical facts. The litigating parties cannot await the possibility of a stable academic 
consensus. The judicial process must do as best it can." (supra note 76 at para 37). However, this difference 
regarding conclusive interpretations is not the concern that I am addressing here. 
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judges appear to remain "positivist troglodytes" about history.223 The epistemological 
crises faced by the social sciences and academic history in the latter part of the twentieth 
century - crises that take aim at the stability and durability of historical facts and past 
exclusions of minority and marginalized populations in the writing of history224 - have 
not filtered into the court room. History in aboriginal rights cases is still of the sort that 
expects to find, as Crown historian von Gernet put it, "a real past." Moving past a text-
driven approach thus involves an epistemological shift to make space for indigenous law 
and oral histories, but also away from written law and the positivist tradition of history. 
As the post-Marshall treaty jurisprudence demonstrates, principles alone cannot 
shift the narrative and epistemological foundations from which interpretation proceeds. 
The institutional and epistemological aspects of the problems suggest solutions that lie 
outside the litigation of particular cases, such as increasing the number of aboriginal 
decision makers and the creation of a specialized treaty tribunal. Both recommendations 
have been made before and there is no need to repeat these analyses here.225 However, 
223 The phrase is from Lawrence Stone, supra note 145 at 190. 
224See discussion above, in section II. See generally Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Reconciliation and Its 
Historiography: Some Preliminary Thoughts" (2001) 7:1 The UTS Rev. 6. 
225 See, e.g., RCAP's recommendation of a specialized tribunal to deal with specific claims, including 
jurisdiction over "any issue relating to treaties that is currently justiciable in the courts," the ability to return 
land as a remedy, and a limited supervisory role over the procedural aspects of comprehensive claims 
negotiation (RCAP, supra note 3, v 2, part 2, chptr 4, online: 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071211054242/http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sh55 e.html#6.4). The mandate of the recently operational Special Claims Tribunal is 
much narrower than was envisioned by RCAP, offering monetary remedies rather than the return of land, 
but does include the jurisdiction to adjudicate historic treaty grievances with finality: online < 
http://www.sct-trp.ca/hist/hist_e.htm >.See also John Borrows' comments on the need to appoint more 
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there is still room within the jurisprudence itself to consider what principles and 
approaches might support treaties as relationship, as constitutional events, and as ongoing 
constitutional processes. Such a jurisprudence will require a shift in focus away from 
common intent. 
iii. Directions 
The above discussion of the treaty jurisprudence shows that it produces an 
unhappy marriage of law and history, and a deficient, obscured constitutional narrative. 
To arrive at possible directions for a shift of emphasis in the treaty rights jurisprudence, 
the remainder of this section will focus on the issues that emerge from the above analysis 
and then outline the ramifications and directions for treaty jurisprudence. The aim, as 
stated above, is for a jurisprudence that coheres with the constitutional promise of 
treaties, which, incidentally, would also better promote the Court's vision of s 35 rights 
facilitating reconciliation between the state and aboriginal peoples. 
A. Public history and the legal fiction of common intention 
As discussed above, the interpretive principles ask judges and parties to look for a 
historical common intention, instructing them to choose from amongst the possible 
interpretations of a treaty the one interpretation that best reconciles the parties' interests 
aboriginal members of the judiciary: John Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada, Report for the 
law Commission of Canada, January 2006, chptr 6. 
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at the time of the negotiation. Walters observes that this judicial inquiry "purports to be 
primarily an historic one .... ; shared treaty-meanings appear to be treated as facts and not 
laws. "226 However, as Walters points out, the idea of a common intention is primarily a 
normative concept, rather than a factual one. The empirical emphasis thus obscures the 
normative foundations for constitutionally protecting treaty rights. Our first issue is the 
disjuncture that this empirical presentation introduces between academic history and 
history in court, presenting concerns related to what antipodean scholars have described 
as 'juridical history": "a mode of representing the past so as to make it available to legal 
and quasi-legal judgment in the present."227 
The disjuncture between juridical and academic history is not necessarily 
problematic: law and history are different interpretive communities and they do not have 
to reach shared conclusions about the past.228 These different fields of knowledge may 
also serve different ends. Miranda Johnson, for example, has argued that, in deciding 
matters of aboriginal rights, institutions such as the Waitangi Tribunal are tasked not only 
with granting historical justice but with re-imagining history to support the re-founding of 
226 Walters, "Covenant Chain" supra note 212 at 94. 
227 Andrew Sharp, "History and Sovereignty: A Case of Juridical History in New Zealand/ Aotearoa" in 
Michael Peters, ed, Cultural Politics and the University in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press, 1997) 159 at 160-1, 166. See also McHugh, Aboriginal Societies; supra note 159, chptr 1. 
228 See Walters, "Covenant Chain", supra note 212 for a discussion oflaw and history as distinctive 
interpretive communities. He argues that, when it comes to finding shared treaty meanings in the past, law 
and history appear to be working within the same interpretive dimensions (ibid. at 94). See also Mark D. 
Walters, "Histories of Colonialism, Legality, and Aboriginality" (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law J. 
819 and Darnen Ward, "A Means and Measure of Civilisation: Colonial Authorities and Indigenous Law in 
Australia" (2003) 1 History Compass 1-24 at 15-19. 
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the nation-state.229 In this role, historical narratives that construct "a formal [political] 
equivalence ... [render] political concepts like biculturalism and partnership thinkable in 
contemporary New Zealand. But in order for these concepts to be established as re-
foundational they must be thickened with an (imagined) historical past. "230 Thus, 
juridical history may be productive of national or official history in a manner that is 
distinctive from the contributions of empirically-oriented histories, particularly if we take 
the authoritative voice of the courts into account. In the case of treaty interpretation, 
however, the disjuncture between juridical and descriptive academic histories is 
problematic. 
The treatment of historical evidence by courts is one aspect of the dis juncture that 
has attracted a great deal of commentary. Arthur Ray, for example, has commented that 
the adversarial process of treaty and aboriginal rights litigation can polarize and 
destabilize academic opinion, potentially resulting in the "dredging up [of] outdated 
theoretical perspectives" or the invention of "new ones on the witness stand," even while 
creatively pushing the scholarship on indigenous history and indigenous-settler relations 
in new directions.231 More problematic ramifications of the disjuncture, however, can be 
felt far beyond academia. The occasionally violent aftermath of the Marshall decision 
between east coast fishers - who perceived the treaty right recognized by the Supreme 
229 Miranda Johnson, Struggling Over the Past: Decolonization and the Problem of History in Settler 
Societies (PhD Thesis, University of Chicago, Department of History, 2008) [unpublished] [Johnson]. 
230 Ibid at 254. 
231 Arthur J Ray, "Native History on Trial: Confessions of an Expert Witness" (2003) 84 Cdn Hist Rev 253 
at 269. 
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Court as a threat to their livelihood- and the Mi'kmaq is the most obvious 
manifestation of this phenomenon. 232 The argument is not that the disjuncture between 
judicial and academic history caused the violence. As Ken Coates convincingly 
demonstrates, the eruption around Marshall was not caused by the Supreme Court's 
decision, but was, rather, embedded in a much longer history of simmering and 
unresolved disputes. 233 The concern is instead how this disjuncture promotes continued 
public confusion and discord about why aboriginal rights are constitutionally protected, 
potentially undermining the authority of law. 234 
In the reaction to Marshall, the Court's finding was perceived to be 'invented' 
given the lack of reference to fishing rights in the text of the 1760-61 treaty itself.235 This 
perception potentially undermines the legitimacy of the Court's aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence more broadly and led to accusations of judicial activism that continue a 
decade later.236 The appeal of a "real history" is not confined to the court room. More 
importantly, the empirical emphasis of the jurisprudence feeds public perceptions that 
232 For a review of the fallout from Marshall, see Ken S Coates, The Marshall Decision and Native Rights 
(Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) at 7-20. See also Russell Barsh & James 
[Sakej] Youngblood Henderson, "Marshalling the Rule of Law in Canada: Of Eels and Honour" (1999) 
11: 1 Constitutional Forum constitutionnel 1 at 1 and 15 esp, and Harris, "Historian and Courts", supra note 
153. For similar concerns in the Australian context, see Bain Attwood, Telling The Truth About Aboriginal 
History (Crowsnest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005). 
233 Coates, ibid. 
234 Johnson (supra note 229) discusses a different problem, arguing that in creating the narrative of political 
equivalence, juridical history has distorted the representation of political authority within Maori society. 
235 This perception was no doubt aided by the comment of the Crown's expert, Stephen Patterson to the 
press that the Supreme Court had misconstrued his evidence. See Harris, supra note 153 at 130. 
236 See Alex M. Cameron, Power Without Law: The Supreme Court of Canada, the Marshall Decisions, 
and the Failure of Judicial Activism (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009) and 
Dianne Pothier's review of this book: (2010) 33 Dalhousie L.J. 189. 
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Mi'kmaq treaty rights are centuries-old points of (written) agreements, rather than rights 
imbued with a concern for justice and reconciliation resulting from disregard for 
centuries-old commitments that has given rise to multi-layered historical grievances, 
dysfunctional political relationships, and real and unjust inequalities in the present day. 
The story that the jurisprudence tells about why we protect treaty rights matters. The 
accusations of judicial activism are troubling (and wrong-headed, in my view), as is the 
lack of awareness of history and Mi 'kmaq experience that fuelled the aftermath of the 
Marshall decision. However, courts are situated within larger fields of public history. 
While courts should not pander to popular opinion, their contributions to public history 
should be explicit enough to educate. An empirically-presented idea of the normative 
concept of historical common intention cannot achieve this end. 
Besides education, what is lost through the ahistorical treatment of common 
intention? According to Bain Attwood, opportunities for reflection and change. Writing 
about indigenous history and legal claims in Australia, Attwood argues that presenting 
the full complexity of history better serves the aims ofjustice.237 He describes the 
emergence of the 'stolen generations narrative' in Australia, constructed largely through 
oral history, memory, and applied forms of historical discourse. The narrative portrayed 
the government policy as genocidal and this narrative was broadly accepted by the 
237 See, e.g., Bain Attwood, "In the Age of Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, "Distance," and 
Public History" (2005) 20 Public Culture 75 [Attwood, "Stolen Generations"] and Bain Attwood, "The 
law of the land or the Law of the Land?: History, Law and Narrative in a Settler Society" (2004) 2 History 
Compass 1. 
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Australian public. By contrast, Attwood contends that academic history characterizes the 
past policy as assimilationist.238 In his view, this disjuncture leaves the genocide narrative 
vulnerable to attack. The clash of historical methodologies involved in producing these 
opposing narratives and the continuing (and authoritative) appeal of the sharper 
historicism of much academic history is capable of undermining the testimony of 
individuals and work of the stolen generations inquiry more generally. It does not serve 
the ends of justice to have people's memories publicly discredited, neither for the 
individuals involved nor when 'sympathetic' public opinion is disrupted by evidence that 
their sympathies were premised on 'lies'. Similarly, the authority that the common law 
and common law constitutionalism draw from history is undermined when the 'truth' of 
the courts' history is shown to be too far from the truth produced in academic contexts.239 
Equally importantly for present purposes is Attwood's further contention that a 
historicist account of the stolen generations policy would be more unsettling than the 
genocidal one. Attwood argues that there is greater potential for change in forcing settler 
Australia to grapple with the continuities in settler policy, in which assumptions that 
assimilation is for the betterment of aboriginal peoples are still prevalent: 
238 It should be noted that these to characterizations of the policy may not be as distinct as Attwood 
assumes. It is arguable that policies aimed at destroying or eliminating a people through eliminating their 
culture meet the definition of genocide; see Woolford, supra note 123 for a discussion of the definition of 
genocide. 
239 For discussions of the role and authority of history in the common law, see Gerald J. Postema, "On the 
Moral Presence of Our Past" (1990-91) 36:4 McGill L J 1153 [Postema] and Paul McHugh, "Sovereignty 
This Century- Maori and the Common Law Constitution" (2000) 31 Victoria Univ of Wellington L J 187. 
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Grasping this historical continuity and grappling with what amounted to an 
intimately close relationship with the approach of their allegedly do-gooding 
forebears or predecessors [who took aboriginal children away from their families 
to promote assimilation] would have been more unsettling than the sorry people's 
distancing of their putatively genocidal ancestors. These settler Australians might 
have realized that the past was in the present not only in the form of Aboriginal 
people affected by being separated from their kin but also in the form of a white 
mentalite we can call assimilationist. Understanding this could have provided a 
means of working through this past in the present, since it would have pinpointed 
the very ideas and attitudes that have contributed and continue to contribute to the 
destruction of Aboriginal communities and the diminution of Aboriginality by the 
1 . 240 sett er society. 
While Attwood' s "might" is an important caveat on predicting the impact of a historicist 
account of the stolen generations policy, his work makes the point that something is 
indeed lost by historical accounts that do not attend to the historical complexity of the 
past. If we cannot see the past clearly, it is harder to move towards a new- hopefully 
more just - direction. As Postema has argued in relation to the common law's reliance on 
precedent more generally, "if members are to take their community's history as 
normative for their dealings, that community must own up to its past, look back at the 
roads not taken and the suffering it has caused and hold itself accountable to them. "241 
Thus, the ends of justice may be better served by a treaty jurisprudence that does not 
'whitewash' the past by retrospectively imposing the honour of the Crown, or other 
principles aimed at fairness in the present. 
240 Attwood, "Stolen Generations" ibid. at 94. 
241 Postema, supra note 239 at 1180. 
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B. Addressing the constitutional significance of treaty rights 
The empirical dressing on the normative concept of common intention highlights 
the need to address the normative foundations for protecting treaty rights. Commentators 
on treaty interpretation have occasionally gazed wistfully towards contract law, noting 
the simplicity (and potential transferability) of well-understood normative principles such 
as undue influence, duress and unconscionability that are used by the court to interpret 
the facts of a given contract. 242 What they notice is the willingness of courts to interpret 
an agreement between parties with a view to balancing the values behind protecting 
freedom of contract and the ends of justice in the particular case. As Binnie J remarked in 
Marshall, "The law has long recognized that parties make assumptions when they enter 
into agreements about certain things that give their arrangements efficacy ... .If the law is 
prepared to supply the deficiencies of written contracts prepared by sophisticated parties 
and their legal advisors in order to produce a sensible result that accords with the intent of 
both parties, though unexpressed, the law cannot ask less of the honour and dignity of the 
Crown in its dealings with First Nations."243 
Binnie J's comment suggests that if we apply normative correctives to resurrect 
the parties' true (and apparently shared) intentions born of a retroactively levelled playing 
field, treaty rights jurisprudence will have succeeded in accomplishing its task. Serving 
242 See, e.g., Michael Coyle, "Marginalized", supra note 43 and Claire Hunter, "New Justification for an 
Old Approach: In Defence of Characterizing First Nations Treaties as Contracts" (2004) 62 U Toronto Fae 
L Rev 61. 
243 Marshall, supra note 76 at para 43. 
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the ends of justice in the treaty interpretation context, however, is more complex than the 
interpretation of contracts, due to the historical nature of the agreements and the 
constitutional character of the moments of agreement - and because the foundational 
values behind protecting historic treaty rights are arguably less understood and more 
contentious than the values behind protecting freedom of contract.244 In contract law, the 
value of enforcing agreements between parties may be related relatively straightforwardly 
to liberal values around freedom in economic relations.245 In the context of historic 
treaties, the law assumes that First Nations consent matters but does not explain why their 
consent matters, at what point in time, or in relation to what. In the broad scope of treaties 
caught by the jurisprudence, consent to land cessions or alliance (as the treaties are 
characterized by the court) are treated on the same plane. While the value of consent in 
social contract theory may be well accepted (even if the conceptualization of this consent 
remains highly contested246), the lingering implications of the nineteenth-century treaty 
law suggest that indigenous peoples were not part of this contract. And as described 
244 Treaty interpretation is presumably less fraught in the present day context, but to date the Supreme 
Court has exhibited a deep split about how the honour of the Crown applies in the context of modem 
treaties, the relationship between historic and modem treaties, and the approach that will best promote 
reconciliation; contrast Binnie J and Dechamps Jin Little Salmon/Carmacks and Moses, supra note 106. 
For commentary, see Julie Jai, "The Interpretation of Modem Treaties and the Honour of the Crown: Why 
Modem Treaties Deserve Judicial Deference" (2009) 26 Nat. J of Con L 25 and Ria Tzimas, "To What End 
Dialogue?" (2011) 54 SCLR (2d) 494. 
245 No doubt a contracts law scholar could take issue with this assertion. I do not mean to imply that the 
values behind contract law are fully settled, immune to challenge, or that the values behind enforcing 
promises could not be justified outside of liberal economics. The comparison is made more for the purposes 
of showing the relative ease with which one can identify a normative basis for enforcing contracts. For a 
discussion of various contract theories see Nathan Oman, "Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law" (2005) 
103 Mich L Rev 1506. 
246 Webber, "Consent", supra note 192. 
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above, the later s 88 and treaty rights cases avoid any direct engagement with the 
constitutional significance of treaties. 
McLachlin CJ's statement in Haida Nation noted earlier- that "[t]reaties serve to 
reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty, and to 
define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982" - continues to 
disconnect treaty rights from the constitutional significance of treaties more generally. In 
this separation, treaty rights are the remainder of reconciled sovereignties, representing, 
perhaps, the terms of that reconciliation. In this schema, treaty rights are born of 
foundational moments of consent, thus explaining the Court's instinct to rely on history 
to define their content. But this approach further confounds normative clarity by 
exacerbating tensions inherent in the values supporting Canada's constitutional order; for 
example, between liberalism, which is fundamentally skeptical of the justice of past 
political relations, and common law constitutionalism, which relies on past constitutional 
arrangements to ground the legitimacy of political authority in the present. Moreover, this 
approach does not accord with the promise or history of treaty-making. In the first section 
of this paper, I emphasized the relational and evolutionary nature of both treaties and 
consent. In the second section, I argued that treaty histories were characterized by 
ongoing disagreements as much as by points of agreement. Bringing these discussions 
forward highlights to the inadequacy of conceptualizing treaty rights as products of final, 
complete agreements. This approach simply does not tell a constitutional story upon 
which more just relations can be built. 
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Honouring past commitments as a foundation of present day communities and 
legal rights is a key component of just political arrangements in a number of different 
philosophies and perspectives.247 In the case of treaties, such foundations are 
constitutional in more than one dimension; treaties embody both a notion of original 
consent and the continuity of "keeping faith with each other" through keeping treaty 
relationships alive. 248 But even if there is a high degree of acceptance of the value of 
honouring past commitments, this value does not prescribe how to implement such 
commitments in the present, particularly when those commitments have suffered long 
periods of neglect. As Jeremy Waldron has argued, there is no straight line between 
historic injustice and the rectification of those wrongs in the present.249 Waldron is in part 
concerned about remedies (e.g., "giving the land back" as a straight line from the 
wrongful taking of land in past), and the potential to do further injustice by not taking 
intervening events and changes into account. While I do not agree with all aspects of his 
argument, he draws attention to the mediation of the consequences of the past through 
present-day normative principles. And a treaty jurisprudence capable of supporting the 
promise of treaties must develop transparent and robust normative foundations to 
adequately address the consequences of the past. 
247 For e.g, James Tully, Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism Jn An Age of Diversity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); James [Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, "Dialogical Governance: A 
Mechanism of Constitutional Governance" (2009) 72 Sask L Rev 29; Martin Krygier, "Law as Tradition" 
(1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237; John Ralston Saul, "The Roots of Canadian Law in Canada" (2009) 54 
McGill L. J. 671. 
248 Postema, Moral Presence, supra note 239. 
249 Jeremy Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice" (2002) 52 Univ of Toronto L J 134. 
252 
C. Re-orienting treaty interpretation 
What would a treaty jurisprudence that does not focus on the reconstruction of an 
imagined common intention look like? Consider, as an example, the different findings of 
common intention and the resultant treaty rights in Marshall. Binnie J found a broad, 
ongoing right to harvest and trade fish while McLachlin J found a narrower temporary 
right that disappeared with the truckhouse system. Under Binnie J's approach, the treaty 
right re-commits the parties to a treaty relationship and constitutionalizes one particular 
element of that relationship: a commitment to exclusive trading relations. It relies on the 
honour of the Crown to bridge the past agreement to the present constitutional right, but 
does so in a manner that cannot fully explain how this principle serves justice in the 
present because it is applied to reconcile the parties' interests in the past. Moreover, the 
principles that guide the modernization of the past treaty promise are thinly sketched, 
focussing on "proportionality" of the modem to the historic to implement the past bargain 
without inquiring into how parties might have re-negotiated their arrangements, or taken 
account of developments between then and now. 250 The jurisprudence thus not only keeps 
us focussed on the past, it also has gaps in the principles that move us from past to 
present. 
250 Proportionality in "modernizing" rights was recently discussed in relation to aboriginal rights in Lax 
Kw'alaams Indian Bandv. Canada (Attorney General), 2011SCC56, [2011] 3 SCR 535. 
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Given that McLachlin J did not find an ongoing treaty right, her conclusion did 
not result in a remedy. But she did not deny the presence of a trade right, just the 
longevity of it. In her approach, the treaty right was rendered obsolete by the changed 
trading system. With different treaty rights principles, however, these findings of fact 
might also support a remedy. As our review of treaty histories suggests, much historic 
injustice relating to treaties was effected through neglect. These histories suggest that 
once a treaty right is identified, the proper inquiry is (like the principles from R v Taylor 
and Williams) what happened to the agreement and the particular right: What happened 
to Mi'kmaq trade and ability to access 'necessaries' once the truckhouse system was 
dismantled? Was the truckhouse system unnecessary because trade was secured through 
other systems (and so the trade right possibly survived in a modified form)? What 
happened to British-Mi'kmaq relations more generally? Were trade and other 
arrangements re-negotiated or altered through practices? Was the Crown neglectful of its 
treaty obligations? Or did the Mi'kmaq agree (under fair conditions) to relinquish their 
trading and harvesting rights? And if so, for what benefit? 
Assuming for present purposes that this story encompassed some elements of 
Crown neglect, the narrative that emerges suggests that the treaty right remained in its 
historic form. The dispute is thus shifted from whether the right exists to how the right 
and treaty relationship were implemented and maintained over time - a diagnosis of the 
problem that better coheres with constitutional narratives about the significance of 
treaties and better explains the continuing need for corrective action by the courts. The 
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task for the courts remains reconstructing the historical relationship and its specific terms, 
but aimed only at defining the historical right as a platform for the parties' 
negotiations. 251 Remedial attention is thus also shifted to causing the parties to bring the 
relationship into good standing, with a guarantee of ongoing historical rights (or perhaps 
damages for the loss of ability to exercise historical rights) looming as the default 
'hammer' to ensure negotiations proceed, but without the pretension that such historical 
rights fully represent the constitutional significance of treaties or fully define the shape of 
treaty rights in the present. Such remedies are perhaps already available under the honour 
of the Crown. In Haida Nation for example, McLachlin CJ made it clear that the honour 
of the Crown applies to treaty-making, treaty interpretation, and treaty implementation. 252 
What is absent from this example is attention to how historic rights would be 
identified in cases where the record does not establish the presence of a historic treaty 
right, such as when treaty rights are claimed based on oral promises not reflected in the 
treaty text. In these cases, the generous interpretive principles still have much to offer, 
251 An approach that is perhaps similar to Vickers J's approach with respect to aboriginal title in Tsilhqot'in 
Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700. For discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Reconciliation and Third-
Party Interests: Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia" (2010) 8 Indigenous L J 7. 
252 Haida Nation, supra note 193 at paras 17, 19. See also Mikisew Cree, supra note 118 regarding the 
honour of the Crown applying to treaty implementation. See also Inuit of Nunavut v. Canada (Attorney 
General), 2012 NUCJ 11, in which the Nunavut court ordered a disgorgement of damages of nearly $15 
million for failures on the part of the federal government in implementing the Nunavut Land Claim 
Agreement. The remedy was based on the finding that the honour of the Crown in this circumstance gave 
rise to a fiduciary duty in relation to the implementation of the agreement. The honour of the Crown was 
also argued to inform the remedy: "To uphold the 'honour of the Crown', this Court should grant a remedy 
that deprives Canada of the benefit it received in failing to set up and implement the NGMP in a timely 
manner" (at para 207). The court would have found the same remedy for a breach of contract had the 
fiduciary claim failed. 
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particularly if aimed at shared meaning and intentions on a broader scale. Mark Walters 
notes that a broader view of common intention, based on customs and practices rather 
than treaty texts and reports, would allow for a greater possibility of locating shared 
meanings in the treaties. 253 In this approach, the asserted historic treaty right would be 
evaluated against a longer historical framework of relations and mutual intention or 
shared meanings may have more in common with Sioui than Marshall. Walter's approach 
is also similar to Brian Slattery's notion of "generic" aboriginal rights that emerged from 
intersocietal law and practices, and against which distinctive specific rights evolved 
through negotiations and other developments. 254 And in a similar vein, Shin Imai has 
proposes a two-stage process to implement "taking up lands" clauses that relies on a more 
generalized view of treaty rights that better reflects the nature of the bargain struck in 
historic agreements.255 The first stage would analyze the substance of the treaty right "not 
as a series of individual rights, but as a guarantee of collective survival."256 The second 
stage would then focus on the measures necessary to secure the viability and access to the 
resource that was promised to support collective survival. All of these approaches suggest 
that the court by-pass the identification of mutual intention on narrow, specific rights in 
253 Walters, "Covenant Chain", supra note 212 at 89. 
254 Brian Slattery, "The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" (2007) 38 Supreme Ct. L. Rev. 595 
[Slattery, "Generative Structure"]. 
255Shin Imai, "Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The "Tracts Taken Up" Provision" (2001) 27 Queen's 
L J 1. 
256 Ibid. at 24. 
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favour of greater attention to the intentions around and parameters of the working 
relationship to define the historic element of a treaty right. 
The directions suggested above share much in common with Brian Slattery's 
theory of the generative structure of aboriginal rights.257 He defines generative rights as 
"rights that, although rooted in the past, have the capacity to renew themselves, as 
organic entities that grow and change."258 According to Slattery, aboriginal rights consist 
of two elements: core generic rights that are common to all aboriginal peoples, and 
specific rights, which develop through treaties and other processes to be distinctive to 
particular aboriginal groups. These rights are identified by courts through "principles of 
recognition," which take account of historical intersocietal law and the emergence of 
generic rights to "provide the point of departure for any modem inquiry into the existence 
of Aboriginal rights and a benchmark for assessing the historical scope of indigenous 
dispossesson and deprivation. "259 The modem and adaptive aspects of the rights are then 
identified through principles of reconciliation, which guide the transit of the historic 
rights through changes such as the community's contemporary needs, changes to 
implicated lands and resources, and broader societal and third party interests.260 Slattery's 
approach accomplishes several things that have been suggested as desirable directions for 
the conceptualization and interpretation of treaties and treaty rights. First, by bridging the 
257 Slattery, "Generative Structure", supra note 254. 
258 Ibid at 593. 
259 Ibid at 623. 
260 Ibid. at 624. 
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treaty term with the longer history of Aboriginal rights as products of intersocietal 
practices and law, he brings the genealogy of the treaty to bear on the interpretation of the 
treaty itself and the right that is protected under s. 35. But in the generative model, 
history informs but is not determinative. History is not the sole constitutive element of 
the right and the articulation of rights does not strain history for answers it may not be 
able to produce. In place of the sole emphasis on history, Slattery's account introduces 
greater transparency and specificity around the normative character of aboriginal and 
treaty rights through encouraging the development of explicit principles of recognition 
and reconciliation. 261 This approach provides a more transparent, and therefore more 
readily debated, account of why aboriginal and treaty rights should be protected. 
Regardless of whether one agrees with these principles, this transparency is critical in 
shifting treaty rights litigation away from its empirical fixation on the past and exploring 
the appropriate interpretive principles for serving the ever-debatable ends of justice in the 
present.262 Finally, Slattery's approach also attends to an aspect of aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence that is largely missing in the treaty context, which is the need to support 
negotiations. He argues that in light of the diverse interests involved in the principles of 
reconciliation, "certain Aboriginal rights cannot be implemented in their entirety by the 
261 Slattery suggests that these principles should be developed within the context of actual cases while 
identifying several potential features of those principles; ibid at 625-6. 
262 Slattery makes a similar point in relation to aboriginal rights and the Van der Peet test; ibid. at 610. 
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courts but require the negotiation of modern treaties,"263 emphasizing the need to 
negotiate the resolution of aboriginal title specifically. 
Two differences from Slattery's approach are proposed in the discussion above. 
First, I proposed that the requirement of negotiation to bring the historic right into the 
modern form applies equally to treaty rights. Taking note of the remarkable uniformity of 
scholars who envision treaties as living relationships involving ongoing negotiations, 
negotiated settlements to treaty rights are imperative. Envisioned as part of the definition 
of the treaty right itself, rather than as a manner by which the Crown might justify an 
infringement (within its proper jurisdiction), negotiated settlements of historic treaty 
rights are required to re-invigorate the treaty relationship. Only through the imposition of 
consultation obligations in relation to "taking up clauses" has the dialogic element of 
treaty rights and processes been recognized. 264 This lack of attention is reminiscent of the 
colonial hangover that continues to characterize treaty histories, discussed above. In these 
accounts, treaties are a fa it accompli; there can be no need to negotiate if treaty rights 
have already been negotiated.265 Negotiated approaches to treaty rights - their modern 
scope, nature, and implementation - are as necessary in treaty contexts as in non-treaty 
contexts. Second, the discussion above proposed a shift in focus regarding remedies. The 
remedial focus should not be on the treaty right itself, but on the treaty relationship. As 
263 Ibid. at 624. 
264 Mikisew Cree, supra note 118. 
265 This conceptualization was reflected in Mikisew Cree, where the Supreme Court suggested that the 
Crown would always have notice of the treaty rights contained in a treaty (supra note 118 at para 34) 
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such, courts that are asked to resolve treaty rights disputes should supervise the 
negotiation of the contemporary form and accommodation of the rights they identify and 
step in to resolve the modem form of these rights only after negotiations fail. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has travelled a long road to consider the conceptualization of treaties 
in history and then in law, and evaluate them against constitutional narratives that rely on 
treaties and treaty processes to suggest post-imperial foundations for the modem state of 
Canada. In spite of several decades of public commissions and scholarship articulating 
and advocating for understanding treaties as living, evolving relationships, these 
directions have yet to be adequately incorporated into treaty narratives in history or law. 
Historical treatments of specific treaties show greater attention to indigenous agency, but 
this highly contextual scholarship is not fully reflected in surveys of the vast scope of 
treaty-making experience in Canada's history. This experience continues to be organized 
around colonial interests and landmarks. To move beyond such colonial hangovers, I 
have argued that indigenous understandings of treaty histories must be incorporated and 
respected, which will be facilitated by discarding subject matter classifications such as 
peace and friendship versus land cession treaties, and chronological lines, such as pre-
and post-confederation versus modem treaties. I also argued that, as iterative and 
cumulative processes, treaty histories must include both fur trade ordering and modem 
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quasi-treaty developments. An inclusive approach has the benefit of incorporating 
additional geographies and indigenous forms of treaty relations more centrally in treaty 
histories. From these arguments, I suggested that treaty-making histories in Canada 
would be better represented by surveys that attend to significant moments of 
transformation or re-iteration of existing relationships and are thus capable of expressing 
the incompletely resolved nature of treaty relations. 
Similarly, legal treatments of treaties have similarly not fully discarded nineteenth 
century characterizations of treaties as a matter of executive goodwill rather than 
processes and relationships that were and are an essential contribution to the founding of 
the state. While the duty to consult jurisprudence suggests that treaties involve ongoing 
processes that support an ongoing reconciliation of indigenous and Crown sovereignties, 
the treaty rights cases in the post-1982 era do not support a similar vision. By focusing 
the inquiry on common intention as coalescing around particular treaty terms, lead cases 
such as Marshall and Marshall; Bernard since 1982 have disconnected treaty rights from 
treaty relationships, demonstrating an approach that situates treaty rights as empirically-
discoverable terms of a fully reconciled relationship. Treaty rights as factual terms of an 
original consent demands that those historical moments be carried into the constitutional 
present without attention to problems that stem from implementation, disagreements 
about the scope of treaty rights and relationships, or the normative basis for honouring 
those past commitments. 
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Drawing on similar critiques and prescriptions by other legal scholars, I suggest 
an approach to the treaty rights jurisprudence that attends to historical interpretation of 
mutual intentions to enter into and maintain treaty relations but does not rely on common 
intentions regarding the meaning and scope of the terms of that relationship to define 
treaty rights. Where Brian Slattery has considered a history of intersocietal law as the 
historical backdrop informing the development of aboriginal rights, I have instead 
encompassed the evolution of intersocietal law in a treaty framework, emphasizing the 
negotiated nature of these intersocietal foundations and the iterative processes between 
negotiated moments as part of treaty processes more generally. This move expands the 
historical context against which treaty practices might be identified, drawing the 
historical argument for an inclusive approach to histories into law. It also builds on 
constitutional narratives of treaty as relationship that promise an alternative to Imperial 
constitutional foundations. From these positions, I argue that treaty rights must be 
interpreted with a view to re-invigorating treaty relationships, and that such an approach 
demands that the parties negotiate the modern parameters of a treaty right under Court 
supervision. Thus, the Court's role in interpreting treaty rights maintains attention to the 
historical substance of the parameters and terms of treaty relationships but is re-oriented 
to supporting constitutional processes - and improved treaty relationships - in the 
present. 
By tracing these concerns through both law and history, common themes emerge. 
The challenge presented by the constitutional narratives of treaties is to resist treaties as 
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moments of resolution and embrace treaties as potentially encompassing as much 
disagreement as agreement. This vision is perhaps more of a challenge to law than 
history. In the latter, there is no need to finally resolve historical disputes. In law, 
however, resolving disputes are precisely what courts are called upon to do. Further, the 
challenge of managing a national narrative that encompasses deep disagreements about 
the founding of the state and the legitimacy of its current authority should not be 
understated. The courts, I suggest, have a privileged role in contributing to this narrative. 
As is common in the field of aboriginal law, treaty rights disputes call upon the courts to 
resolve disputes that go to the foundations of the Canadian constitutional order. Such 
tasks demand that courts muster all of the creativity of the law that is available to them, 
including fashioning new remedies from time to time. In this paper, I have argued that the 
courts' creative energies should be enlisted to support treaty relationships by interpreting 
treaty rights as a support for ongoing treaty relationships, rather than as representing the 
terms of a long stale settlement. Through the duty to consult, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the ground is always shifting in an agenda of reconciliation. Carrying this 
recognition into the treaty rights jurisprudence would go a long way to establishing a 
treaty jurisprudence capable of supporting the promise of treaties. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The preceding chapters use different methodologies, cover different eras and 
geographies, and address different audiences. Coherence is found in their ultimate objects 
of study: how indigenous peoples and European traders managed their relationships, and 
the formation and role of law in those processes. Intersocietal law has been used to 
describe the nature of law in these contexts. This dissertation has taken up the challenge 
of a grounded, historical exploration of the concept against the backdrop of how 
intersocietal law has been incorporated in the aboriginal rights jurisprudence and related 
scholarly writing. It is a concept that has been relied on to explain and ground the 
historical source of aboriginal rights, thereby embedding indigenous contributions within 
the common law rights. 1 It is also a concept that has been relied upon to express the 
argument that, morally as well as legally, aboriginal rights must incorporate and express 
both indigenous and common law legal traditions. 2 
This dissertation provides reflection on both applications of intersocietal law. First I 
explored the nature of intersocietal law through the intersection of legal traditions in case 
studies on the fur trade, providing historical content from which to reflect on the nature 
1 See, e.g., Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Cdn Bar Rev 196; 
Jeremy Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community 
between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L J 623; R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 
SCR 507 at para 42. 
2 John Borrows, Canada's Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 201 O); Mark D 
Walters, "The Morality of Aboriginal Law" (2006) 31 Queen's L J 470; Patricia Monture "Now That the 
Door is Open: First Nations and the Law School Experience" (1990) 15 Queen's L J 179. 
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and dynamics of a non-rights based modus vivendi. These explorations contribute to 
ethnohistorical literature, adding law as a dimension of fur trade relations and as an 
element of historical experience that can help elucidate the perspectives of those not well 
represented in the historical record. As legal history, these case studies consider 
indigenous law rather than focusing on the application of law to indigenous individuals 
and peoples, thus 'decentring' the study of legal history away from colonial and imperial 
institutions and doctrines. These studies also provide reflection on constitutional and 
treaty literatures, which rely on historical claims and narratives to prescribe post-imperial 
directions for Canadian society and constitutional law. In the case studies, I offer an 
interpretation of intersocietal law as characterized by the persistence of different and 
competing norms and normative frameworks, which nevertheless support the general 
stability of relationships. In the chapter on treaties, I carry this persistence of competing 
norms and interpretations into an argument regarding the problematic characterization of 
treaties as historical phenomena and the resulting legal interpretation of the rights secured 
by treaties. 
This interpretation of intersocietal law strongly reflects the characterization of 
treaties as relationship by indigenous and constitutional scholars. It also resonates -
perhaps oddly in light of the different political institutions and economies of 
contemporary Canada - with the work of political theorists who consider contemporary 
processes of reconciliation to be characterized by dissent and contestation rather than by 
a point of political transformation at which differences are finally resolved. Finally, and 
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although not the direct object of study, the interpretation of intersocietal law in the case 
studies has legal import in the implications it has for sovereignty: the nature of 
indigenous expressions of jurisdiction and sovereignty in the fur trade; how the activities 
and practices of European traders supported the establishment of de facto if not de Jure 
sovereignty; and the territorial and jurisdictional scope of European sovereignty 
established through the fur trade. In the times and geographies considered, expressions of 
indigenous sovereignty were strong and, beyond the governance of internal trading post 
affairs, company expressions of sovereignty were equivocal. 3 The Mackenzie Valley case 
study in chapter four tackled this theme most directly, but chapters two and three also 
illustrate the limited authority of the company traders in the territories in which they 
worked and the overt and subtler assertions of power by indigenous traders in the course 
of the trading relationships. In keeping with my contextual methodology, it would be 
necessary to aim directly at the subject of sovereignty to draw conclusions about whether 
a measure of sovereignty was acquired through the activities of traders at particular 
trading posts. Having not trained my sights directly on this issue, I can offer only a 
general observation that the stable presence of trading posts may be a source of 
prescriptive or settler rights in common law legal traditions, but indigenous welcome into 
territory cannot be presumptively equated with a cession of sovereignty in indigenous 
3 See Edward Cavanagh, "A Company with Sovereignty and Subjects of its Own? The Case of the 
Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1763" (2011) 26 Can. J ofL. & Soc'y 25 for an argument of HBC trading 
posts establishing a limited sovereignty beyond trading posts in relation to Home Indian populations prior 
to 1763. 
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legal traditions. Like other aspects of my interpretation of the intersocietal law of the fur 
trade, claims of sovereignty rely on competing normative systems and we can find 
evidence in fur trade relations that support both sets of claims. 
Following the case studies, the project switches to consider more directly the legal 
implications of the legal ethnohistory of the fur trade in relation to aboriginal rights. 
Although inspired by common law and indigenous law arguments about aboriginal rights, 
my methodology and intent are strongly contextualist and not aimed at supporting a 
particular legal or philosophical argument regarding aboriginal rights. Nevertheless, the 
narratives of adaptation, mutual interest in the relationship, and persistent and unresolved 
difference suggested by these case studies have strong ties to constitutional writings 
about treaties, and the importance of treaties in grounding a post-imperial constitutional 
order in Canada. These connections, as well as the more particular historical connections 
between fur trade and treaty argued by historians of indigenous-settler relations, lead to 
the consideration of what an intersocietal understanding of fur trade legal ordering might 
demand of both historical and legal conceptualizations of treaties in chapter 5. 
The focus on treaties as well as the interpretation offered of intersocietal law 
introduce a subtle shift in the how the concept of intersocietal law contributes to 
understanding aboriginal rights. To the theories that place intersocietal law as a historical 
source of aboriginal rights, I have added the important caveat that the normative 
parameters of indigenous-settler relations were not settled even if historical practices 
were absorbed and reflected upon in the common law or constitutionalized aboriginal 
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rights. Potentially fundamental disputes - such as over sovereignty - are thus carried 
forward into the aboriginal rights jurisprudence, where they remain unresloved. Treaties, 
broadly construed, provide a shared legal house in which different legal traditions may 
co-exist and the work of co-existence can be furthered. In addition, focusing on treaty 
relationships better reflects historical interpretations of treaties, constitutional writing 
about treaties, and present developments around consultation and the proliferation of 
agreement making. From these arguments, I attempt to develop an account of a treaty 
rights jurisprudence that is coherent with a narrative of the ongoing negotiation of treaty 
relationships. I argue that to be capable of re-invigorating treaty relationships, courts 
should not attempt to correct years of neglect by 'modernizing' historical rights and 
imposing common intentions too narrowly. Instead, courts should support treaty 
relationships by defining the historical terms of the relationship and supervising the re-
negotiation of those relationships in the present. 
The writing of these pieces has taken place over a period of eight years, in fits and 
starts. Each time I started again, there were new developments in the relevant literatures 
to take into account. In ethnohistory and history, new literature on the fur trade and 
particular indigenous peoples off er new insights and more material to bring to bear on the 
studies conducted for this dissertation. 4 In histories of indigenous-settler relations, 
4 See, e.g., Carolyn Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World: Travelers and Traders in the North American 
Fur Trade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Carolyn Podruchny and Laura Peers, eds, 
Gathering Places: Aboriginal and Fur Trade Histories (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010); Jennifer Brown, 
"Rupert's Land, Nituskeenan, Our Land: Cree and English Naming and Claiming around the Dirty Sea" in 
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increasing attention to the intersection of law and history has brought the fur trade more 
centrally into treaty histories. 5 Critical scholarship from a variety of disciplines continues 
to address the legitimacy of Canadian sovereignty and advocate for a post-colonial or 
post-imperial constitutional order. These critiques stem from new fields of history, such 
as the study of settler colonialism.6 Closely related to post-colonial studies but centred 
primarily on the settler states of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and 
Israel, this field pursues transnational accounts of settler colonialism, highlighting the 
ongoing presence of colonial history in settler states. 7 Alongside these studies - generally 
from within or in conversation with liberal philosophical traditions but also drawing 
heavily on indigenous writers - is continued attention to the problems of reconciliation in 
Ted Binnema and Susan Neylan, eds, New Histories for Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada's Native 
Pasts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 18; and Heidi Bohaker, "Nindoodemag: The Significance of 
Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701" (2006) 63 William and 
Mary Quarterly 23.; Chris Anderson, "Moya 'Tipimsook ("The People Who Aren't Their Own Bosses"): 
Racialization and the Misrecognition of "Metis" in Upper Great Lakes Ethnohistory" (2011) 58 
Ethnohistory 3 7. 
5 See, e.g., Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller & Frank J. Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A Documentary History 
of Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000); Arthur J. Ray, 
Telling it to the Judge. Taking Native History to Court (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 2011); J. R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2009). With respect to the intersection of law and history more generally, see 
William C. Wicken, The Colonization of Mi'kmaw Memory and History, 1794-1928. The King v Gabriel 
Sylliboy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 
6 Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). See also the 
new journal, Settler Colonial Studies, established in 2011 (on line: 
<http://oj s. l ib.swin.edu.au/index.php/settlerco lonialstudies>) 
7 See, e.g., Edward Cavanagh, "History, Time and the Indigenist Critique" (2012) 37:8 Arena Journal 16; 
and Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous Peoples in American and Australia, 1788-
1836 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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settler societies and the difficulty of arriving at a post-imperial constitutionalism.8 These 
conversations are broader than the focus of the papers in this dissertation, but treaty 
practices figure prominently in these accounts because treaties offer a constitutional form 
capable of replacing the colonial doctrines upon which the political authority of the state 
has been built, and through which improved relations with indigenous peoples and 
reconciliation of sovereignties might be pursued. 
Paralleling developments in academia, there has been a groundswell towards 
process-oriented solutions in public law that has coincided with the enlargement of the s 
35 duty to consult and accommodate aboriginal peoples, mandated by Haida Nation v 
British Columbia. 9 Responses in the legal literature generally welcome such 
developments as offering a dialogic approach to renewed relationships, including, 
potentially, the acknowledgment of unreconciled sovereignties and a path to a post-
imperial constitutionalism. 10 But this literature also points out the ongoing limitations of 
the aboriginal rights doctrines and a duty to consult that does not require indigenous 
consent. 11 At the same time, the legal literature on indigenous legal traditions has grown 
8 Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, eds, The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford, 
NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2008); James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), vol 1; Andrew Schaap, "Agonism in Divided Societies" (2006) 32 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 255. 
9 Haida Nation v British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511. 
10 See, e.g., James [Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, "Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism of 
Constitutional Governance" (2009) 72 Sask L Rev 29; and Mark D Walters, "The Morality of Aboriginal 
Law" (2006) 31 Queen's L J 470; Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties. Aboriginal Nations and Canada 
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2012). 
11 Gordon Christie, "A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida 
Nation" (2005) 23 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 17 and Minnawaanagogiizhigook (Oawnis 
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exponentially since this project began. 12 This literature has different ends but also 
contributes to a post-imperial legal order by ensuring that indigenous legal orders are 
understood and relied upon as living legal traditions. 
While the amount of literature produced during the time span of my project is a 
lesson in why one should pursue doctoral projects more quickly, these literatures have 
also provided me with the inspiration to complete this work. Fortunately, and remarkably 
from my perspective, the developments in the many fields of study that my project 
touches upon and responds to appear to have made my project more, rather than less, 
relevant. It is a study of dialogical and agonistic processes in fur trade relations that aims 
to give indigenous law and indigenous actors their proper (and equal) place in the 
Canadian legal history and constitutional law. It adds the dimension of law and legality to 
studies of fur trader and indigenous-settler relations. It also presents a study of 
geographies and eras that do not fit easily in settler-colonial patterns: the fur traders were 
Kennedy), "Reconciliation without Respect? Section 35 and Indigenous Legal Orders" in Law Commission 
of Canada, ed., Indigenous Legal Traditions (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 77; Brian Slattery, "The 
Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" (2007) 38 Supreme Court Law Review 595; and Kent McNeil 
and David Yarrow, "Has Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected their 
Definition?" (2007) 3 7 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 177. 
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in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the Law. Comparative 
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(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 287; and, Hadley Friedland, The Wetiko (Windigo) Legal Principles: 
Responding to Harmful People in Cree, Anishnabek and Saulteux Societies - Past, Present and Future 
Uses, with a Focus on Contemporary Violence and Child Victimization Concerns (LLM thesis, University 
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merchants not settlers, highlighting the contradictions in the traditional colonial theories 
in which the acquisition of settler sovereignty is premised upon the traders' activities. 
Against all of these intellectual developments, the law has also changed but not 
in a manner that reflects the critical and historical literatures. Instead, the Canadian 
aboriginal rights jurisprudence post-1996 appears to have responded more to theoretical 
developments around deliberative democracy and liberal theory, turning away from its 
British imperial roots. Studying this deep history and the settler colonial literature in 
particular makes this tum in the jurisprudence more obvious. Motivated by this critical 
literature, my analysis of the treaty rights jurisprudence confirms the settler colonial 
critique that colonialism continues to structure our politics and law, and that 
relinquishment of domination has not yet been achieved. And yet, in line with the 
optimism inherent in legal writing, and demonstrating that law remains my "home" 
discipline, this dissertation is not solely critical. Law may yet serve to correct injustices 
imposed and enforced by law. Reconfiguring Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence to 
accept deep and ongoing contestations as a matter of history and law would go a long 
ways towards achieving this aim. 
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Appendix A: Archival Research 
The archival research conducted for this dissertation focussed on two main geographies 
and time periods: York Factory, from 1670-1763 and the Mackenzie District, from 1800-
1827. My intention was to do enough archival work to consider if and how practices 
established in the early York Factory period transferred with the traders and the Company 
as it moved inland, west and north. 
I drew on research completed for my LLM Thesis. For that project, I reviewed York 
Factory trading post journals in approximately five year periods, alternating five years on, 
five years off and adjusting the length of that review period to follow ongoing events or 
particularly helpful record keepers (such as Isham). The intention was to observe regular 
patterns of interaction. 
For the dissertation, I reviewed additional correspondence records and sources regarding 
the early period and added materials from the Athabasca and Mackenzie Districts, in the 
first quarter of the 1800s. In addition, I reviewed some correspondence files in the 
government records for Treaty 11 from the RG 10 series. I also relied on published 
archival material, particularly traders' journals and letters. Lloyd Keith's published 
documents from the North West Company was particularly important to this research. 
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